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DISSENT, FREE SPEECH, AND THE
CONTINUING SEARCH FOR THE "CENTRAL
MEANING" OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.*
THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED:
A MEDITATION ON LAW,
RELIGION, AND LOYALTY. By Stephen L. Carter. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 167. Cloth, $20.50; paper,

$12.95.
DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA. By Steven

H. Shiffrin. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 204.
$29.95.
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only
the unanimity of the graveyard.'

Since the Warren Court's expansive construction of the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment, there has been no shortage of
legal scholarship aimed at justifying the remarkably broad protections
afforded the freedom of speech under landmark cases such as
Brandenburgv. Ohio,2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' and Virginia
State Board of Pharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.4
At the same time, in recent years, a growing chorus of free speech
skeptics have made their voices heard.' These legal scholars have
* Associate Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law. B.A. 1987, M.A.
(Philosophy) 1987, Emory; J.D. 1991, LL.M. 1991, Duke. - Ed. I would like to thank Professors Frank Bowman, Dan Cole, Jeff Cooper, Kenny Crews, Michael Heise, Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, Betsy Wilbom Malloy, Gerry Moohr, David Orentlicher, Gary Spitko, Jim
Torke, and Brad Wendel for offering very helpful comments on an earlier version of this
Review. As always, any errors or omissions are mine alone.
1. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,641 (1943).
2. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
5. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIs?:
HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); STANLEY FISH,

THERE'S No SucH THING As FREE SPEECH: AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too (1994);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS
THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1993); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Charles R.
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questioned why a commitment to freedom of expression should dis-

place other (constitutional) values such as equality, community, or
citizenship.
This spirited challenge to the Warren Court's free speech orthodoxy has given rise to a kind of free speech counter-Reformation. Defenders of the free speech tradition have joined the fray, challenging
those who question the value of racist, sexist, or homophobic expression.6
The debate has taken place against the backdrop of a longstanding
controversy about the "central meaning"7 of the First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause. Since Justices Holmes and Brandeis began forcefully applying the Free Speech Clause to provide broad protection to
political speech activity,8 scholars have been deeply divided over the

precise rationale for according speech protection when the speech imposes significant social costs on the general community. Classic theories of free speech, such as Alexander Meiklejohn's "democratic deliberation" thesis,9 have competed with newer rationales for protecting
free expression, such as the pursuit of truth, self-realization, or perLawrence III, IfHe Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, PublicResponse to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
6. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New FirstAmendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (1992); Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1996); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus: A Modest Proposal?,1990 DUKE L.J. 484; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1009 (1996) [hereinafter Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review]; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Workplace Harassment,39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992).
7. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "the CentralMeaning of
the FirstAmendment," 1964 SUP. Cr. REV. 191.
8. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court formally
embraced the Holmes/Brandeis vision of the First Amendment in Brandenburgand has not
looked back since. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446-49 (1969). But see Meritor Say.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that Title VII permits a cause of action
based on a "hostile work environment," an environment that might be created and maintained through speech activity); Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal.
1999) (upholding an injunction against manager's use of racist language, free speech objections notwithstanding); Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995).
9. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-

GOVERNMENT (1948) (arguing that speech should be protected only insofar as it facilitates
democratic deliberation within the community) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH];
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. Cr. REV. 245
[hereinafter Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment]. Harry Kalven continued the Meiklejohn
project, see Kalven, supra note 7, and Owen Fiss carries the torch today, articulating forcefully the democratic-deliberation theory of the Free Speech Clause, see OWEN M. FISS, THE
IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED:

FREEDOM OF

SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996) [hereinafter FiSS, LIBERALISM

DIVIDED]; Owen M. Fiss, Why the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987).
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sonal autonomy.10 Other scholars have suggested more practical rationales for protecting free expression, such as avoiding social disorder
by permitting disgruntled elements of the community to vent their
frustrations peacefully."
Two recent books, one by Professor Steven Shiffrin' 2 and the other
by Professor Stephen Carter,13 propose a renewed focus on protecting
dissent as the central value of the First Amendment. Both works posit
that the government's response to dissent should serve as the key to
evaluating the overall effectiveness of the Supreme Court's free
speech jurisprudence. Professor Shiffrin states his thesis as follows:
"[T]he First Amendment spotlights a different metaphor than the
marketplace of ideas or the richness of public debate; instead, it supports the American ideal of protecting and supporting dissent by putting dissenters at the center of the First Amendment tradition" (p.
128). Professor Carter sounds a similar theme arguing that "[c]ivic life
requires dissent because it requires differences of opinion in order to
spark the dialogues from which the community thrives and grows" (p.
16). Carter goes even further, positing that the legitimacy of a government's demand of loyalty from its citizens should be a function of
its treatment of those who dissent from its laws and policies: "[T]he
justice of a state is not measured merely by its authority's tolerance for
dissent, but also by its dissenters' tolerance for authority." 14
A dissent-based theory of free speech has a great deal of superficial appeal. After all, who could be against dissent in a society ostensibly dedicated to permitting freedom of speech? Moreover, the
Supreme Court of the United States has taken great pains to emphasize that facilitating political dissent is a core project of the Free
Speech Clause. 5 These observations notwithstanding, there are rea10. See, e.g., MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:. A CRmCAL ANALYSIS 1114 (1984); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.03, at 2-24, 2-25 (1994); Robert
Post, Equality and Autonomy in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence, 95 MIH. L. REV. 1517,
1525 (1997) (reviewing Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supranote 9).
11. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7
(1970); Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and the FirstAmendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915,949 (1978).
12. Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
13. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale Law Schdol.

14. P. 97; see also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ.877, 882-84 (1963) (arguing that the First Amendment should facilitate
broad-based participation in government decisionmaking and noting that "[o]nce one accepts the premise of the Declaration of Independence - that governments derive 'their just

powers from the consent of the governed' - it follows that the governed must, in order to
exercise their right of consent, have full freedom of expression both in forming individual
judgments and in forming the common judgment").
15. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414-20 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greennoss Builders, Inc., 472

U.S. 749, 758-60 (1985) (plurality opinion); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 680 (1972);
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sons for skepticism about the federal courts' ability to devise and enforce a viable dissent-based theory of free speech.
First, and perhaps most importantly, there are serious definitional
difficulties associated with determining whether or not speech constitutes "dissent." Speech that is hostile to the actions of one branch of
the government might be supportive of the actions of another.16 To a
large degree, "dissent" is in the eyes of the beholder. 7 As Professor
Richard Delgado has observed, "[a]lthough Shiffrin, to his great
credit, invented the dissent theory, neither he nor someone else comparably progressive will be able to dictate the manner in which courts
will apply it.'" 8 If citizens engaged in dissent have cause to fear being
marginalized by prosecutors and judges drawn from the majority culture, they would have even more cause to fear being silenced under a
regime that makes full First Amendment protection wholly contingent
on the goodwill of a state functionary possessing the discretion to apply or withhold a talismanic label.
In addition, the social costs of speech activity do not necessarily
track whether speech constitutes "dissent." Indeed, some of the most
potentially disruptive speech activity imaginable at least arguably constitutes dissent - activities such as shooting physicians who provide
abortion services or bombing federal facilities. 9 Less extreme examples of dissenting expressive conduct include flag burning or the
burning of draft cards." One need not even rely on expressive conduct to illustrate the point: Nazis in Skokie represent a kind of dissent, yet the nature and context of this speech activity impose very
high social costs on the community.21 The Supreme Court's rhetoric to
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971); West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,

319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310-11 (1940).
16. For example, a group of people protesting the Nixon administration's efforts to
avoid delivering Oval Office tape recordings to the Special Prosecutor were "dissenting"
from the Executive Branch's policies, but arguably, cheering on the federal judiciary. See
generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Whether such speech constitutes dissent depends on whether one views the question from the perspective of the Executive or
Judicial Branch of the federal government. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
18. Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the FirstAmendment, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 778, 784 (2000) (reviewing DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF
AMERICA).

19. To his credit, Professor Carter openly acknowledges that wholly unacceptable acts
of violence against the community arguably constitute a form of dissent. Pp. 60-61, 73-78,
81-84. Even when government may constitutionally regulate expressive conduct, it may do
so despite its communicative value and not because of it. See United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77, 381-82 (1968).
20. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (flag burning); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (draft card
burning).
21. See Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th
Cir. 1978), afg 477 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978); see also American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-30 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing the
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the contrary notwithstanding, much contemporary First Amendment
case law reflects direct cost/benefit analysis of proposed speech activity.? As Justice White once put the proposition,
it is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been ac-

cepted because it may be more appropriately generalized that within the
confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so over-

whelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no
process of case-by-case adjudication is required.P

It seems unlikely that the Justices would abandon such an approach in
favor of a more absolute protection for speech activity denominated
"dissent" (even if the definitional difficulties could be overcome,
which is doubtful).
These objections to a dissent-based theory of the First Amendment do not, however, undermine the utility of Shiffrin's or Carter's
efforts. Shiffrin's project constitutes a sustained effort to bring the
free speech apostates (generally scholars of the Left) back into full
communion with the free speech tradition. This is an important project and should spark debate between the free speech doubters and believers. If the Roman Catholic Church and the Lutheran Church can
resolve their theological differences and create the promise of a return
to full communion, Shiffrin is right to push for a reconciliation between free speech traditionalists and the free speech critics.
Professor Carter's emphasis on dissent serves a very different project: empowering religious minorities within the larger political community. His work constitutes a sustained plea for more secular citizens and policy makers to take seriously the concerns of religiously
motivated dissenters.' To the extent he suggests that the community,
social costs of speech activity), summarily affirmed, 1001 U.S. 475 (1986); DELGADO &
STEFANCIC, supra note 5, at 8-10,32-37,49-56,126-28.
22. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-54 (1983) (balancing employee speech on
matters of public concern against the cost of disruption in a government workplace); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509-14 (1969) (balancing student
speech rights against the risk of "material and substantial" disruptions in the school);
O'Brien,391 U.S. at 376-82 (balancing burden on expressive conduct against achievement of
"important" or "substantial" government objective via a narrow tailoring requirement); see
also Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on CategoricalApproachesto Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 671 (1983); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech, Shielding Children, and TranscendingBalancing,1997 SUP. Cr. REv. 141.
23. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982); see also Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLTJM. L. REV. 449, 485 (1985) ("Of
course, ad hoe balancing has long been an integral feature of first amendment doctrine for
many types of disputes.").
24. See Gustav Niebuhr, Vatican Settles A HistoricIssue With Lutherans, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 1998, at Al; Peter Steinfels, After Fourand a Half Centuries,Lutheran and Catholic
Officials Affirm a Consensus On an Issue That Sparked the ProtestantReformation, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1999, at A13; Charles Trueheart, Faiths Heal Ancient Rifts Over Faith:
Catholics,Lutherans End DoctrinalDispute, WASH. POST, Nov. 1,1999, at Al.
25. See infra section III.C & Part IV.
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always and unfailingly, owes religious extremists a careful and concerned audience, he overstates the case of religiously motivated dissenters. On the other hand, to the extent that religiously motivated
dissenters seek breathing room from the civil state in order to honor
the dictates of conscience, Professor Carter offers a powerful argument for listening to what the dissenters have to say.
I.

DISSENT AS IDEOLOGY: DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE ROLE OF
DISSENT IN PROGRESSIVE POLITICS

Professor Shiffrin's work represents an effort to give leftists and
progressives - often free speech critics - a reason to rethink their
hostility to the free speech project. He offers both practical and philosophical reasons for the doubters to return to the one true church:
(1) "Like it or not, the free speech principle is here to stay" (p. 129).
(2) "[T]here is insufficient reason to suppose that the left acts against its
interests in supporting the free speech principle even assuming that
the principle were laissez-faire.... To the extent that leftist politics
depends on social movements and grassroots protests and activities,

the free speech principle is vital" (p. 125).
For reasons that I will develop more fully below, it is highly unlikely
that the free speech critics will agree to rejoin the free speech congregation. Moreover, free speech traditionalists are likely to balk at the
compromises that Shiffrin proposes as an incentive for the free speech
critics to renounce their heresies and embrace the free speech principle.
A. Some DefinitionalProblems with Shiffrin's Vision of Dissent
Before one evaluates Shiffrin's larger, and ambitious project, one
must first meet and overcome two practical difficulties with Shiffrin's
rather unusual definition of "dissent." The first is definitional and the
second is operational.26
1.

Defining Dissent

Shiffrin defines dissent, in large part, by reference to the identity of
the speaker. "By dissent, I mean speech that criticizes existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities" (p. xi). Even
Soviet Russia ostensibly embraced constructive self-criticism (samokritika);27 accordingly one would be hard pressed to object strenuously
26. Frankly, these objections would likely apply to any dissent-based theory of free
speech. In this sense, then, my objections are not unique to Shiffrin's theory.
27. See ELLEN PROPPER MICKIEWICZ, MEDIA AND THE RUSSIAN PUBLIc 49, 67-68

(1981).
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to this baseline proposition, (i.e., so far so good). Of course definitional issues abound with this definition of "dissent" because the concept is largely relational. Thus, almost immediately storm clouds begin to form on the horizon: "Commercial advertisers, however, are
not dissenters" (p. xii). Tobacco advertising, in particular, merits no
special solicitude under Shiffrin's dissent-based vision of the First
Amendment. Thus, it would seem that, under Shiffrin's theory, large
corporate entities, such as tobacco companies, cannot engage in dissent even if they oppose the views of either the government or the
general community. Dissent, for Shiffrin, appears to be the exclusive
prerogative of disempowered cultural minorities who are victimized
by the hierarchy and racism of the contemporary United States. Simply put, corporations need not apply. Corporate speech might have
some communicative value, "but it does not deserve the full value that
should be afforded to more classic instances of dissent."
2.

Excluding Speakers Based on Viewpoint

One might think that reactionary groups, like the Ku Klux Klan or
John Birch Society, would fit the "more classic" paradigm of dissent.
One would be mistaken. Although "[t]he Ku Klux Klan would also
claim to be dissenters, social outcasts who challenge the foundations of
the system... the Klan arguably silences those who would otherwise
be dissenters" (p. xii). Accordingly, "a focus on dissent in this context
would not offer clear-cut guidance - which perhaps helps to explain
why many see the hate speech issue as a difficult problem" (p. xii).
Racist dissent "should be not a case for celebrating our glory as a nation but an occasion for shame" (p. xiii).
3.

Dissentin Service of Ideology

As this preliminary analysis shows, Professor Shiffrin's conception
of dissent is rather one-sided. The flag-burning Gregory Johnson presents a paradigm of dissent; he is entitled to the broadest protections
afforded under the Free Speech Clause (pp. 10-11). This is so because
"[i]f we must have a 'central meaning' of the First Amendment, we
28. P. xii. Professor Shiffrin does not attempt to distinguish between corporations engaged in commercial speech and noncommercial speech: "I think it better to make decisions
about the general category without resort to ad hoe decisions within it." P. 41. Theoretically, one could distinguish between corporations attempting to sell a product and corporations attempting to contribute to the process of democratic deliberation. Compare First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Beliotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating a statute that prohibited
corporations from making expenditures to influence voters) with Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (invalidating a regulation that
banned a utility from advertising to promote use of electricity). Although the Supreme
Court has recognized this distinction, Professor Shiffrin does not place any reliance upon it
when developing his dissent-based model of free speech. See, e.g., p. 119.

1620

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1613

should recognize that the dissenters - those who attack existing customs, habits, traditions, and authorities - stand at the center of the
First Amendment and not at its periphery" (p. 10). Once one moves
from a disaffected leftist burning a flag to a disaffected rightist
preaching race hatred, however, Shiffrin's commitment to dissent
seems considerably weaker.
For Professor Shiffrin, dissent serves the ends of progressive politics by empowering cultural and political minorities to challenge "injustice." "The dissent model assumes that in large-scale societies
powerful interest groups and self-seeking politicians and bureaucrats
are unavoidable" (p. 17). In consequence, "[d]issenters and the dialogue that follows will always be necessary" (p. 17). "The value of dissent, then, in this context is not that it fosters individual development
or self-realization, or even that it exposes injustice and brings about
change" (p. 18). Rather, it is a kind of "cultural glue" that binds the
political community together. This is all well and good until we learn
that this "cultural glue" does not provide any adhesive value to rightwingers and corporate entities that are engaged in speech activity opposing official government policies that enjoy broad-based community
support.
In the context of commercial speech, Professor Shiffrin submits
that "[c]ommercial advertisers are not dissenters" (p. 41). Because
commercial advertisers "encourage people to consume products that
cause needless death and suffering" (p. 48), they cannot assume the
mantle of dissent.29 Here, we see the strongly content-laden conceptualization of dissent that Professor Shiffrin proposes:
Tobacco advertising is not an instance of the individual striking out
against the current. Instead, it is an example of the powerful influencing
the market rather than one of dissent by the less powerful. Tobacco advertising is no part of a social practice that challenges unjust hierarchies
with the prospect of promoting progressive change. Thus, it may have
some First Amendment value in the dissent mold, but it does not deserve
the full value that should be afforded to more classic instances of dissent.
[pp. 41-42]

29. Some of these conclusions appear related to Professor Shiffrin's assumption that
government enjoys a relatively free hand in regulating commercial speech. Pp. 33-37. For
better or worse, Professor Shiffrin's efforts at prognostication have failed. Although it is
true that Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), and Edge

Broad. Co. v. FCC,509 U.S. 418 (1993), supported some of his assertions about government
regulation of commercial speech, more recent cases indicate quite clearly that the tide has
turned in favor of affording commercial speech remarkably broad First Amendment protection. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999); City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). With each passing term, the Justices seem to be moving closer and closer to the position that commercial speech enjoys the
same measure of First Amendment protection as noncommercial speech. See Alex Kozinski
& Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of CommercialSpeech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627 (1990).
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This is a remarkable limitation on the scope of dissent, not just for
commercial or corporate speakers, but for any person or entity whose

speech fails to "challenge[] unjust hierarchies with the prospect of
promoting progressive social change" (p. 42). This ideologically
bound definition of dissent invites legislators and judges alike to pick
free speech winners and losers based on both the identity of the

speaker and the viewpoint of the speaker.30

Unfortunately, this is not an aberrational statement. A few pages

later, Shiffrin reports that "[t]he dissent perspective would argue that
policies, prescriptions, and privileges of the elite need to be challenged
on a regular basis by enough people to make a difference" (p. 45).
Again, Shiffrin is openly associating dissent with a particular set of
partisan or ideological outcomes. It is difficult to take such a theory

very seriously, for it openly invites government censorship of disfavored speakers (i.e., "elites," corporate entities such as tobacco com-

panies, and Neanderthal right-wingers spouting racist messages).3 Indeed, this model of the dissent perspective has more in common with

contemporary free speech jurisprudence in the People's Republic of
China32 than in the United States:

30. Ironically, Professor Shiffrin faults Professor Owen Fiss and other devotees of Professor Alexander Meiklejohn's democratic deliberation model of free speech for inviting
judicial personnel to make subjective decisions about whether speech activity encourages or
facilitates democratic deliberation. Pp. 19-22. Shiffrin argues that, under the Fiss model,
"[j]udges would be deciding on an ad hoc basis which issues need to be discussed on the national agenda and which have been comparatively marginalized." P. 20. Yet, if judges face
such difficulties in deciding whether speech enhances or debases democratic deliberation,
are they going to have any easier time deciding whether particular speech activity constitutes
"dissent"? Moreover, Shiffrin's exclusion of corporate and right-wing speakers from his
model of "dissent" embraces the exact sort of judicial subjectivity that he faults Fiss for embracing. Professor Shiffrin cannot have it both ways: either judges are capable of fairly exercising discretion, or they are not.
31. Indeed, if taken to its logical extreme, under Professor Shiffrin's dissent theory, the
Republican Party and its candidates might not merit the broadest protections of the First
Amendment to the extent that the party's platform fails to "challenge unjust hierarchies" (at
least as defined or understood by Professor Shiffrin). After all, the Republican Party platform opposes abortion on demand, supports minimalist government, opposes the welfare
state, and generally supports tax relief for corporations and upper-income taxpayers - all
policies unlikely to fit Shiffrin's definition of "dissent." Were the federal courts to embrace
Professor Shiffrin's dissent theory, to the extent one opposes change, insufficiently advocates
"progressive" change, or supports "hierarchy" of "the elite," one could claim only a reduced
share in the protections afforded by the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.
32. See XIANFA [Constitution] art. 3 (1982) ("Citizens of the People's Republic of China
enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration."); id. art. 51 ("The exercise by citizens ...of their freedoms... may not infringe
upon the interests of the state, of society, or of the collective."); cf Erik Eckhohn, A Quiet
Roar: China's Leadership Feels Threatened By a Sect Seeking Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1999, at A10; Seth Faison, Followers of Chinese Sect Defend Its SpiritualGoals,N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 1999, at A4; Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Reportedly Detains2,000 Members of Falun
Gong Sect, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at A14; Cindy Sui, Falun Gong Holds Jail Hunger
Strike; Sect Members Resist China'sCrackdown, WASH. POST, Feb. 15,2000, at A17.
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[w]hen legislatures seek to regulate the speech of the powerful on

grounds of political equality, a dissent perspective would not suggest that
the courts should pull out a rubber stamp. On the other hand, courts
should be generous in assessing such regulations because the legislature
seeks to advance important constitutional goals. [p. 47]

Thus, dissent is the exclusive prerogative of a speaker "challenging the
insensitive exercise of power by a person she believes is carrying hierarchy to excess," and "not a corporation hawking its wares or seeking
to dominate the election process" (p. 48).
This, of course, begs contemporary political reality. Tobacco companies are in full retreat, and smokers are an increasingly marginalized
and disfavored subgroup within the community. California has enacted taxes on the sale of tobacco products, with a portion of the revenues generated used to fund advertising campaigns aimed at destroying the market for tobacco products.3 This principle of "tax and
destroy" raises serious general First Amendment problems; if government may tax an entity to subsidize government speech aimed at its
ultimate destruction, government essentially can monopolize the marketplace of ideas. 4 A tobacco company engaged in speech activity
protesting this arrangement seems squarely in the role of dissent and,
moreover,
would be defending important generic free speech princi35
ples.

33. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 30,121-30,130 (West 1994) (also known as "Proposition 99"); Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 806 P.2d 1360, 1362-67
(Cal. 1991) (upholding constitutionality of Proposition 99); see also RICHARD KLUGER,
ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETrES WAR 703-05 (1996); Paul A.
LeBel, "Of Deaths Put On By Cunning and Forced Cause": Reality Bites the Tobacco
Industry, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 635-47 (1997) (reviewing STANTON A. GLANTZ ET
AL., THE CIGARErE PAPERS (1996), PHILLIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN (1996), and
KLUGER, supra). Massachusetts and Arizona followed California's lead, enacting schemes
taxing tobacco products and using the funds to provide health care services and also advertising campaigns aimed at driving smoking out of existence. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
42-3251 to -3253 (West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 2xx (Supp. 1999); ch. 64C, § 7C
(1998).
34. See EMERSON, supra note 11, at 697-716; MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983); John E.
Nowak, Using the Press Clause to Limit Government Speech, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1988);
Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 589-95 (1980); William W. Van
Alstyne, The FirstAmendment and the Suppression of Warmongering Propagandain the
United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 530 (1966); Edward
H. Ziegler, Jr., Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of OfficialPartisanship,
21 B.C. L. REV. 578, 614-17 (1980); Jay S. Bloom, Comment, UnconstitutionalGovernment
Speech, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 815 (1978); Note, The Constitutionalityof Municipal Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns,93 HARV. L. REV. 535 (1980); Mark V. Tushnet,
Talking to Each Other: Reflections on Yudoj's When Government Speaks, 1984 WIS. L.
REV. 129 (book review); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). But cf
Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990) (stating that government officials can legitimately be expected to express the views of the majority of their constituents).
35. See Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 589 (1996); see also Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good For
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Turning to racist speech, Professor Shiffrin straightforwardly rejects hate speech as an integral member of the dissent family. "In my
view, the argument that First Amendment values (such as truth,
autonomy, self-expression, and liberty) dictate that racist speech cannot be regulated is ultimately indefensible" (p. 50). Given the exclusion of commercial speech from the universe of "dissent," this is
hardly a surprising move. Shiffrin ultimately questions the utility of
hate speech regulation, not because such regulations violate the First
Amendment, but rather because "the racist character of our society"
probably would make such regulations ineffective at protecting the interests of racial and cultural minorities (pp. 50, 80-86).
In Shiffrin's view, hate speech should not be protected "to safeguard the liberty of the speaker or because it is valuable" (p. 85). Be-

cause "dissent" is intrinsically valuable and lies at the heart of the First
Amendment, a careful reader must conclude that hate speech, in Shiffrin's view, does not constitute "dissent." The government should not
proscribe such speech only because "American society may be so
thoroughly racist that nontargeted racist speech regulations would be
counterproductive" (p. 85). Shiffrin takes pains to emphasize that if
his cost/benefit analysis proves to be wrong, "I would presently support punitive measures against public instances of racial vilification
even when not targeted against individuals."36
Plainly, Professor Shiffrin's viewpoint-based definition of dissent
leads to some deeply counterintuitive results: although both Ward
Connerly and Clarence Thomas are members of a historically disempowered racial minority, they arguably are not engaged in "dissent"
when they take positions that do not combat "injustice" or "challenge7
unjust hierarchies" (at least as some would define those terms)?
Likewise, although David Duke and Matthew Hale espouse racist
viewpoints rejected by most citizens, 8 they too are not engaged in dissent because their speech potentially silences disempowered minorities. Presumably, minorities who espouse racist or anti-Semitic viewpoints, such as Louis Farrakhan or Leonard Jeffries, also are not
"dissenters."
General Motors: CorporateSpeech and the Theory of Free Expression,66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 235 (1998).
36. P. 85. In addition, Professor Shiffrin endorses providing tort remedies to the victims
of targeted hate speech. Pp. 80-87, 161 n.161.
37. Of course, Mr. Connerly and Justice Thomas undoubtedly would claim that their
professional efforts are aimed precisely at "challenging unjust hierarchies" and facilitating
"progressive" change. Professor Shiffrin's strongly left-leaning definitions of "progress" and
"challenging hierarchy" are contestable and undoubtedly would be contested if his dissent
theory ever gained any ground in the federal courts.
38. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text; see also Christi Parsons, White Separatist Denied Law License, CEi. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1999, § N, at 1 (describing the Illinois Bar Association's decision to refuse admission to Matthew Hale because of his support of racist viewpoints and organizations, including the World Church of the Creator).
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Historically, the Supreme Court has placed viewpoint neutrality at
the very core of the First Amendment. 39 Government attempts to take

sides based on a speaker's position on a given issue of the day are presumptively unconstitutional.4"

Even when speech is otherwise pro-

scribable, government may not pick and choose among speakers based

on viewpoint.41 Shiffrin's vision of the First Amendment does not appear to be viewpoint neutral, because a speaker's ability to claim the
full protection of the First Amendment is, at least in some circumstances, contingent on the substance of the speaker's message. Nor is
his definition of dissent speaker neutral - a speaker's characteristics

might define whether or not she (or it) can lay claim to the strongest
protections of the First Amendment. For example, no matter what the

issue, commercial enterprises cannot engage in dissent.42
This certainly represents a new twist on First Amendment theory.
Governments historically have cared less about the identity of a
speaker than the content of a speaker's message. Hence, in the early
part of the twentieth century, a person advocating the necessity of a

proletarian revolution faced official censorship and punishment for
advocating such ideas. 43 More recently, those espousing views sympathetic to Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism have faced persecution for
their ideological commitments.' The identity of the speaker was quite

39. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414-16 (1989); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-71 (1982) (plurality
opinion); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959); Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,271-73 (1951).
40. See Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1970); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S 116, 132, 136-37
(1966); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 1113, 167-71,239-40 (1993).
41. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 512 n.20 (1996); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 878-80
(1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
42. Consider, for example, Benetton's recent and controversial advertising campaign
featuring death row inmates. See Stuart Elliot, Benetton Ads Offer Tour of Death Row, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 1999, at C8; Hank Stuever, Radical Chic: Benetton Takes On the Death
Penalty, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2000, § C, at 1. Although Benetton undoubtedly wishes to
sell clothing, it is difficult to understand why this speech activity should not be deemed "dissent." Cf p. 41 ("There is a serious question whether judges should be asked to make ad
hoc decisions about whether particular advertisements are or are not dissenting, I think it
better to make decisions about the general category without resort to ad hoc decisions within
it.").
43. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919). Even celebrated labor leaders fell victim to the government's censorial appetites.
See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
44. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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irrelevant to the analysis; membership in a particular social or cultural
minority would not affect the outcome of a case. Eleanor Roosevelt
stood on the same First Amendment ground as Marcus Garvey or J.
Edgar Hoover.
A speaker-based theory of the First Amendment seems deeply
problematic. As a practical matter, if the United States is as profoundly racist as Shiffrin suggests (pp. xii-xiii, 76-87), it is difficult to
imagine police, prosecutors, courts, and jurors applying a speakerbased vision of the First Amendment in a just fashion (although some
might suggest that the task itself is inherently unjust). One might
think that, assuming Shiffrin's assertions about the unremittingly racist
nature of the contemporary United States are true, the opportunity to
make vindication of speech rights contingent on the identity of the
speaker would leave minority culture speakers less well off than they
are under current First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the project of viewpoint neutrality is meant to ensure that unpopular speakers
are not censored simply because the speaker's message offends the
dominant forces within the community. Speech regulations must be
viewpoint neutral precisely because police, prosecutors, judges, and
jurors are highly likely to hold strong preexisting opinions about the
proper ordering of the community. To counter this trend, reviewing
courts require the government to censor all speakers or censor none.
Moreover, with respect to public property, the government may censor speakers only through viewpoint neutral, reasonable time, place,
and manner regulations4 5 and, with respect to private property, the
government may proscribe speech only when the speech raises a clear
and present danger of imminent lawlessness. 4
B.

More GeneralProblems with a Dissent-BasedModel
of FreeSpeech

Even if one were to reject Shiffrin's troubling definition of dissent,
a more generalized dissent-based model of the First Amendment
would still present serious operational difficulties. Whether speech
constitutes dissent is a highly subjective matter. Suppose, for example,
that a street protestor supports a national missile defense but opposes
the deployment of the Patriot missile? Is such a person engaged in
dissent against the government's defense policies, or is such a person
effectively supporting the government? Undoubtedly, different people would characterize the speech in divergent ways, depending on

45. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171,177-78 (1983); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,271 (1951); Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
46. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,448-49 (1969).
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whether they viewed the Patriot missile as an essential component of
the government's defense program.
It really should not matter whether the speech effectively supports
or opposes contemporary government defense policy. If the speech
relates to an issue of public concern about which the government must
establish and enforce a policy, then the speech should enjoy the most
robust protection that the First Amendment can afford.47 Judges
should not attempt to engage in a preliminary characterization of the
speech as "dissent" or "non-dissent" to determine the burden on the
government in suppressing the speech activity. 8

The problem of identifying dissent is infinitely more difficult than
this preliminary analysis would suggest. The "government" is not a
monolithic entity. For example, the Reagan Administration opposed
the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade49 and consistently urged
the Supreme Court to overrule this precedent. On the anniversary of

Roe, President Reagan regularly spoke, via telephone, at a pro-life
rally held in Lafayette Park, directly across the street from the White

House.50 The protestors opposed the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe,
viewing it as a condonation of murder, a position embraced by the Executive Branch of the federal government (through the Department of
Justice and the President himself).5 1 Were these pro-life protestors
47. See MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 9, at 22-27; Emerson, supra note 14, at
882-86; Kalven, supra note 7, at 205-13.
48. One might suggest that any speech the government seeks to suppress constitutes dissent. Although this definitional fix has some superficial appeal, it really would not solve the
problem. Government regulations regarding the use of public property for speech activity
are often generic- whether one can use a particular park or street for speech activity is not
contingent on the message one seeks to propagate. See Clark v. Community For Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). Accordingly, limitations on speech activity might well
apply to persons wishing to support some aspect of government policy.
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. See Ruth Marcus & Victoria Churchville, Antiabortion March Nears; ProtestorsArrive By the Busload,WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1985, at Al; Ruth Marcus & Steven Heilbronner,
"Reagan to Address Abortion Foes, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1985, at Al; Robin Toner, Rally
Against Abortion Hears Pledge of Support By Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1987, at A10
[hereinafter Toner, Rally Against Abortion]; Robin Toner, Reagan Exhorts Foes of Abortion
at CapitalRally, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1986, at D25 [hereinafter Toner, Reagan Exhorts]. After succeeding President Reagan, President Bush continued the Reagan Administration's
abortion policies. See Steven V. Roberts, "Nominee of Bush's Is Said to Oppose Banning
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1989, at Al:
Mr. Bush pleased opponents of abortion today when he spoke by telephone to a rally protesting the Roe v. Wade decision and made one of his strongest statements to date on the
highly emotional issue. "I know there are people of good will who disagree, but after years
of sober and serious reflection on the issue, this is what I think.... I think the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade was wrong and should be overturned."
51. At various times, President Reagan vowed to "end this national tragedy," Toner,
Rally Against Abortion, supra note 50, and pledged to "continue to work together with
members of Congress to overturn the tragedy of Roe v. Wade," Toner, Reagan Exhorts, supra note 50. Moreover, Reagan emphasized that the Executive Branch had decreased the
incidence of abortion by "restrict[ing] the use of Federal funds to perform abortion" and by
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engaged in dissent, or merely supporting the position of the federal
government? The answer depends on whether or not one views the
question from the perspective of the federal judiciary rather than the
Oval Office.
Undoubtedly, protecting dissent is an important function of the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
routinely has indicated that this is so 2 Accordingly, Shiffrin's desire
to build a free speech framework on the construct of dissent is perfectly understandable. Given the definitional and operational difficulties, however, dissent is better protected through a project of strict
viewpoint neutrality.
Because of the potential for bias in any system of free speech protection contingent on the characterization of speech by government
officials, requiring that all speech be treated equally serves as a far
better means of effectively protecting dissent than a theory that invites
would-be government censors to make the protection of speech to
some degree contingent on a label easily withheld because of antipathy toward the message (or the messenger). Prohibiting the government from officially taking sides on questions of the day and then silencing all opposition best ensures that contrary voices are heard.
Take, for example, anti-abortion protestors. It is difficult to
imagine a viable dissent-based model of the First Amendment that
would not encompass this group. Survey data show that a clear majority of U.S. citizens believe abortion should be legal, at least in some
circumstances.53 At the same time, a substantial plurality of citizens
view unborn fetuses as possessing personhood from conception and,
therefore, the destruction of a fetus as a form of murder.54 President
Clinton and Congress, unsurprisingly, have sided with the majority,
enacting laws that, as applied by some federal and state courts, severely restrict the ability of anti-abortion protestors to engage in
peaceful anti-abortion protests outside abortion clinics.55 The federal
"den[ying] Government funds to organizations overseas that perform or promote abortion."
Toner, Rally Against Abortion,supra note 50.
52. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
53. See Carey Goldberg & Janet Elder, Public Still Backs Abortion But Wants Limits,
Poll Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at Al; Andrew M. Greeley, How Do Catholics Vote?:
Not As Pawns of the Church, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1984, at E21. Father Greeley reports
that even clear majorities of Roman Catholics do not oppose abortion under all circumstances. See id.
54. See Goldberg & Elder, supra note 53; see also Pamela Constable & John W.
Fountain, Abortion Foes in Grim Profusion: ProtestMarks 25th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade
Decision, WASH. POST, Jan. 23,1998, at B1.
55. See, e.g., Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat.
694 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994)). Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have sustained the Access Act against First Amendment challenges. See American Life League, Inc.
v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55

F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).
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judiciary generally has blessed this legislation and endorsed the creative use of injunctions to restrain protestors who are communicating
messages to women attempting to enter and leave abortion service
providers.56 In short, the full power of the federal government has
been brought to bear against pro-life, anti-abortion protestors who
wish to demonstrate outside abortion clinics.
Whether or not one agrees with the pro-life movement's assertions
about the nature of unborn human fetuses, these protestors are plainly
engaged in a form of dissent. Moreover, this dissent is highly unpopular, in part because of the crude methods often utilized by the
anti-abortion protestors (e.g., the use of graphic depictions of aborted
fetuses and other ghastly props in making their point). Shiffrin never
mentions anti-abortion protestors as a model of dissent. Indeed, given
his speaker- and viewpoint-based limitations on what constitutes "dissent," it is far from certain that they would even meet his definition 7
Of course, one might object that it is also far from certain that the
protestors will fare any better under the viewpoint-neutrality project.
A law that prohibits all persons from engaging in speech activity
within so many feet of an abortion clinic restricts the speech activities
of all persons without regard to their viewpoint on abortion. This ignores the reality that pro-life demonstrators are far more likely to engage in protest activity outside abortion clinics than pro-choice activists. The facially neutral restriction cuts more deeply against one side
of the debate, and does so quite intentionally in consideration of the
rights of those seeking to enter and leave family planning clinics. 53
This does not demonstrate the failure of the viewpoint-neutrality
project so much as the failure of the federal judiciary to apply First
Amendment principles to a group of very unpopular protestors who
engage in discourse that is highly offensive to many persons within the
community. In any event, it does not seem likely that anti-abortion
protestors would fare any better under a free speech regime vesting
56. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519
U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 479-88 (1988); Planned Parenthood of the Columbialvillamette, Inc. v.
American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999); see also Lawson v.
Murray, 119 S. Ct. 387 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of cert.); Williams v. Planned
Parenthood of Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 1133 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of

cert.); Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of cert.).
57. Suppose that the anti-abortion protestors were all heterosexual, upper-middle class,

caucasian males, employed by a non-profit corporation whose officers oppose abortion on
demand (for example, priests and lay members of the Roman Catholic Church). Given that
this group does not suffer the ill effects of the pervasive racism and patriarchy Shiffrin believes to plague the contemporary United States, a district court judge utilizing Shiffrin's dissent theory might well deny the protestors the full protection of the First Amendment.

58. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictionsof Speech Because of Its Content: The
Peculiar Use of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 100-15 (1978) (arguing

that subject matter restrictions, although facially neutral, often mask official antipathy toward particular messages and speakers and, therefore, should be viewed skeptically).
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judges with the ability to pick and choose speakers based on either the
content of their messages or the demographic and economic makeup
of their groups.
C. Shiffrin's Defense and Its Shortcomings
Shiffrin anticipates the objection that his theory is viewpoint, and
perhaps speaker based: "To be sure, some might accuse my analysis
of tracking my political preferences too closely, so that left-wing dissenters get protected while people I do not like (corporations and
right-wingers) do not" (p. 129). This disclaimer appears on the penultimate page of the book and scarcely recalibrates the preceding 128
pages, in which Shiffrin consistently defines "dissent" in terms of the
ideological perspective of the speaker: dissent constitutes speech activity by the less powerful challenging the more powerful to redress
"injustice" (rather a value-laden concept, not to put too fine a point on
the matter) (pp. xi-xiii, 10-12, 17-18, 20, 41-42, 45, 47-48, 75-76, 80, 85,
91-93, 112, 120). Having consistently defined the free speech project
in value-laden, ideological terms, a disclaimer on the next to the last
page really does not present much of a counterweight.
Nevertheless, Professor Shiffrin maintains: "In an important
sense, however, this accusation is wrongheaded. Rules under my approach are fashioned to protect dissent without regard to the politics
of the dissenters" (p. 129). This simply is not so, at least with respect
to openly racist speakers like Matthew Hale and the World Church of
the Creator:
Because both aggressors and victims can be characterized, with some accuracy, as dissenters, the dissent story underscores the difficulty of the
First Amendment status of racist speech. On the one hand, the dissent
perspective seeks to protect those with popularly disdained views and, in
an important respect, this includes those who publicly express racist
views. On the other hand, the dissent perspective seeks to assure that
those who are out of power or lower in a hierarchy have the means to
protest their status and to combat the inevitable abuses of power by
higher-ups. A regime that is blind to the importance of assuring that disadvantaged groups are not intimidated will contain, as its status quo, substantial corruption and abuse. [p. 77]
Plainly, Shiffrin is saying that Matthew Hale and David Duke are
not entitled to the same level of free speech protection as Jesse
Jackson or Hillary Rodham Clinton. Just in case there might be doubt
about this, Shiffrin later emphasizes that "my contention should be
clear. I am not arguing that racist speech should be protected to safeguard the liberty of the speaker or because it is valuable" (p. 85). As
to the Ku Klux Klan, for instance, "the Klan says in public what many
millions of white individuals think or come close to thinking in private" (p. xii), hence the Klan's message is, at best, a redundancy.
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Moreover, the Klan "silences those who would otherwise be dissent-

ers" (p. xii). In consequence, "a focus on dissent in this context would
not offer clear-cut guidance" (p. xii), meaning that the Klan's speech
activities do not constitute "dissent" for purposes of Professor
Shiffrin's theory of the Free Speech Clause.

Nor is Professor Shiffrin's objection to censoring racist speech related to "a chilling effect in the marketplace of ideas (though some
marginally valuable speech could be lost); nor.., the vagueness of
working out standards case by case (though vagueness is of course not
a virtue)" (p. 85). Thus, dissenters who oppose workplace speech

regulations, or affirmative action programs, or equal civil or political
rights for racial minorities are outside Shiffrin's dissent-based model of
the First Amendment - their opposition to the existing status quo

may be discounted, because it is offered in support of a political
agenda inconsistent with Shiffrin's notions of redressing "injustice."
Indeed, such speech can be seen as seeking to increase the frequency

of racial injustice in the United States.
Racist dissent merits protection only because efforts to eradicate

such speech through government regulation might backfire. Shiffrin
tells us that "[i]f I thought such regulation would be effective on balance in combating racism, I would presently support punitive measures against public instances of racial vilification even when not tar-

geted against individuals" (p. 85). He limits this proposal only by
noting that he would abandon this position if "[p]eople of color...
think that the tangible benefits of deterrence and the symbolic importance of this legislation outweigh the speculative possibilities of nondeterrence, evasion, and increased racial hostility; that, in short, the
advantages of taking a stand outweigh the costs."59

Given Shiffrin's absolute exclusion of racist speech from his concept of "dissent," one must conclude that, his assertion to the contrary
notwithstanding, his theory of free speech is viewpoint-based. A
viewpoint-neutral, dissent-based theory of the First Amendment
59. P. 85. One wonders how a federal district court judge would go about ascertaining
the answer to this question. After all, it seems doubtful that all members of a given racial
minority group would share identical views on the desirability of hate speech regulation such a proposition is highly essentialist. See Carter, p. 69 ("Now, you might have noticed my
use of the term 'black community.' Let me make clear that I do not claim - and I do not
believe - that there exists an identifiable set of black 'meanings,' as there often is, for example, in a religious community; that is, I do not believe in the existence of such a thing as
the 'black point of view.' "). Moreover, it also seems likely that different racial minority
groups might have different attitudes about hate speech regulation. Does Shiffrin mean
that, if a bare majority of a given racial group supported hate speech regulation, it should be
deemed both constitutional and desirable? What about those who dissent from this point of
view within the minority group? The problem seems hopelessly complex and, therefore, the
suggestion that government simply should defer to the wishes of racial minorities is not particularly helpful. Cf Carter, p. 69 ("So I am not in that sense an essentialist, and I quiver
whenever smart professors who should know better assert that there is a unique 'black perspective' (which they, of course, are uniquely able to identify).").
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would extend the strongest protections of the Free Speech Clause to
all speech in opposition to existing government programs and policies
even if the opposition seems terribly wrongheaded, misguided, or
hate-inspired. Such dissent merits protection not because the general
community derives substantial benefits from these proposals, but because a government empowered to silence racist dissenters is equally
empowered to silence progressive dissenters. 6°
Indeed, given Shiffrin's repeated assertion that "American society
may be so thoroughly racist that nontargeted racist speech regulations
would be counterproductive" (p. 85), not to mention his earlier asser-

tion that "our country is racist to the core" (p. xiii), one wonders why
he would trust the presumably racist government to enforce hate
speech codes in a fair and even-handed fashion. Professor Nadine
Strossen has reported that Canada's experiment in regulating "degrading" erotic speech has not stopped the flow of "mainstream" heterosexual pornography into the country, but has led to the censorship
of gay and lesbian erotica. 1 Simply put, the average male, heterosex60. Shiffrin's doctrinal defense of hate-speech regulation also merits a brief mention.
Professor Shiffrin mounts an extended attack on both Justice Scalia's majority opinion and
Justice White's concurring opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,505 U.S. 377 (1992). Pp. 5176. His basic objection rests on the idea that existing free speech jurisprudence already
makes a number of important distinctions based on the content of speech activity. Pp. 57-58.
Citing to commercial speech cases, Shiffrin argues that "point-of-view" discrimination is a
permissible feature of government speech regulation in some circumstances and, given this
state of affairs, regulations subjecting racist points of view to civil or criminal liability should
be sustained against First Amendment objections. P. 57-63. Later on, Shiffrin shifts his
ground and characterizes Justice Scalia's objection to the St. Paul ordinance as a problem
involving content discrimination. See pp. 57-67. Essentially, Shiffrin uses the concepts of
"point-of-view" discrimination and "content discrimination" interchangeably. Of course,
viewpoint-based discrimination and content-based discrimination are not the same thing.
A local ordinance permitting candidates for public office - but not commercial advertisers - to place signs on utility polls owned by the city would constitute content discrimination. Contemporary free speech jurisprudence generally permits government to regulate
different kinds of speech activity differently, although this is not universally the case. See,
e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419-21, 430-31 (1993)
(striking down a ban on commercial news racks, noting blurred distinction between commercial and other speech); William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some
Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1638-48 (1996) (noting a
recent trend to treat commercial speech like any other speech). Viewpoint-based discrimination, on the other hand, picks and chooses free speech winners and losers within a particular kind of speech activity. For example, a municipal ordinance permitting Proposition
200 supporters to place signs on city-owned utility polls but denying the same permission to
Proposition 200 opponents would constitute viewpoint-based discrimination. The government would be picking a preferred point of view from within the marketplace of ideas and
advancing this viewpoint through its sovereign powers. R.A.V. involved an ordinance that
mandated both viewpoint-based discrimination and content discrimination. See R.A.V., 505
U.S. at 391-95. This makes all the difference in the world for purposes of free speech analysis.
61. See NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY:

FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND

THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 234-44 (1995); see also Mary Williams Walsh, Chill Hits

Canada'sPorn Law, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at Al (describing government raid of a lesbian bookstore).
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ual Canadian customs agent does not find Penthouse or Hustler unduly
offensive (or "degrading") but does find Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs sufficiently "degrading" to justify official government suppression.
Shiffrin never comes to terms with the inherent contradiction of
positing a society that devalues and disrespects cultural and political
minorities with a free speech doctrine that invites the state to pick free
speech winners and losers. To be fair, his defense of free speech
against postmodern critics rests on the idea that marginalized political
groups obtain needed breathing room through the exercise of free
speech rights. "To the extent that leftist politics depends on social
movements and grassroots protests and activities, the free speech
principle is vital" (p. 125). In the absence of the free speech principle,
"government could squelch antiwar protestors and civil rights protestors."' The problem is that Shiffrin's refusal to credit right-wing and
corporate speech activity as dissent opens up the very real possibility
of government censorship of liberal or progressive speech activity.63
Professor Shiffrin undoubtedly recognizes these seeds of contradiction in his argument. His project is not so much to convert the free
speech absolutists, but the free speech critics coming from the New
Left.' By attempting to marginalize the free speech prerogatives of
reactionaries and corporations, he makes the free speech principle potentially more attractive to the postmodern critics. This is, of course, a
difficult tightrope to walk.65

62. P. 125; see also Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Watts v. United States,
394 U.S. 705 (1969); Bond v. Flogel, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
63. See STROSSEN, supra note 61, at 222-24 (describing the widespread use of hate
speech regulations to silence racial minorities and women for speech critical of the dominant
culture). Professor Strossen reports that, under the University of Michigan speech code,
"there were more than twenty cases of whites charging blacks with racist speech." Id. at 223.
Moreover, "the only two instances in which the rule was invoked to sanction racist speech
(as opposed to other forms of hate speech) involved punishment of speech by or on behalf of
black students." 1d; see also Strossen, supra note 6, at 506-07, 556-59 ("The general lesson
that rules banning hate speech will be used to punish minority group members has proven
true in the specific context of campus hate speech regulations."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, ResurrectingFreeSpeech, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 971,987 (1995) ("Using the state to change culture before power in an unequal world can often backfire, for example, if speech codes are
applied to students of color, or antipornography laws to gay erotica."). But cf Lawrence,
supra note 5, at 450 n.82 (arguing that hate speech regulations should not be applied to protect members of the "dominant majority groups").
64. See infra notes 82-99 and accompanying text.
65. Evidently, at least one member of the Critical Race Theory movement has been enticed by Professor Shiffrin's efforts to vest a greater share of the First Amendment's stock
with cultural minorities favoring progressive causes. See Delgado, supra note 18, at 779
("Steven Shriffin's Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America is a welcome addition to
this emerging 'First Amendment legal realism' vein of scholarship.").
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The Social Costs of Speech Activity Do Not Necessarily Track
Viewpoint or Content

Even if the considerable definitional difficulties could be overcome
successfully, a dissent-based model of the First Amendment would still
not work. To put the matter plainly, the social costs of speech activity
do not necessarily correlate with whether the speech constitutes "dissent" (however defined). Indeed, the bombing of the Oklahoma City
federal building arguably constituted the most powerful statement of
dissent in the last decade. To that, one might add Theodore
and the
Kaczynski's mail bomb letters to the purveyors of technology
66
anti-abortion zealots' murders of abortion clinic personnel.
Shiffrin might respond that acts of violence do not constitute
speech activity, but rather criminal conduct, and therefore do not constitute dissent. 7 Fair enough. The point still remains that the groups
most likely to engage in dissent also impose some of the highest costs
on the community.
Consider, for example, Matthew Hale and the World Church of
the Creator. Hale and his church preach a brand of white supremacy
that is highly destructive of building and maintaining a viable pluralistic community.' Indeed, his racist tracts motivated Benjamin Smith
to go on a multi-state rampage, murdering two minorities and
wounding nine others in the process. 9
The official policy of the United States government is to promote
and secure the full civil rights of all persons. The policy appears in
myriad federal laws and regulations and enjoys the support of all ma-

66. For a list of the physicians and staff members murdered and wounded since 1993,
see Michael A. Fletcher, Sniper Kills Abortion Doctor Near Buffalo, WASH. POST, Oct. 25,
1998, at Al. Since Dr. David Gunn's murder on March 10,1993, in Pensacola, Florida, antiabortion protestors have killed five additional clinic personnel and wounded yet another
five. See id. "Since 1977, there have been over 1,700 attacks against abortion providers, according to the National Abortion Federation." Id
67. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); United States v. O'Brien, 391

U.S. 367,376 (1968).
68. See Rosemary Radford Ruether, How Did the Creator Become A White Racist?,
CHi. TIuB., July 18, 1999, at C17; Kirsten Scharnberg, A Gospel of Hatred, CHi. TRIB., July
11, 1999, at Cl. Professor Ruether believes that, rather than affording racist churches a respectful hearing, Christians of good will
need to take responsibility for more mainstream patterns of thought that feed racist extremism: namely belief in a God who ordered creation as a hierarchy that sacralizes the power of
dominant groups over others, who favors some nations and religions against others and who
mandates war and violence as a way to establish God's reign on Earth.
69. See Edward Walsh, Midwest Gun Spree Suspect Is Dead,WASH. POST, July 5, 1999,
at Al; Edward Walsh, Racial Slayer Killed Himselfin Struggle, WASH. POST, July 6, 1999, at
Al; see also Eric Bailey, 2 Brothers Indictedin Synagogue Fires, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18,2000,
at A19 (describing the various acts of terror James Tyler Williams and Benjamin Matthew
Williams have committed against Jews, racial minorities, and homosexuals, including arson
and murder, all in the name of maintaining and enforcing "biblical law").
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jor political parties. No serious mainstream person in contemporary
American politics advocates conditioning the civil rights or liberties of
citizens on race. Consequently, Hale and his followers have placed
themselves in opposition to the official position of the government;
they are engaged in dissent.
Whether or not courts openly admit the practice, they routinely
engage in utilitarian cost/benefit analyses when deciding free speech
claims.7" Hence, indecent erotic speech enjoys less First Amendment
protection than a candidate's stump speech under the theory that the
community reaps greater benefits from the latter than the former and,
accordingly, the government enjoys less of an ability to restrict political speech than non-obscene erotica!'
Some of the most costly speech activity constitutes dissent.72 This
does not necessarily mean that government should enjoy a relatively
free hand in censoring the speech of unpopular political minorities,
but it does suggest that the problem of hate speech requires more than
simply determining whether or not the speaker is engaged in dissent
and, if so, letting the speaker have his say.
In fact, Shiffrin largely abandons his focus on dissent when discussing the problem of hate speech. In rather direct terms, he advocates a kind of utilitarian calculus in determining whether or not to tax
the costs of such speech activity against the community in order to facilitate the speech activities of hate mongers: "The basic problem with
the autonomy argument [in favor of protecting hate speech] is that it
cannot show that the value of individual autonomy outweighs the
harm caused by racist speech" (p. 79). Shiffrin also questions whether
"the idea of respect for persons demands any particular weighing of
the competing values in this context," and concludes that "[a]ny confidence that the value of free speech in this context outweighs the harm
requires placing a thumb on the scales" (p. 79).

70. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982) (carving out an exception
to the Miller obscenity test in order to allow regulation of child pornography). But cf Blasi,
supra note 23, at 485 ("The realistic goal must be to contain such balancing, not eliminate it;
even Justice Black recognized in disputes over the timing and location of demonstrations an
appropriate sphere for a case-by-case judicial comparison of communicative and regulatory
interests.").
71. Compare McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), and City of
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994), with Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991),
and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).

72. See Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 916, 916-19 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (giving the history of the Skokie case, which involved a Nazi march through a

Jewish community); see also S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibratingthe Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg,41 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1165 (2000); Lee C. Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and
Free Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV. 617 (1982) (reviewing ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING
MY ENEMY (1979)).
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This practical cost/benefit analysis makes a great deal more sense
than application of a reflexive "dissent = protected speech" calculus.
Because the social costs of hate speech are so great, courts should
weigh carefully whether the benefit to the project of democratic deliberation justifies absorbing the corrosive effects of hate speech.73 As
Professor Richard Delgado has put the matter, "A realist approach
would regard both individual and social costs and benefits as daily
weighing in the balance."'74 In consequence, such a theory "would deal
with both the effects of hate speech on the life of a single individual as
well as its impact across large groups."'
In this regard, it bears noting that virtually all Western democracies have adopted hate speech codes - including Canada, France, and
Germany. Those nations have performed the cost/benefit analysis and
concluded that the potential harm associated with hate speech outweighs its potential social value. Thus, in Canada, a candidate calling
76
for a race war would find himself in jail, not on the ballot.
Given the consensus in other industrial democracies, that hate
speech constitutes a social harm worthy of proscription, Shiffrin's utilitarian approach has much to recommend it. He also reaches a defensible result: hate speech should be protected not because it is intrinsically socially valuable, but rather, because government is incapable of
fairly administering a speech code. Rather than using the rhetorical
shell of "dissent," Shiffrin would have advanced his case more convincingly if he simply had made a direct argument for social
cost/benefit analysis in contemporary free speech jurisprudence.77
II.

DISSENTING FROM SHIFFRIN'S VISION OF DISSENT

Even a sympathetic reader will find it difficult to overlook a fundamental objection to Professor Shiffrin's theory of the First Amend73. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 307-08 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The
vulnerability of various forms of communication to community control must be proportioned to their impact upon other community interests."); see also Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding a criminal conviction based on Beauharnais distributing racist leaflets on the streets of Chicago, Illinois, under an Illinois statute prohibiting group libel).
74. Delgado, supra note 18, at 789.
75. ld.
76. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 319 (1985); Canadian Human Rights Act,
R.S.C., ch. H-6, § 13 (1985); Regina v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731; In re Keegstra, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 697, 744-49; WF Party v. Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, UN
GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. 40, at 231, U.N. Doc. No. A138/40 (1983); see also Kathleen E.
Mahoney, The CanadianConstitutionalApproach to Freedom of Expression in Hate Propaganda and Pornography,55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1992); Kathleen E. Mahoney,
Hate Speech. Affirmation or Contradictionof Freedom of Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV.
789,792 n.17, 804-05.
77. See Delgado, supranote 18, at 785-91.
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ment: Shiffrin's unrelentingly ideological definition of the dissentbased free speech project. For Shiffrin, dissent is not about democratic deliberation, or personal autonomy, or any of several other wellestablished theories of free speech. Instead, "dissent" constitutes
criticism of the existing social structures by select members of disgruntled cultural minorities seeking to slay "hierarchy" and "injustice" in a
quest to achieve fundamental social change (of a sort consistent with
progressive/radical ideals of government):
Dissent attacks existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, and
authorities. It spies injustice and brings it to light. This does not mean
that dissent is always effective; indeed, much dissent does little to bring
about effective change. Nor is dissent always fair. It may often be distorted by envy of those higher up in a particular hierarchy.... For all its
occasional faults, dissent is indispensable. Without it, unjust hierarchies
would surely flourish with little possibility of constructive change. If the
truth about the presence of injustice is to be spread, social institutions
must be constructed in a way that nurtures critical speech. [p. 93]
This conceptualization of dissent, although undoubtedly welcome by
those who question the importance of speech relative to equality or
community,78 runs strongly against the grain of prevailing free speech
norms.
A. Dissent Comes from Across the IdeologicalSpectrum
The problem, obviously enough, is that much contemporary dissent involves what "progressives" may view as implicitly encouraging
or embracing racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, or homophobic attitudes and
behaviors; even more dissent explicitly seeks to preserve "existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities" (p. 93) in the face
of powerful erosive forces. Simply put, there is no reason to suppose
that dissent, as a social phenomenon, unfailingly redounds to the support of liberal or radical candidates, policies, or causes. Shiffrin's conceptualization of dissent is, at best, highly romanticized and, at worst,
hopelessly naive. It is probably true that "we are a long way off from
a society that is committed to encouraging dissent in an effort to combat injustice" (p. 112). That said, it seems far from clear that more dissent necessarily will advance the cause of social justice. It is just as
conceivable that reactionary forces might carry the day.79
78. See Delgado, supranote 18, at 782-95.
79. Certainly, the recent trend in favor of state initiatives banning or prohibiting voluntary affirmative action efforts would suggest that dissent from existing government policies
does not always redound in favor of positions supported by liberals or progressives. It also
would be a mistake to assume that state governments support the passage of such antiaffirmative action initiatives. This was certainly not the case in Washington State, where
virtually every state-wide elected officer from the Governor on down actively campaigned
against the passage of Initiative 200. See Sam Howe Verhouek, In a Battle Over Preferences,
Race and GenderAre at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1998, at Al. Thus, supporters of Initia-
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For persons who subscribe to Holmes's marketplace of ideas
metaphor or to Meiklejohn's conception of free speech" as a necessary incident of the project of democratic self-government, who wins
or loses the debate is far less important than the fact of the debate itself.8 ' Shiffrin comes dangerously close to suggesting that freedom of
speech is the exclusive prerogative of one segment of the community
- liberals, progressives, and radicals. Given the lack of electoral success of such persons in recent times, one might well ask whether a theory of the First Amendment that invites viewpoint or speaker-based
government censorship will redound to the benefit of Shiffrin's preferred class of speakers."
Of course, Professor Shiffrin does not absolutely condition First
Amendment protection on speech constituting dissent. Vague references to the protection of "political speech" and "commercial speech"
exist in the text - although the reader is left at sea as to precisely
what these protections should be (p. xii). Shiffrin's enthusiasm for
free speech is plainly focused on a particular subset of speech that advances a specific ideological vision for the community; those who fail
to advance that agenda, such as tobacco companies or the purveyors
of alcohol, appear to be left at the gate (pp. 41-42).
When tobacco companies espouse radically unpopular opinions at
substantial variance from the existing policies of the government, it is
difficult to understand why a federal court concerned for dissent
should withhold the full protection of the First Amendment. After all,
most theories of dissent are positional: one defines dissent in relation
to the existing policies and practices of the community. Hence, in a
state like California with fairly draconian public smoking statutes, a
tobacco company or restaurant owner seeking the repeal of such laws
to permit customers to smoke on the restaurant's premises would be
dissenting from the official policies of the government, policies that
enjoy the support of a contemporary majority of California voters.

tive 200 were positioned in opposition to the established political hierarchy in Washington
State (i.e., they were dissenters).

80. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
81. As Justice Holmes explained, "[e]very idea is an incitement," and "[e]loquence may
set fire to reason." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

Accordingly, the process of democratic deliberation does not guarantee any particular ideological outcome: "If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way." Id.

82. As Shiffrin himself notes, pp. 121-22, many scholars of the Left have abandoned
both free speech and rights talk, more generally, as social structures that tend to reify rather

than challenge existing social, economic, and political conditions. See, e.g., Peter Gabel, The
Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousnessand the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEXAS L.
REV. 1563 (1984); Robert A. Williams Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively:

The Perils and

Promise of CriticalLegal Theory for People of Color,5 LAW & INEQ. 103 (1987).
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Similarly, during the Prohibition years,' the liquor industry found itself in the position of dissenting from the official policies of the federal
and state governments (an effort that finally bore fruit with the adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment).'
"The dissent perspective would argue that the policies, prescriptions, and privileges of the elite need to be challenged on a regular basis by enough people to make a difference" (p. 45). It is difficult to
fathom precisely what this means, or how a federal district judge
would go about implementing this mandate. "Elite" positions on
questions of the day are far from self-evident. Do elites favor or oppose abortion on demand? How about school vouchers that may be
used at pervasively sectarian primary and secondary schools? Should
federal courts commission polling data or appoint the Gallup Organization as a special master to determine which viewpoints merit robust
First Amendment protection and which do not? It is difficult to disagree with Shiffrin that "[p]rotection for dissent is a necessary feature
of any respectable democracy" (p. 45), but I am not at all sure that any
respectable democracy could embrace Shiffrin's definition of dissent
while claiming to maintain more than a mere theoretical commitment
to the freedom of political speech.
Professor Shiffrin seems to recognize that problems might inhere
in implementing his dissent-based vision of the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, he suggests that courts should accord progressive speech
regulations broad deference. "[C]ourts should be generous in assessing such regulations because the legislature seeks to advance important constitutional goals" (p. 47). If a particular regulation represents
an imperfect solution to the problem of empowering the marginalized
voices within the community or silencing the voices of corporations, so
be it. "Regulations designed to secure justice in the polity need not be
perfect. Justice should not be delayed because non-viable alternatives
are conceivable" (p. 47). Shiffrin admonishes that "[a] dissent-based
approach proceeds from a moral condemnation of unjust hierarchies
wherever they may be inside or outside of government - whether or
not they relate to 'public issues' ' (p. 48).
An unsympathetic reader might ask precisely who will identify the
"unjust hierarchies" in order to sustain otherwise impermissible viewpoint or speaker-based speech regulations. Presumably, this task will
fall upon some official within the government, perhaps a judge or
prosecutor. If one accepted Shiffrin's suggestion that the United
States "is racist to the core" (p. xiii), and dominated by "elite" perspectives, it is difficult to understand how his theory of free speech
could be successfully implemented absent an intervening revolution.
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
84. U.S. CONST. amend.

I.
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Because persons holding significant positions of power undoubtedly
would be selected with great care and sophistication by the evil elites
calling all of the shots, is there really any reason to believe that these
officials would embrace more than superficially a theory of free
speech that privileges their mortal enemies while silencing their dearest friends? There is, thus, a certain amount of inconsistency in the
theory between the continued state supervision of speech, the guidelines supposedly directing such supervision, and the underlying assumptions about authority's willingness to obey such guidelines - assumptions that created the need for progressive dissent in the first
place.
In this regard, consider the case of Missouri Supreme Court Justice
Ronnie White. The United States Senate refused to give its consent to
Justice White's appointment to the U.S. federal district court in St.
Louis, Missouri, allegedly because he was "pro-criminal" and "activist."' The evidence supporting this characterization largely consisted
of Justice White's voting record in death penalty cases - he had the
temerity to vote to reverse death sentences in approximately thirty
percent of the cases that had come before him.' For this perceived
failure of judgment, the Senate voted to reject his nomination on a
straight party line vote of fifty-four Republicans voting against the
nomination versus forty-five Democrats voting in favor of the nomination. Justice White's story is but a single part of a larger phenomenon:
women and racial minorities have greater difficulty obtaining confirmation in the contemporary Senate than do heterosexual white menY
If a majority of the Senate is prepared to reject a nominee for registering dissent from his colleagues on ultimate matters of life and
death, it seems unlikely that the Senators will prove more willing to
embrace judicial nominees who register political dissent on other controversial issues, such as drug policy. The implications for a dissentbased theory of free speech should be clear: If Justice Ronnie White
cannot engage in principled dissent when matters of life and death are
at stake without rendering himself unfit for federal judicial office, is it
really plausible to think that the "system" would tolerate officials who
consistently reach out to protect highly unpopular, marginalized dissenters, thereby affording them the broadest protections of the First
Amendment's free speech guarantee? If contemporary American so-

85. See Charles Babington & Joan Biskupic, Senate Rejects JudicialNominee, WASH.
POST, Oct. 6,1999, at Al (describing the circumstances surrounding the Senate's rejection of
the nomination and quoting Missouri GOP Senator John Ashcroft as describing Justice

White as "pro-criminal" and "activist").
86. See id.
87. See Ben White, Deepening Rift over Judge Vote, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1999, at A3
(describing the Senate's higher rejection rate for minority judicial nominees than for nonminority nominees during the Clinton administration).

1640

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1613

ciety suffers from as many racial, gender, and class biases as Professor
Shiffrin suggests and elected officials fairly and accurately implement
the wishes of their constituents, there is not much cause to be optimistic about these questions. Indeed, Justice White's experience suggests
that the price of registering dissent can be staggeringly high, even
when the underlying policy position at issue enjoys broad support
within a plurality of the community.
The abject failure of campaign finance reform provides another
cautionary note for any dissent-based account of free speech. In
Buckley v. Valeo," the Supreme Court accepted the proposition that
money equals speech and protected unlimited direct spending to elect
or defeat a particular candidate.89 Moreover, the Buckley Court also
embraced a financing scheme for presidential elections that effectively
institutionalizes the Democratic and Republican parties, a system that,
moreover, hobbles independent and third-party presidential candidates.90 Despite widespread alienation and cynicism about the contemporary electoral process, there appears to be little hope for securing meaningful campaign finance reform anytime soon. Even if the
Supreme Court were to rethink its "speech equals money" logic, it is
doubtful that incumbent members of Congress would act against their
own collective self-interests by enacting meaningful campaign finance
reform in order to empower political dissenters. In this fashion, then,
candidates who wish to bring nontraditional programs or platforms before the American public systematically are disfavored (and thereby
silenced).91
Professor Shiffrin undoubtedly would agree with this description of
the current state of electoral affairs, but probably would argue that the
proper response is swift adoption of meaningful campaign finance reform legislation (pp. 111-12). This begs the fact that we have not arrived in our present situation by mere happenstance. The system
marginalizes and silences dissent not by accident, but by design. 2 Neither the Democratic nor Republican parties are likely to embrace any

88. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
89. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 12-23, 39-59; see also Burt Neuborne, Toward a
Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055, 1055-62,
1071-73 (1999) (critiquing the Buckley decision and offering up rationales for sustaining
comprehensive campaign finance reform legislation).
90. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-108; cf id. at 290, 291-94 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the public funding provisions "enshrined the Republican and Democratic Parties in a permanently preferred position, and has established
requirements for funding minor-party and independent candidates to which the two major

parties are not subject").
91. See Owen M. Fiss, Money andPolitics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470,2478-82 (1997).
92. For an extended discussion of the relationship between wealth and free speech, see
Free Speech andEconomic Power: A Symposium, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1053 (1999).
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program of reform that disserves their short and long term institutional interests.93
To the extent that dissent presently does not seem to enjoy any
special call on executive, legislative, or judicial consciences, making all
speech claims contingent on a subjective label bids fair to legitimate
greater, not less, suppression of politically marginal speakers. Thus,
absent some revolutionary change in government (which seems, at
best, highly unlikely), a system of free speech protection focused primarily on dissent likely would have the perverse effect of further stifling meaningful opposition to existing governmental and economic
policies and institutions.
The related problem of ascertaining precisely what constitutes
"injustice" also exists. Throughout his work, Professor Shiffrin emphasizes the importance of dissent to combating successfully "injustice." Describing the proper mission of the public schools, he argues
that
our educational system must educate not only autonomous thinkers prepared to reject the habits, customs, and traditions of the larger society
but also citizens who generally regard dissent against injustice as virtuous
behavior.... For example, students in large and small groups could be
assigned projects of challenging injustices they collectively perceive
within their local communities. [pp. 113-14]
Such activity should be encouraged because "[t]he practice of challenging injustice should not only instruct them in the present but also
encourage them to do so in the future" (p. 114). This is all well and
good, so long as one leaves undefined the scope and content of "injustice." Once a teacher, principal, administrator, or school board member begins attempting to identify "injustices" within the community,
things are likely to get very complicated very quickly.
Shiffrin is undoubtedly correct to suggest that injustices exist
within our society at the national, state, local, and neighborhood level.
The problem, of course, is that in a diverse and pluralistic society with
myriad ideological, religious, and social traditions and commitments,
one person's injustice is another person's tradition.94 It is not at all
clear that having the government attempt to identify and define "injustice" for purposes of applying the First Amendment's Free Speech

93. See JERRY MAsHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE
TO IMPROvE PUBLIC LAw 44-47, 86-105 (1997) (describing public choice theory, the idea

that legislators, given a free choice, systematically will make decisions that advance their
own perceived self-interest, with particular attention to the problem of federal campaign finance reform).
94. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, The War of the Worlds: A Few Comments on Law,
Culture, and Rights, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 379, 379-83 (1997); Leslye Amede Obiora,
Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence in the Campaign Against
Female Circumcision,47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275,278-79,332-45,371-78 (1997).
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Clause represents a sound jurisprudential approach to vindicating free
speech claims.'
B.

The Measure of Dissent

Professor Shiffrin has undertaken an incredibly difficult task: he is
attempting to square postmodern free speech critiques with a revised
and renewed liberal free speech tradition. Rather than simply admitting defeat for the liberal conception of free speech and ceding the
field to the CLS, Critical Race Theory, Feminist Jurisprudence, and
Law & Sexuality critics, he attempts to construct a multi-cultural and
postmodern theory of free speech that relocates free speech as a bulwark for the protection of oppressed and marginalized cultural minorities. Instead of entrenching the position of existing elites, Shiffrin's
vision of the First Amendment would make the Free Speech Clause a
powerful weapon for dispossessed political and cultural minorities to
challenge what they perceive to be "injustice."
His definition of dissent demonstrates his commitment to this
project: it is viewpoint and speaker-based precisely because a viewpoint and speaker-based approach is essential to meeting and refuting
the critique of the Left. By vesting the strongest protections the Free
Speech Clause has to offer with the strongest critics of the postBrandenburgtradition, he hopes to create a free speech paradigm that
is acceptable to all. Shiffrin's project is incredibly ambitious, and he
deserves a great deal of credit for the strength and power of his arguments. One also should note that he self-consciously embraces the
role of agent provocateur: "I am trying to open a dialogue rather than
provide the last word" (p. 112). His effort at reconciling the free
speech tradition with the critique of the New Left is terribly important
if the social consensus in favor of free speech as a preferred value is to
be maintained. In other liberal democracies, when these values come
into conflict, the social commitment to free speech has given way in
the face of demands that adequately securing values associated with
equality and community be given a higher priority than protecting free
speech.
Professor Shiffrin argues that "there is insufficient reason to suppose that the left acts against its interests in supporting the free speech

95. For example, the government of South Carolina does not seem to view the continued display of the Confederate battle flag over the state capitol building "unjust," even

though many African-American South Carolinians seem to so view the matter. See David

Firestone, 46,000 March on South Carolina Capitol to Bring Down Confederate Flag, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18,2000, at A14; Bob Herbert, In America: Of Flagsand Slurs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

20, 2000, at A19. If minorities in South Carolina cannot convince the state government to
remove an emblem long-associated with racist causes from the seat of state government,

should they have any confidence that state functionaries would credit their efforts to engage
in dissent combating other forms of injustice?
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principle even assuming that the principle were laissez-faire" (p. 125).
Free speech facilitates grass-roots organizing and protest, which challenges the status quo and facilitates reform; accordingly, liberals, progressives, and radicals should embrace free speech (pp. 124-27).
Viewed through this prism, the free speech principle "has a strong political tilt against the unjust exercise of power" (p. 128). Moreover,
"[1]ike it or not, the free speech principle is here to stay" (p. 129). As
a matter of political pragmatism, progressives and radicals should acknowledge that "[it] is better political strategy to claim it than to hold
out oneself as an enemy of a cherished right" (p. 129). Thus, if arguments based on principle do not convince, a frank appeal to practical
political considerations might get the job done. If neither approach
succeeds, try to scare the free speech apostates back into the fold with
the prospect of damnation: a sustained attack on free speech "promises to guide the left into outer darkness" (p. 130).
The New Left is badly divided on the value and importance of free
speech to the progressive cause. A growing number of critics reject
rights talk in general96 and the value of free speech in particular.'
Thus, Shiffrin's project represents a sustained and cogent effort to
bring the free speech schismatics back into the fold.
Ultimately, however, even Justice Brennan, the great conciliator,
would not have been able to reconcile these contending factions. Free
speech traditionalists are certain to object to Shiffrin's effort to make
the identity of the speaker - not to mention the content of the
speaker's message - an important component in determining the
First Amendment status of speech activity. This aspect of the program
rends asunder the viewpoint-neutrality project, an essential tenet of
the traditional First Amendment faith.
Free speech critics also are unlikely to be convinced.98 Shiffrin has
attempted to give them a greater stake in the First Amendment by
vesting disempowered cultural minorities with enhanced claims to free
speech protection. So long as the instrumentalities of government remain in the majoritarian hands, however, the critics will not be satisfied.9 After all, even if cultural minorities enjoyed some greater call
96. See Gabel, supra note 82; Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 697, 707 (1992); Robert Williams, supra note 82, at
114-21. But cf Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 404-06 (1987); Williams, supra note 82, at

121-34.
97. See Delgado, supra note 5, at 140-41; Andrea Dworkin, Pornography Is a Civil
Rights Issue for Women, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55 (1987/88); Mari Matsuda, Lecture, in
Alan Borovoy et al., The James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Language as Violence vs.
Freedom of Expression; Canadianand American Perspectives on Group Defamation, 37

BUFF. L. REV. 337,360 (1988/89).
98. But see Delgado, supra note 18, at 782-87,795-98, 802.
99. See E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator
From MajoritarianCulturalNorms Through Minority-CultureArbitration, 49 CASE W. RES.
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on the Free Speech Clause, the contingency of this claim on courts
staffed overwhelmingly by members of the majority would breed intense skepticism (with some good cause)."°
C. Enhancing DemocraticDeliberationin the Name of Dissent
It would be a mistake, however, to disregard Shiffrin's call for a
renewed dialogue about the centrality of dissent to the free speech
project. Even if one contests his definition of "dissent" and his insistence that "dissent" consistently seeks to overcome "injustice," his
proposals for facilitating improved public deliberation have great
merit and deserve serious consideration.
Shiffrin is surely correct to suppose that the Free Speech Clause
should facilitate dissent from disaffected individuals and groups within
the society. Moreover, many of his proposals for enhancing the role
and visibility of dissent within the body politic are quite sensible. Professor Shiffrin suggests four broad reform projects that might improve
the quality and quantity of public deliberation:
Any society that encouraged dissent would have to meet four conditions:
(1) its system of public education would need to promote attitudes and to
teach skills that would assist in creating a substantial body of citizens
with the talent and the will to challenge injustice in appropriate circumstances; (2) channels of communication for expressing dissent would
need to be open; (3) legal barriers to dissent would need to be held to a
minimum; an (4) social and governmental institutions would need to be
designed to make information available to those who wish to dissent.
[pp. 112-13]

L. REV.275,286-90 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming]; E. Gary Spitko,
He Sai4 He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII and the "Reasonable Heterosexist" Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56, 81-89 (1997); E. Gary Spitko, Judge
Not: In Defense of Minority-Culture Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1065, 1067-69, 1072,
1075-77 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Judge Not]. Professor Spitko's utter distrust of majoritarian adjudication of the legal rights of cultural minorities in the public courts has led him to
call upon cultural minorities to establish their own, quasi-private courts through voluntary
arbitration. See idat 1077-83; Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming,supra. Although he has
never written on First Amendment doctrine, I strongly suspect that he - and others like him
- would object strongly to any free speech theory that potentially vests judges and juries
with more, rather than less, discretion because, in his view, such discretion inevitably will
come to be exercised consistently in a fashion that marginalizes cultural minorities. To the
extent that data on the question exist, it does seem to support such fears. See Spitko, Gone
But Not Conforming, supra,at 278-86.
100. See Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming,supra note 99; Spitko, Judge Not, supra note
99. As Dean Kathleen M. Sullivan has explained:
Thus, I believe that a number of the new arguments for speech regulation with a postmodem twist have a massive non sequitur at their core. Why trust the state - the very
source of some of the bad, old social structures - to get the new ideology right? There
might be strong reasons to distrust the state in reordering our ideological preferences, even
if we trust it to solve other problems in our collective life.
Sullivan, supra note 63, at 987.
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Each of these proposals not only would advance a dissent-based vision
of the Free Speech Clause, but also would advance the project of

democratic deliberation more generally. In this sense, then, one wedded to a different operational paradigm for the Free Speech Clause
might still agree with the substance of Professor Shiffrin's program of
reform.
It would be difficult to disagree with Professor Shiffrin's assertion
that the public schools should prepare students for active participation
in the life of the community. Given the apathy and lack of participation by young people in contemporary electoral politics, 0 ' it would
appear that the schools are failing to foster in the nation's youth a

spirit of civic duty and a corresponding obligation of participation in
the project of democratic self-government. To be sure, the task of
preparing young Americans for participation in our democracy does
not fall solely on the shoulders of teachers and school administrators.
Nevertheless, the apathy of younger citizens toward the electoral process at all levels of government is a problem t° that the schools should
address. As Professor Shiffrin puts it, "an educational system committed to producing active citizens with a sense of justice can produce a
more active citizenry" (p. 113). Undoubtedly, "in educating for democracy in public and private realms, our schools could do more to
encourage dissent." 3 Were they to do so, perhaps young citizens
would be less apathetic about actively participating in the project of
self-governance.
101. See LINDA J. SAX ET AL., AMERICAN FRESHMAN: NATIONAL NORMS FOR FALL
1997, at 2-4 (1997); Charles N. Quigley, Civic Education: Recent History, CurrentStatus, and
the Future, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1425, 1433-35 (1999); see also Richard Harrington, Giving a Rap
About Voting, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,1992, at F7 ("Since 1971, young people's voting participation has declined with each presidential election (36 percent in 1988)."); Rene Sanchez,
College Freshmen Have the Blahs, Survey Indicates;Academic, Civic Apathy Reach Record
Levels, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1998, at Al (reporting on minimal interest of entering college
freshmen in civic participation, with "[o]nly about 17%" expressing interest in " 'influencing
the political structure'" and a mere 21% indicating that they regularly vote in student elections); Rene Sanchez & Audrey Gillan, Outnumbered, Outvoted, Out of Clout on the Hill,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at Al ("Some analysts say the percentage of young adults who
vote in presidential elections, which has never been high but showed new signs of growth in
1992, tumbled below 30% last year.").
102. See Panel Discussion: Civic Education, 62 ALD. L. REV. 1451, 1459, 1462 (1999)
(reporting that only 20% of young adults voted in the last federal election and warning that
"[t]he participation of young people in voting and other forms of civic association appears to
be in a free-fall. We can expect the lowest voting turnout yet among 18-to-25-year-olds in
the next presidential election."); Steven A. Holmes, The Melting Pot Politics of 2000 Are
Truly Soupy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2000, § 4, at 1 ("Despite efforts like MTV's 'Rock the
Vote,' young people continue to be among the most politically apathetic groups in the country.").
103. P. 114. Ironically, students currently enjoy very limited free speech rights on campus and, therefore, their opportunity to engage in dissent is more apparent than real. See S.
Elizabeth Wilbor, Teaching the New Three Rs - Repression, Rights, and Respect: A Primer
of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 120-21 (1995) (noting that "core political
speech is no more protected in the public schools than a dirty limerick scrawled in a bathroom stall").
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Professor Shiffrin's second reform proposal deals with access to
the media (pp. 115-17). He criticizes broadcasters for caring too much
about maximizing profits and too little about facilitating democratic
deliberation (including, of course, dissent) (pp. 115-17). His suggestions for improving the mass media's contribution to public discourse
include increasing candidate access to the media, creating opportunities for the public to access media outlets to communicate their ideas
with the larger community, and a renewed commitment to noncommercial broadcasting (pp. 116-17). All of these proposals would
materially improve the process of democratic deliberation in this
country and should receive serious consideration. 1 '
Professor Shiffrin's failure to address the Internet as a potential
platform for dissent is puzzling. Although television broadcasters and
cable system operators presently deliver programming to mass audiences on a more reliable basis than the Internet, technological changes
will chip away at the existing broadcast media's monopoly on mass
audiences. Accordingly, the need to ensure accountability from
broadcasters and cable system operators may be reduced as the Internet makes programming content-on-demand a reality. 5 This is not to
say that established media cannot or should not do a better job of facilitating democratic deliberation. Rather, their continuing failure to
take action may be less important over the long term than Shiffrin
suggests.
Professor Shiffrin also proposes reforms aimed at reducing the opportunity costs (pp. 117-18) and transaction costs (pp. 118-20) associated with engaging in dissent. Again, even if one were to dispute or
reject Professor Shiffrin's definition of "dissent" as unduly limited, his
proposals for reducing the potential liabilities associated with speech
activity on matters of public concern would enhance the ability of average citizens to participate in the project of democratic deliberation.
In other words, limiting the liability associated with engaging in public
debate and enhancing the access of average citizens to the means of
participating in public debate would be wise policies under any plausi-

104. Having previously endorsed many of the same proposals, I hardly can be heard to
object to Shiffrin's call for a renewed commitment by the mass media to facilitating the project of participatory democracy. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats,and Children'sTelevision Programming,45 DUKE LJ. 1193, 1236-48 (1996);
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of
Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2134-38 (1997) (book
review) [hereinafter Krotoszynski, The Inevitable Wasteland].
105. There might still be a need for government-subsidized educational programming in
the age of the Internet. Although the Internet will provide a platform for delivering programming content to a mass audience, one must still hire writers, producers, and actors to
create the content. The history of public access cable stations suggests that providing a platform for the delivery of programming content will not ensure a reliable supply of high quality programming. See Krotoszynski, The Inevitable Wasteland,supra note 104, at 2128-29.
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ble conception of free speech in a democratic society." As with the
proposals associated with broadcasting, one wonders why Professor
Shiffrin does not explore the possibilities of the Internet for facilitating democratic deliberation and dissent. Although broadcast media
remain critically important to the process of elections and public debate, new media are going to play an increasingly important role in
democratic deliberation. A reform program aimed at securing regulations that promote the dissent-enhancing possibilities of the Internet, a
relatively new medium for mass communication, might possess greater
potential for success."
Professor Shiffrin is right to challenge the legal community to think
creatively about ways in which to secure greater and more representative public participation in the project of democratic deliberation. In
the end, Professor Shiffrin undoubtedly is correct to assert that with
respect to encouraging public participation in self-government: "[w]e
can do better. We cannot do enough" (p. 120).

III. DISSENT IN THE SERVICE OF THE LORD: RELIGIOUSLY
MOTIVATED DISSENT AND THESECULAR STATE
Professor Stephen Carter, like Professor Shiffrin, presents a
dissent-based model for conceptualizing the freedom of speech. And,
like Shiffrin, Carter has a particular set of speakers in mind when arguing that dissent should play a greater role in contemporary political
debate. "Mainstream politics, with its arrogant rejection of religious
argument and traditional religious values, has alienated tens of millions of voters, and by no means are all of them hard-line conservatives" (p. 9). Carter's thesis is an elaborate argument in favor of taking religiously motivated dissent more seriously.
Invoking traditional Enlightenment conceptions of the state,
Carter argues that a government retains its legitimate claim to the allegiance of its people only so long as it remains responsive to their
needs, wants, and desires (pp. 7-19). Traditionally, these ideas are expressed in the maxim that just governments derive their legitimacy
from the consent of the governed, a consent that is ongoing and freely
given."° Professor Carter suggests modifying the maxim by placing
greater emphasis on the government's responsiveness to the dissent of
the governed (pp. 4-7). Invoking language in the Declaration of Inde106. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, SilencingJohn Doe: Defamation & Discoursein Cyberspace, 49 DUKE LJ. 855,860-65, 876-83 (2000).
107. See id. at 892-904, 944-46.
108. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES ON
GOVERNMENT
89-94, 95-99, 123-31, 134-42,211-43 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (1690); JEAN
JACQUES ROSSEAU, Of the Social Contract,in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER

POLITICAL WRTINGS 48-54 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans. 1997) (1762).
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pendence complaining that "[o]ur repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated Injury,"'1 9 Carter argues that legitimacy
should be as much a function of how a government responds to dissent
as it is about creating and sustaining programs that enjoy broad majoritarian support:
Perhaps governments - good and fair ones anyway -

do not after all

derive their powers from the consent of the governed. Perhaps they derive their powers instead from the dissent of the governed. For the fairness and decency of any state should be assessed not alone through a
study of whether its majorities examine it and find it good, but through a
study of whether its minorities examine it and find it good. Another way
to look at the matter is this: the justice of a state is not measured merely
by its authority's tolerance for dissent, but also by its dissenters' tolerance for authority. [p. 97]
Carter, like Shiffrin, sees dissent as essential to the construction of
a just polity. "Civic life requires dissent because it requires differences
of opinion in order to spark the dialogues from which the community
thrives and grows."'1' Yet, "[i]n contemporary America... the nation
is all too full of people and groups who insist that the political sovereign does not hear their voices" (p. 18). If something is not done to
correct this state of affairs, Carter warns that "disaffection may turn to
disallegiance" (p. 18).
A.

Community, Power, and the Importance of Dissent

Majorities naturally attempt to inculcate a common set of values as
part of an ongoing effort to maintain community identity. Sometimes
these efforts are benign, and sometimes they are not. Carter provides
a historical sketch of the use of the public schools as a tool in forging a
single, Protestant concept of American citizenship (pp. 19-45). In
many respects, this effort was less about ensuring universal education
and civic participation than about destroying pre-existing ties to Old
World institutions, such as the Roman Catholic Church.
One study of textbooks concluded that the aim of the public schools by
the turn of the century was to replace the love of what was viewed as a
foreign God with a love of America as a country - very much the KnowNothing program, long after the party itself vanished from the scene.
[pp. 44-45; footnote omitted]
Carter believes that a project of using the public schools to inculcate
Protestant values has now evolved into a project of teaching purely
secular values, including open disrespect for religion and religious institutions (pp. 44-49). He warns that the government sows the "seeds
of disallegiance" when "our 'free' society counts among the powers of
109. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 1776).
110. P. 16; see also Emerson, supra note 14, at 883-84.
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government the power to use education as the lever to eradicate unwanted religious traditions" (p. 47).
Unlike Shiffrin, Carter's vision of dissent is completely viewpointand speaker-neutral. "It is very much in the nature of the tools of
democratic dissent that they may be used by the bad guys as well as
the good guys" (p. 120). Carter recognizes and embraces the idea that
robust protection of dissent undoubtedly will mean that some parents
inculcate immoral and unjust ideas in their children. "The freedom of
the family to make religious choices - a freedom that is essential if
religious communities are to be able to survive by projecting their narratives over time - must include the freedom to make choices other
than the best" (p. 48). Freedom necessarily encompasses "the privilege of making mistakes" (p. 48). If the state attempts to replace parental values with the government's values, parents will respond first
with dissent and, if this proves unavailing, with disallegiance.
Professor Carter pursues this idea to its logical conclusion: a right
of revolution in the face of an unresponsive government (pp. 53-99).
In his view, we increasingly run the risk of forcing loyal, but dissenting,
citizens to consider this alternative because of the community's refusal
to take seriously their objections to a number of current social policies
(most notably including legalized abortion). Pointing to the Supreme
Court's contemporary free exercise jurisprudence as a case in point,
Carter suggests that the government's effective message to religious
minorities is "it doesn't matter if the secular sovereign makes it difficult for you to practice your religion, because there are lots of other
religions out there, and you can choose one of the others instead" (p.
57). Returning to his theme of dissent, Carter posits that although
"[i]t is, of course, vital to the notion of witness that the witnesses can
be seen and heard" the secular authorities nevertheless have sanctioned the "remov[al] of pro-life protestors from defined zones in
front of clinics where abortions are performed" (p. 60).
Properly understood and implemented, a meaningful commitment
to free speech values, at one time or another, will prove vexing to all
constituencies within the community. "This is perhaps the principal
glory of our First Amendment tradition: properly understood, it frustrates everybody - or at least everybody possessing the will to censor
debate and the political power with which to do it" (p. 65). The problem, as Carter sees it, is that religiously motivated dissent is no longer
taken seriously by either the government or the secular cultural majority. This then forces religiously motivated dissenters to consider resorting to political crimes in order to bring their concerns to the attention of the community and provoke some kind of response (pp. 67-78).
Thus, if a government meets repeated petitions with "repeated
Injuries," the government loses its right to command the allegiance of
the dissenters (pp. 9-13). At the same time, problems arise because
governments and dominant community groups often equate dissent
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with disallegiance or disloyalty (pp. 16-19). The problem is exacerbated when religious communities attempt to establish themselves as
separate communities within the larger whole (pp. 67-86). Carter acknowledges that some self-constituted groups engage in grossly antisocial behaviors, like murdering physicians who perform abortions or
bombing federal buildings. Nevertheless, "[o]ne must not make the
mistake of assuming that the violence and perhaps paranoia of these
groups is an argument against the ideal of self-constituted communities; it is simply evidence, were any needed, that there is wickedness
everywhere" (p. 83).
B.

Reaffirming the National Commitment to Dissent

Significantly, Carter's arguments are aimed far less at fringe groups
than traditional liberals, whose commitment to free speech principles
has been wavering of late."' "[I]f we are to preach more tolerance, it
is not sufficient to preach it to intolerant, divisive religionists, of which
there are many; we must preach it as well to intolerant, divisive secular
liberals, many of whom seem to value diversity across every spectrum
except the religious" (p. 85). He further posits that the success of the
liberal agenda has created ambivalence about the use of state power to
squelch dissent. "This is a greater problem for liberalism in the 1990s
than it was in the 1960s because liberalism has won so many political
battles in the intervening decades that it has developed a troubling
moral complacency, particularly with respect to the tough questioning
of authority that was once its glory" (pp. 85-86). This "complacency"
has led to free speech backsliding:
It is indeed a bit embarrassing, given the 1960s, but when today's liberals
talk about, say, protests at abortion clinics, one can hear, echoing down
time's corridors, the terrifying logic of the silencing slogan of the silent
majority days: "America - Love it or Leave It!" Which means, of
course, "Our America - do it our way or go to jail!" [p. 86]
How then, should free speech theory attempt to address the phenomenon of religiously motivated dissent? Professor Carter argues
for a "dialogue" based model in which dissent is not ignored or deval111. To the extent Professor Carter's intended audience encompasses leftists and radicals, his proposals are likely to receive a decidedly frostier reception than Professor
Shriffrin's dissent thesis. This is because Professor Carter's paradigmatic dissenters - religiously motivated opponents of abortion rights - are a group potentially silenced (or at
least muzzled) under Professor Shriffin's dissent theory of free speech. Although one should
not overgeneralize, most leftists and radicals within the legal academy support efforts to reduce gender subordination and enhance feminist agency, and therefore, would view
women's potential loss of control over reproduction as a serious setback to the cause. In this
way, Professor Carter's model of dissenters illustrates a potential objection to Professor
Shiffrin's theory, at least if one believes (as most liberals do) that the viewpoint of a speaker
generally should not prefigure whether particular speech activity merits or enjoys constitutional protection.
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ued merely because the speaker happens to possess religious motivations, or uses overtly religious arguments, for advancing her position.
Such an approach would "mean that there is nothing about the religious source of their convictions that should bar them from public dialogue - a terrible rule, and one which, as I have mentioned, would
have destroyed or severely disabled the moral arguments of both the
Abolitionist movement and the civil rights movement" (p. 93).
Professor Carter lodges his complaint not so much against Congress and the Executive Branch of the federal government, but rather
against the federal judiciary, which, in his view, has been insufficiently
protective of religiously motivated dissenters within the community.
He believes the federal courts are overconfident of their analytical capabilities; the project of judicial review (or judicial supremacy) "rests
on the foundational point that the courts are far wiser than anybody
else (sovereign or citizens) and thus must be obeyed, always and everywhere and by everyone. Period" (p. 110).

In a move reminiscent of Abraham Lincoln's scathing critique of
the then-recent Dred Scott"2 decision during the Lincoln-Douglas debates,' Professor Carter questions whether judicial decisions should
be obeyed if they reject or betray the fundamental moral commitments of the community. "[I]t is not obvious, that people will obey judicial opinions that are wrongheaded, and even less obvious that they
should" (p. 114). Contemporary liberal reverence for the courts, sug-

gests Carter, is a lingering shadow of the civil rights movement.
But that history is of use only if we suppose it'to prove that judges will
usually be wiser than politicians. At times they are - but over the long
run, the human beings who judge are every bit as capable of error and
wickedness as the human beings who legislate or carry the laws into execution. [p. 131]
Professor Carter is undoubtedly correct. The same Supreme Court
that gave us Brown v. Board of Education"4 also gave us Dred Scott v.
Sandford"5 and Plessy v. Ferguson"6 (not to mention Korematsu"7 and
Bowers v. Hardwick"'). Simply put, there is no reason to believe that
112. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
113. See The First Joint Debate at Ottawa (Aug. 21,1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS
DEBATES 40, 74-77 (Harold Holzer ed., 1993); The Third Joint Debate at Jonesboro (Sept.
15, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra, at 136, 168-72; The Fifth Joint Debate at Gatesburg (Oct. 7, 1858), in TiE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra, at 234, 26264; The Seventh Joint Debate at Alton (Oct. 15, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS
DEBATES, supra,at 321,360-62.

114. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

115.
116.
117.
118.

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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the courts alone possess the ability to engage in virtuous or just policymaking, or that they will do so on a consistent basis.1" 9 Of course,
judges, unlike members of Congress or the President, do not face
regular democratic accountability (i.e., the need to seek and obtain reelection to office). Institutionally, at least, they are better positioned
to interpose themselves between the wishes of the majority and the
rights of an unpopular minority. 2 ' Although Professor Carter rightly
questions whether the federal judiciary's decisions routinely promote
justice, in some respects he fails to credit the judiciary for its moral

victories.
For example, Professor Carter makes much of the fact that the
Supreme Court upheld "breach of the peace" convictions against
Martin Luther King, Jr. and other members of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference for marching in Birmingham, Alabama on
Easter Sunday without a permit.12 He does not mention that the pivotal moment of the civil rights movement - the Selma-toMontgomery March - took place under the protection of a federal
court order issued by district judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr." Given the
scope, scale, and duration of this mass protest activity, it is rather difficult to imagine how it could have taken place without the formal sanction of law.
The Selma March ignited the conscience of the national community and led to the passage of the landmark Voting Rights Act of
1 9 6 5 .13 More than any other mass-protest action, it changed the face
of the nation. Federal judicial intervention sustained the march
against the entrenched opposition of every element of the state government.2 4 Professor Carter's unqualified slashing attacks on the federal judiciary give insufficient credit to the personal and professional
sacrifices of judges like Frank M. Johnson, Jr., J. Skelly Wright, Elbert
P. Tuttle, John R. Brown, John Minor Wisdom, and Richard T.

Rives.1 5

119. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., ConstitutionalFlares: On Judges, Legislatures, and
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 49-60 (1998); cf NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-13, 123-50,
232-70 (1994).
120. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RnviEw (1980).
121. Pp. 105-10. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
122. See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965); see also Ronald J.

Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis,
104 YALE L.J. 1411 (1995).
123. See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973

(1994)); Krotoszynski, supra note 122, at 1412, 1427-28.
124. See Williams,240 F. Supp. at 105-09.
125. See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
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Professor Carter's attack on the judiciary is really in the service of
a subsidiary point, however. Given that the judiciary is not infallible,
it is entirely reasonable to suppose that citizens might profoundly disagree with a particular decision of the federal courts. In his view, Roe
v. Wade 26 presents a good example of this phenomenon. Carter argues that Roe rests not on constitutional principle, but rather on the
"moral instincts" of the Justices composing the Supreme Court's majority in favor of the result (p. 136). Given this state of affairs, he asks:
"Would it be so unreasonable for an aroused citizen - or an aroused
majority of citizens - to wonder why the judges' moral instincts are a
better extra-constitutional source than the moral instincts of the people themselves?" (p. 136). His answer: "Clearly not; nor can the
judges themselves provide a persuasive response, unless the response
indicates a willingness to engage
in that conversation - not mono'127
logue - of which Bickel wrote.
Only by taking seriously the dissent of cultural, racial, or religious
minorities can the nation lay a valid claim to respecting democratic
pluralism. "In all of this, my concern has been for the autonomy of
the many communities - particularly, but not exclusively, religious
communities - into which democratic citizens organize themselves"
(p. 142). Respect for democratic pluralism means respecting opinions
that may seem wrongheaded, or even evil: "That the mores of some
communities may seem to be morally objectionable or simply bizarre
only fortifies the point, for it is only through the willingness to accept
these differences that we become truly democratic" (p. 142). Rather
than using law to disperse and destroy these self-constituted communities, government "should more properly serve as a means to preserve
the diversity among our communities of meaning" (p. 142).
C. Making the Case for According Religiously Motivated Dissent
GreaterSolicitude: Mixed Motives and the Need to Recognize the
Difference Between Jihad and Community Survival
One would be hard-pressed to disagree with Professor Carter's
plea that we take the opinions of religiously motivated dissenters seriously. Undoubtedly, such speakers often fail to secure a meaningful
hearing because many object to the idea of imposing public policies on
the general community based on a particular set of religious commitments. Indeed, when John Kennedy ran for president in 1960, many
commentators worried about whether Kennedy would make inde126. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
127. P. 136. See BICKEL, supra note 120, at 26, 65-72, 117, 127-33, 205-06, 235-43, 261;
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 11041 (1975); see also Barry
Friendman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 577, 586-90, 653-80 (1993);

Krotoszynski, supra note 119, at 46.
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pendent policy determinations free and clear of Vatican influence.Y,
More recently, New York governor Mario Cuomo wrestled with the

problem of squaring his official duties with his Catholic faith, particularly with regard to the abortion issue.'2

At the same time, there is something disturbing about a particular
religious sect's attempting to use the levers of secular power to achieve
sectarian aims. For example, the recent controversy in Kansas over
the teaching of evolution strongly suggests that religious dissenters do

not merely want a hearing, they want to win the debate and implement

their policy views on the entire political community.13 The Kansas
state school board's decision to remove evolution from the statemandated science curriculum was not an isolated event - across the

nation, religious fundamentalists are working daily to take
over local
31
and state school boards, often with tremendous success.

128. See LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 172
(1967); THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1960, at 259-62 (1961);
John F. Kennedy, Jr., Remarks on Church and State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1960, § 1, at 22,
reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE INAMERICAN HISTORY 190 (John F. Wilson & Donald L.
Drakeman eds., 2d ed. 1987); see also Paul J. Weithman, John Courtney Murray - Do His
Ideas Still Matter?, AMERICA, Oct. 29, 1994, at 17; Catholicism and the Campaign, 72
COMMONWEAL 507-08 (1960). In an earlier presidential campaign, the election of 1928,
New York Governor Al Smith, the Democratic nominee, came under sharp attack because
of his membership in the Roman Catholic Church and, like John F. Kennedy, found himself
forced to defend his religious associations. See Arthur Schlesinger Jr., O'Connor,Vaughan,
Cuomo, Al Smith, J.F.K., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,1990, at A31.
129. See Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and PublicMorality: A Catholic Governor's
Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13 (1984); see also Ari L. Goldman,
New York's ControversialArchbishop,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 38; Sam
Roberts, Cuomo to Challenge Archbishop over Criticism of Abortion Stand, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1984, at Al. Catholic scholars have noted the potential difficulties of remaining
faithful to the teachings of the Church while discharging a civil function. See, e.g., John H,
Garvey & Amy V. Coney, CatholicJudges in Capital Cases, 81 MARO. L. REV. 303 (1998);
John H. Garvey, The Pope'sSubmarine, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849 (1993).
130. See Pam Belluck, Board for Kansas Deletes Evolution from Curriculum, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, at Al; Jacques Steinberg, Evolution Struggle Shifts to Kansas School
Districts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1999, at Al. The Kansas School Board came under sharp
criticism for its decision. Noted Harvard paleontologist, Stephen Jay Gould, described the
decision as "like saying '[w]e're going to continue to teach English, but you don't have to
teach grammar,'" and predicted that the citizens of Kansas "would be profoundly embarrassed by the stupidity of the ruling" and "would vote that school board out of office the
next year." Claudia Dreifus, PrimordialBeasts, Creationists, and Mighty Yankees, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1999, at F3.
131. Hanna Rosin, CreationismEvolves, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1999, at Al ("In the last
four years, school boards in at least seven states - Arizona, Alabama, Illinois, New Mexico,
Texas, Kansas, and Nebraska - have tried to remove evolution from state science standards
or water down the concepts, with varying degrees of success."); see also Sandra Blakeslee, In
Schools Across the Land, a Group Mounts Counterattacks on "Creation Science," N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999, § 1, at 20; Hanna Rosin, Creationism, Coming to Life in Suburbia,
WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1999, at Al. Dr. Stephen Jay Gould blames this state of affairs on apathy toward school board elections:
The only reason it [the Kansas decision to remove evolution from the state's science curriculum) happened is that nobody votes in school board elections anymore. Thus, determined minorities can take over. It took this fundamentalist group three election cycles to
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There is something inherently destructive of political community

when one group of citizens attempts to impose theologically grounded
public policies on citizens who do not share the same set of theological
commitments.
It is one thing to say that feeding the hungry makes
for good public policy; it is another to say that, because Jesus commands the feeding of the hungry, those who oppose the policy will
surely burn in hell.33 "Competition among religions for position
within government must be avoided so that none need fear any other,
as each might otherwise seek its own establishment through government or within government."1"
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger elaborated on these concerns in his
landmark opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 5
He argued that
"[o]rdinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even
take over in Kansas. They only have a one-vote majority, 6-4. Four are up for election next
year.
Dreifus, supranote 130.
132. See Cuomo, supra note 129, at 16-20. As Governor Cuomo puts the matter:
I protect my right to be a Catholic by preserving your right to believe as a Jew, a Protestant
or non-believer, or as anything else you choose. We know that the price of seeking to force
our beliefs on others is that they might some day force theirs on us. This freedom is the fundamental strength of our unique experiment in government. In the complex interplay of
forces and considerations that go into the making of our laws and policies, its preservation
must be a pervasive and dominant concern.
Id. at 16; see also James Madison, The Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, June 20, 1785, reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 301-02
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (warning against the infusion of sectarian argumentation in public policy debates "[b]ecause it will have a... tendency to banish our Citizens"
(i.e., utterly alienate them from the project of democratic discourse on the basis of religion.)). But cf Ronald Reagan, Politicsand Morality Are Inseparable, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 7 (1984) (arguing in favor of active efforts by people of faith to seek
legislative reforms incorporating their faith-based policy preferences).
133. See Cuomo, supra note 129, at 19-20. As Justice Jackson stated the matter:
This freedom [freedom from "establishments" of religion] was first in the Bill of Rights because it was first in the forefathers' minds; it was set forth in absolute terms, and its strength
is its rigidity. It was intended not only to keep the states' hands out of religion, but to keep
religion's hands off the state, and above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out of public
life by denying to every denomination any advantage from getting control of public policy or
the public purse.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson
plainly believed that overt efforts to inject questions of faith into public policy debates might
bring about highly divisive churchtstate relationships that would undermine confidence in
the civil state and risk the autonomy of communities of faith. Of course, Professor Carter is
not arguing for the creation of John Calvin's Geneva, but he is arguing that those who advocate such arrangements receive a full and fair hearing from the general community. At least
arguably, encouraging overt efforts to give greater weight to those who generally reject a
strict separation of church doctrine and matters of state risks the advent of irreconcilable
divisions within the community. One need look no further than modem day Northern Ireland to see the potential negative effects of overtly evangelized politics.
134. William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall - A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770,777-78.
135. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political division along religious lines was one
of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended
to protect. 13 6 In Burger's view, "[t]he potential divisiveness of such
13 This does not
conflict is a threat to the normal political process.""
mean, of course, that religiously motivated dissent should not enjoy
First Amendment protection. Rather, it suggests that, in a pluralistic
community, constituted by individuals possessing myriad racial, cultural, and religious identities, overt efforts to impose public policies
based on faith-based understandings of appropriate human behavior
might not represent the best course of action for the community. In
public policy terms, efforts to inject facially theological arguments into
policy debates (i.e., "God commands that abortion be treated as murder") run a serious risk of ending, rather than facilitating, the conversation. Moreover, it is far from clear that a law passed solely in order
to satisfy religious scruples (or primarily for that purpose) would pass
muster under Establishment Clause analysis."'
Professor Carter makes strong arguments for the benefits of religiously motivated dissent, and posits some rather nasty consequences of
completely ignoring such speakers, but he never really attempts to
present or consider the other side of the question. Is self-consciously
religiously motivated public policy sustainable in a pluralistic democracy? This is a question that Carter never asks, much less answers.
Consider, for example, anti-abortion protestors. Professor Carter
consistently uses anti-abortion protestors as his paradigm of ignored,
slighted, and legally marginalized religiously motivated dissenters. He
argues strongly that the general community must engage such dissenters on the merits of their position in an ongoing "dialogue" about
community values (pp. 20, 60-61, 74-81, 90-95, 134-36). The problem,
of course, is that the most committed anti-abortion protestors view
abortion as murder - no different than randomly shooting a passerby
on the street. Carter seems to be aware of this faction of the pro-life
movement:
After all, if a pro-life protester is persuaded by his religious understanding that fetuses are human, that abortion is murder, and that physicians
136. Id. at 622; see also Paul A. Freund, PublicAid to ParochialSchools, 82 HARv. L.

REv.1680, 1692 (1969) ("While political debate and division is normally a wholesome process for reaching viable accommodations, political division on religious lines is one of the
principal evils that the first amendment sought to forestall.").
137. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
13& See id. at 612-13 (holding that a "statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion'" (citations omitted)). A law passed in order to satisfy the religious convictions of a particular religious sect arguably lacks a secular purpose and, moreover, directly advances a
particular religion's social objectives.
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who perform abortions are thus, literally, baby-killers, why (other than
moral cowardice, a fear to face the judgment of the society) should he

not kill the doctors? [p. 74]
The question that begs to be asked is: How can one sustain a meaningful dialogue with such a person? Although Carter faults secular
liberals for dismissing, out-of-hand, the viewpoints of religious dissenters, he fails to acknowledge the unwillingness of many religious
dissenters to compromise. Compromise, of course, is the mortar of
democratic self-government.
Thus, a careful reader might lodge a rather basic objection to Professor Carter's theory of free speech: he seeks a dialogue with persons
unwilling to compromise what they believe to be divinely ordered
resolutions to hotly contested questions of public policy. A person
who believes that God has commanded a particular result is unlikely
to strike a deal that involves anything short of total victory.
As the existential philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard, explained so
eloquently, faith ceases to be faith when one has reasons for holding a
particular belief.'39 In Kierkegaard's view, real faith requires the crucifixion of reason and the embrace of the "absurd" - strongly held, en-

tirely intuitive convictions that one simply cannot justify through ra-

tional explication."4 Thus, the very idea of rational dialogue about
matters of faith confronts a difficulty: faith does not subsist on reason,
139. See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, Concluding Unscientific Postscriptto the "Philosophical Fragments". An Existential Contribution by Johannes Climacus, reprinted in A
KIERKEGAARD ANTHOLOGY 190, 214-216 (Robert Bretall ed., 1946) (1843) [hereinafter
Kierkegaard, Postscript];SOREN KIERKEGAARD, Fearand Trembling: A DialecticalLyric,
reprintedin A KIERKEGAARD ANTHOLOGY, supra, at 116, 130-34 [hereinafter Kierkegaard,
Fearand Trembling]. As Kierkegaard puts the matter:
Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual's inwardness and the objective uncertainty. If Iam capable of grasping
God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I must believe. If I
wish to preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent upon holding fast to objective uncertainty, so that in the objective uncertainty I am out "upon the seven fathoms of water"
and yet believe.
KIERKEGAARD, Postscript,supra,at 215.
140. See KIERKEGAARD, Postscript,supra note 139, at 255 ("Faith is the objective uncertainty along with the repulsion of the absurd held fast in the passion of inwardness, which
precisely is inwardness potentiated to the highest degree."). In this regard, it bears noting
that Abraham serves as Kierkegaard's archetype of faith because Abraham was prepared to
violate all universalist ethical prescriptions by murdering his son, Isaac. See KIERKEGAARD,
Fearand Trembling, supra note 139, at 130-34. Abraham possessed such faith that he was
willing to murder his own son because he believed that God required him to do so. See id.
Of course, one longs to ask the question: "What if Abraham was wrong about God's will?"
As Kierkegaard aptly notes, "[t]herefore, although Abraham arouses my admiration, he at
the same time appalls me." Id. at 133. Abraham's story represents an individual transcending traditional notions of morality because faith requires him to do so. "The story of
Abraham contains therefore a teleological suspension of the ethical." Id. at 134. Abraham
transcends the universal - "[i]f such is not the position of Abraham, then he is not even a
tragic hero but a murderer." Id. Accordingly, "[fjaith is a miracle, and yet man is not excluded from it; for that in which all human life is unified is passion, and faith is a passion."
Id.
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but belief. There is little cause to suppose that a dialogue challenging
someone's most fundamental teleological commitments will prove
fruitful: "to him who follows the narrow
way of faith, no one can give
141
counsel, him no one can understand.
In light of the bitter disagreements associated with knowing
"God's will," the history of theocratic states has not been particularly
happy, and the admixture of religion and politics has led to a great
deal of bloodshed throughout human history. 42 As Professor William
Van Alstyne has explained, "The idea of a civil nation of free people,
diverse in their thoughts, equal in their citizenship, and with none to
feel alien, outcast, or stranger in relation to civil authority, remains
powerful and compelling."' 43 The problem boils down to this: How
does one maintain a meaningful dialogue with a person who, by divine
ordinance, cannot compromise her demands of the secular state? Professor Carter does not offer much help on this aspect of the problem.
Moreover, given that the secular state permits citizens to organize
into separate "communities within the community," the state's tolerance for a particular behavior does not effectively mean that all citizens must engage in the behavior. If a particular religious community
rejects homosexual sodomy as an abomination in the sight of God, it is
quite free to maintain that belief and its members are free to conduct
their sexual lives in accordance with it. The group's members may
teach this value to their children and remove them from the public
schools in order to ensure that secular authorities do not inculcate
contrary values. 44 Beyond this, however, I am not sure what claim of
right the self-constituted religious community should have over the
rest of the community.
That is to say, if a majority of citizens embrace sexual autonomy as
an official state policy, I do not think that a religious dissenter has a
right to demand the reenactment of the proscription against sodomy.
I do not disagree with Carter that a person seeking such a legislative
change ought to be permitted to speak in favor of a return to traditional morals,'145 but a failure on the part of the community to act on
that suggestion, or even to afford the religiously motivated dissenter a
polite audience, would not justify acts of terrorism against the state by
the religious dissenter.
141. KIERKEGAARD, Fearand Trembling,supra note 139, at 134.
142. The Thirty Years' War is one example; the present dysfunctions in Northern
Ireland provide yet another. When religionists attempt to use the secular state as a tool of
indoctrination (whether voluntary or not), those who are not co-religionists are likely to respond negatively (not to put too fine a point on the matter).
143. Van Alstyne, supranote 134, at 787.
144. The Constitution certainly would privilege such a decision. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

145. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296,308-10 (1940).
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Thus, if the community affords greater opportunities for religious
dissent, but nevertheless rejects the positions advanced by the religious dissenters, I am not at all convinced that the religious dissenters
will let the matter go. To put the matter in Carter's nomenclature, after the "repeated petitions" of the anti-sodomy religious dissenters fail
to achieve meaningful social and legal reforms, are they then free to
proclaim their "disallegiance" from the community and take up armed
resistance?' 16 Portions of Professor Carter's book suggest that this result is not untenable (pp. 19-27, 73-89).
At bottom, Professor Carter offers up a consequentialist vision of
free speech: take seriously dissent from disaffected members of the
community, be prepared to defend the existing social ordering on the
merits, or face the growing possibility of dissenters renouncing their
loyalty to the government and seeking change through an inherent
right of revolution. At the same time, he emphasizes that "I am not
insisting that the ability of a community to define itself must be without limits" (p. 89). Nevertheless, Carter concludes that:
in a society founded on -a Declaration of Independence that warns
against the rejection of repeated petitions of the citizenry, those limits
should be few, and we must avoid the totalizing tendency to treat all of
our deeply held values as principles by which not only the national sovereign but every community, no matter how constituted, must be bound.
[p. 89]
The problem, of course, is that religious dissenters not only want to be
self-regulating (to a large extent they already are), but rather that they
wish to impose a theocratically inspired set of health, safety, and morals regulations on everybody else!
Again, I do not disagree with Professor Carter's suggestion that
religious dissenters bent on imposing "totalizing" theocratic visions on
the body politic should have their say; the First Amendment should, at
a minimum, debar government from picking and choosing free speech
winners and free speech losers.147 Religiously motivated speakers
146. Actually, Mr. Eric Robert Rudolph appears to have jumped the gun. In the last
three years, he allegedly has bombed the Atlanta Olympic festivities, a lesbian bar, and several abortion clinics. See Thomas B. Edsall, Clinic Bombing Probed For Link to Rudolph,
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1999, at A20; Sue Anne Pressley, Carolinians Doubt Rudolph Is
Hiding In Their Mountains,WASH. POST, Mar. 31,1999, at A3. No serious person could argue that Mr. Rudolph's actions are justified because the general community decided to hold
an international athletic competition that celebrates international cooperation, tolerates bars
catering to a predominantly lesbian clientele, and permits abortion services. But see Carolyn
Tuft & Joe Holleman, Inside the Christian Identity Movement, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Mar. 5, 2000, at A8 (describing the rise of the Christian Identity movement and the penchant
of some adherents to use violence when less drastic approaches fail to achieve social
change).
147. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940); see also Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951). But cf. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Womens' Health Ctrs, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994);
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
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should (and do) enjoy the same free speech rights as those engaged in
nonreligiously motivated speech activities.1" That said, I worry about
the implications of Professor Carter's theory when the religious dissenters fail to convince the general public to embrace their vision for a
virtuous community. Perhaps he seriously believes that a polite audience will satisfy religious dissenters, even if they inevitably fail to secure meaningful reforms. One would have reason to believe, however,
that Jehovah might demand something more than democratic discourse, if democratic discourse fails to get the job done.
With respect to homosexuality, Professor Carter suggests that
meeting religious objections would be a relatively simple task:
So, even though, for reasons I have already noted, it is foolish and historically naive to meet religious objections to homosexuality by asserting
that religionists cannot impose their moral judgments on anybody else, it
strikes me as fairly easy to meet the objections on the merits, that is, to
defend the privacy right that covers sexual conduct. [p. 91]
It might be easy to make logical arguments about the benefits of
living in a society that respects sexual autonomy as an integral aspect
of personal autonomy, or personal privacy. It is quite another thing to
believe that such arguments would prove persuasive to someone who
takes Leviticus literally, and believes Leviticus to be the divine word
of God made known to man. Indeed, if the argument were so selfevident and easy to make convincingly, one might ask Professor
Carter to explain the seeming anomaly of Bowers v. Hardwick,'49 a
case in which the Chief Justice of the United States invokes the
"Judeao-Christian" proscription against homosexual sodomy as a sufficient reason for sustaining a Georgia law prohibiting it.150
The fact of the matter is that reasoned discourse stands little
chance against the divine word of God. Thus, it seems hopelessly naIve to suggest that
[o]ne triumphs, in other words, by doing that which I have stressed elsewhere is the only democratic way to meet religious claims of morality in
the public square: to argue against them on the merits, by presenting the
case for defeating them in terms independent of the religious source of
the values in question. [p. 91]
But why is there any reason to believe that reasoned discourse will be
at all convincing to a person who sincerely believes she is attempting
to do God's will? Indeed, a person who devoutly believes that, by ob148. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,392-95
(1993) (prohibiting viewpoint discrimination against religiously motivated speakers wishing
to use school facilities after-hours for a film series); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951).
149. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
150. See id. at 196 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
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taining (or, as is often the case preserving) a proscription against a
particular sexual activity, she will be "saving" potential sinners from
their own base appetites is unlikely to be moved by policy arguments,
no matter how artfully constructed. It is more than ironic that Professor Carter would call for respect and tolerance of people who, in many
instances, do not accord similar respect and tolerance to sexual minorities. How does the Christian so-called "formerly gay" movement
fit into Professor Carter's moral universe? Why should a gay man or

lesbian take seriously someone who views their most basic life choices
as an abomination, something to be "fixed," whether voluntarily or

not?
Perhaps anticipating these criticisms, Professor Carter notes that

"[a]s a scholar and citizen who is a Christian, I worry about the obsession of some members of my faith with rules to govern sexuality" (p.
91). With all due respect, tell that to the parents of Matthew Shepard.
Moreover, please explain to them why the anti-gay protestors at
Matthew's funeral merit careful and solicitous consideration, as these
zealots chant that their son bums in hell because "God hates fags." '

The remarkable cruelty of some "religious dissenters" toward sexual
minorities has become so extreme'1 2 that even religious leaders long
151. Associated Press, Protest Greets Meeting on Antigay Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1999, at A30. Among the anti-gay protests were signs reading "Matt is in hell and God hates
fags," Scott Simon & Mark Roberts, Matthew Shepard Funeral,NPR Weekend Saturday,
Transcript No. 98101703-214 (Oct. 17, - 1998), "No Fags in Heaven" and "No Tears for
Queers," Tom Kenworthy, A Gentle SpiritMourned, THE RECORD, Oct. 17, 1999, at Al. In
a circus-like atmosphere, anti-gay protestors screamed that "fags, if you don't repent, he will
burn in hell right now," "it's the word of God," Simon & Roberts, supra, "God don't live by
Sodom and Gomorra," "He lived in shame, he died in shame," Dennis Shepard et al.,
ABC
Nightline, Transcript # 98101601-j07 (Oct. 16, 1998), and "Matthew was wicked!," Registers
Wire Service, Nation Grievesfor Shepard,DES MoINES REGISTER, Oct. 17, 1999, at 1. Just
in case, the protestors also "blanketed the local media with profane leaflets to make sure
that they were noticed." Shepard et al., supra. Surely National Public Radio commentator,
Scott Simon, got it exactly right when, in opening a report on Matthew Shepard's funeral, he
began by noting that "[t]he greatest tragedy that life can call upon a parent to experience is
to bury a child." Simon & Roberts, supra. To expose Mr. and Mrs. Shepard to homophobic
taunts and jeers at the funeral of their murdered son represents an almost unimaginable capacity for cruelty.
152. Religiously motivated bigots regularly picket political meetings of gay and lesbian
organizations, see Peter Baker, Clinton Equates Gay Rights, Civil Rights, WASH. POST, Nov.
9, 1997, at A18 (reporting that during a Human Rights Campaign fundraiser featuring President Clinton, a "small cluster of people holding signs saying 'God Hates Fags'" stood outside the hotel); at religious celebrations of gays and lesbians, see Rene Sanchez, At Gay
Wedding, Methodists Take A Vow Against Church Ban, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1999, at A3
(reporting that outside a convention center where two lesbians were being married by a
Methodist minister, "the mood was tense. Under the close watch of police officers on
horseback, about a dozen protesters who were kept across the street railed against homosexuality, waving signs such as 'God Hates Fags' "); and even, sadly, at the funerals of gay
men who die of AIDS or at the hands of bigots, see Associated Press, ProtestGreets Meeting
on Antigay Violence, N.Y. TimES, Oct. 24, 1999, at A30 (noting that Rev. Fred Phelps and
other Christian protesters "taunted gays at the funeral of Matthew Shepard"); Annie
Gowen, Holy Hell, WASH. POST, Nov. 12,1995, at F1 ("Phelps pickets funerals of AIDS victims."). Given the utter incivility of these religiously motivated speakers, it is difficult to un-
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associated with anti-gay speech activities have taken great pains, of
late, to show that they hate the sin but love the sinner.'53
The infamous Reverend Fred Phelps, of Topeka, Kansas, provides
a useful illustration. Rev. Phelps regularly pickets churches in Topeka
(and elsewhere) that he deems insufficiently committed to eradicating
homosexuality, welcoming worshippers with greetings such as
"Sodom! That's a sodomite church!," and "It's a leper colony. Unclean! Unclean!"154 Phelps and his supporters told a local Episcopal
minister that he "drink[s] anal blood at the altar of the sphincter" and
chanted "Rectum Bob, smells like his name."'155 Then, there are the
good old standbys on signs, placards, and t-shirts: "Thank God for
AIDS," "Fags Burn in Hell," and "God Hates Fags." 156 Phelps is an
apostle of hate, who nevertheless claims that his mission has divine
'
sanction because "God hates them [homosexuals] too."157
Professor
Carter cites Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. as a paradigm of the
religiously motivated dissenter. The problem, of course, is that not all
religious dissenters will pursue a more just ordering of the community
- witness Rev. Phelps.
At an even more extreme position from Rev. Phelps, consider
Benjamin Matthew Williams, another deeply committed person of
faith who, in July 1999, shot and killed a gay couple in Sacramento,
California. In an interview with a reporter from a local newspaper,
Williams explained that "I'm not guilty of murder." Why? "I'm guilty
of obeying the laws of the Creator.... So many people claim to be
Christians and complain about all these things their religion says are a
sin, but they're not willing to do anything about it."'58 Obviously, it
would be grossly unfair to characterize all religious dissenters as having a common cause with persons like Rev. Phelps or Mr. Williams.
Nevertheless, people like Phelps and Williams are engaged in religderstand why Professor Carter believes that the general community owes them anything
more than a polite hearing on the merits of their positions.

153. See Frank Rich, Has Jerry Falwell Seen the Light?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1999, at
A17. As Rev. Falwell recently put the matter, "Many of us pastors like to talk about loving
the sinner but hating the sin... [but] unfortunately, that statement has often become a
meaningless cliche... [because] we too often fall short of the mark of... truly loving the
sinner." Id. (last omission in original). Rev. Falwell explained that "[a]dmittedly, evangeli-

cals have not exhibited an ability to build a bond of friendship to the gay and lesbian community. We've said to go somewhere else, we don't need you here [at] our churches." Id,

(alteration in original).
154. Gowen, supra note 152.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.

158. Rich, supra note 153; see also Bailey, supra note 69 ("Benjamin Williams said the
slaying of the gay couple was justified as an execution because they had violated biblical law.
He said his defense in the murder case will be based on his belief that the Bible condemns
homosexuality as a crime punishable by death.").
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iously motivated dissent.' To the extent that Professor Carter could
be understood to seek a careful hearing of the views expressed by such
folk and their ilk, he asks far too much of the community in general
and sexual minorities in particular."6 The First Amendment might require that people who cheerfully assert that "Fag is a good Bible word,
don't forget,"'' be free of direct government censorship. 62 It does not
require that the community take them or their views seriously.
Professor Carter makes frequent reference to anti-abortion protestors as models of those engaged in religiously motivated dissent (pp.
19-21, 60-61, 80-81, 89-95, 134-36). As with anti-gay protestors, the
tactics of some in the pro-life movement breach even the most minimalist expectations of civility. Although "[p]eaceful picketing has rou-

tinely occurred outside clinics, with demonstrators carrying signs or
placards expressing their viewpoint that abortion is murder," anti-

abortion protest activities have gone well beyond relatively passive
picketing efforts "to [include the] disruptive use of bullhorns, the
forming of a 'gauntlet' through which patients must pass, the photographing of patients, and the taunting of clinic personnel."'63 Some
pro-life activists engage in "sidewalk counseling," which can involve
anything from attempts to engage a patient in a conversation about
her abortion decision to threats and physical intimidation. "Over the
years and recently with greater frequency, clinic protest has escalated

159. The Supreme Court has made clear that expressive conduct constitutes speech,
even if it is not constitutionally protected under all circumstances. See Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 402-06 (1989); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-78 (1968).
160. In this regard, it is difficult to find much moral fault with the "angry mob" that
pelted Phelps and his disciples "with eggs and excrement" as they attempted to protest at the
funeral of gay writer Randy Shilts, who died of AIDS. See Gowen, supra note 152. As a
legal matter, Reverend Phelps is, of course, entitled to the fullest protection that the First
Amendment has to offer. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1951); see also
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 875, 878-80 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). As Justice Frankfurter succinctly put the matter, "The
State cannot of course forbid public proselytizing or religious argument merely because
public officials disapprove the speaker's views." Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 282 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
161. Gowen, supra note 152 (quoting Rev. Phelps).
162. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-11 (1940); see also Niemotoko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1951); id. at 273, 282-89 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). As
Justice Blackmun explained in Pico, "our precedents command the conclusion that the state
may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that idea
for partisan or political reasons." Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
163. Laurence J. Eisenstein & Steven Semeraro, Abortion Clinic Protest and the First
Amendment, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 221, 222-23 (1993); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 171 (1990) (reporting that the pro-life movement's
tactics "have included picketing clinics and the homes of clinic staffs, shouting at women
who seek abortions, pelting pregnant teenagers with plastic replicas of fetuses, harassing
clinic employees, chaining themselves to doors, and lying motionless in streets and driveways").
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in scale and intensity."'" 4 "For many women and teenage girls, Operation Rescue's blockades have turned the experience of seeking an
abortion into a nightmare of jeering demonstrators, a spectacle that in
turn attracts the added horror of media coverage of this intensely personal decision."'" Moreover, speech activity has given way to violent
expressive conduct: "More violent methods of protest, such as firebombing and arson, are not uncommon occurrences at clinics that
provide abortion and family planning and referral services. '' "T
In light of the increased passion of pro-life protestors, state and
federal courts have proved willing to limit pro-life protestors' speech
activities, issuing injunctions that limit not only attempts to impede
physical access to clinics, but also prohibiting sidewalk counseling and
requiring "that protestors act in a non-threatening manner (e.g., no
more than two protestors may approach a patient), remain reasonably
quiet, and cease their counseling if the patient expresses a desire not
to hear it."' 67 To be sure, behavior sufficient to constitute an assault,
even if engaged in for the purpose of registering opposition to legalized abortion, should not enjoy constitutional protection. That said, it
is difficult to square basic free speech theory with restrictions that require protestors to cease speaking when asked to stop or that require
protestors to remain "reasonably quiet." It is unthinkable that such
restrictions would be sustained against protestors objecting to racial
l
discrimination."M
Although courts have responded to the fact of ongoing clinic violence with increasingly broad injunctive relief, fringe
pro-life groups have pledged to continue using force to stop the provision of abortion services, up to and including murdering physicians
providing abortions and their staff members.'69
164. Eisenstein & Semeraro, supra note 163, at 225.
165. TRIBE, supra note 163, at 172.
166. Eisenstein & Semeraro, supra note 163, at 225; see also FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO
CLTNIC ENTRANCES ACT OF 1994, S.REP. NO. 636, at 6-10 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 699,703-707 (describing the growing problem of violence at abortion clinics).
167. Eisenstein & Semeraro, supra note 163, at 231.
168. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
169. See Arianne K. Tepper, Comment, In Your F.A.C.E.: FederalEnforcement of the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, 17 PACE L. REv. 489, 492-95, 535-40
(1997). Roy McMillan, a member of the Mississippi Abortion Abolition Society, frames the
issue in very plain language:
It is justifiable to shoot abortionists. It would be immoral not to do so when all else has
failed. The tide's been turning for the past year and a half. People are realizing that violence, violent tactics and shootings are becoming more effective. I have no problem predicting that more doctors will be killed. It's the biblical mandate to protect the innocent unborn.
Marc Cooper, The Changing Landscape of Abortion, GLAMOUR, Aug. 1995, at 251 (inset
box). A Mobile, Alabama Roman Catholic priest, Rev. David Trosch, has gone so far as to
predict that politicians who support abortion rights will be assassinated: "Perhaps, even
probably, the lives of those politicians who fail to strongly oppose abortion will be at risk."
Tepper, supra,at 494.
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The Reverend David C. Trosch, a defrocked Roman Catholic
priest from Mobile, Alabama, teaches that the murder of abortion
providers is morally justified: "[W]e will see the beginning of massive
killing of abortionists and their staffs" because killing those involved
17
in providing abortions constitutes "justifiable homicide.""
In his
view, "[d]efending innocent human life is not murder," '' and
"Catholic theology is very clear that the innocent are to be protected.
'
And the death of an assailant, if warranted, is commendable."172
Another zealot, Don Treshman, argues that "[w]e're in a war" and "[t]he
only thing is that until recently the casualties have only been on one
side. There are 30 million dead babies and only five people on the
other side, so it's really nothing to get all excited about."173
Allowing that anti-abortion protestors have fared worse than antigay protestors in Congress and in the courts,174 the same question
raised in the context of anti-gay protests applies with full force in this
context: how does one engage in a dialogue with someone who sincerely believes that God commands an immediate end to abortion
services on demand (and by any means necessary)? The more extreme members of the pro-life movement openly promise to use violence if they fail to achieve political results within a time certain and
no amount of dialogue is likely to alter their point of view.
Of course, it might be desirable for members of the community to
attempt to engage these angry citizens - just as such an intervention
might be useful with Rev. Phelps or Mr. Williams. Undoubtedly, some
members of the pro-life movement might be open to compromise or,
having been given a respectful audience, might agree to abjure violence in support of the pro-life cause. To this extent then, attempts at
dialogue could produce some positive results on a case-by-case basis.
It seems hopelessly optimistic to think, however, that Rev. Trosch
(and others like him) will agree to accept any outcome other than total
victory.' 5 Moreover, clinic patients, staff, and physicians - the usual
170. Laurie Goodstein, Suspended Priest Preaches "New Theology" of Antiabortion

Homicide, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1994, at A3; see also Gustav Niebuhr, To Church'sDismay,
Priest Talks of "JustifiableHomicide" of Abortion Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at
A12.
171. Niebuhr, supra note 170, at A12.
172. Colman McCarthy, Kennedy, the Church and Dissent, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1994,
at B1l.
173. Catherine S. Manegold, Anti-Abortion Killing: The Movement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
1995, at A26.

174. That is to say, no federal statute authorizes injunctive relief against anti-gay protests, nor have courts issued injunctions to limit the antics of Rev. Phelps and his merry
band.
175. See, e.g., John Kifner, Finding a Common Foe, Fringe Groups Join Forces, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, § 4, at 3 (describing the activities and attitudes of violent anti-abortion
protestors, including Neal Horsley, "who maintains an anti-abortion Web site with a logo of
dripping blood and a list of doctors who perform abortions - their names are crossed out if
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audience for such speech activities - have no moral or civic obligation
to attempt such an effort and their failure to176attempt a dialogue should
not be construed as an excuse for violence.
Neither the criminal activities nor the gross and anti-social behavior of some anti-abortion protestors should lead courts or legislatures
to conclude that all anti-abortion speech activities - even disruptive
protests at the clinics themselves - should be unprotected. Simply
put, anti-abortion protestors should not be subjected to viewpointbased legislative and judicial limits on their speech activities. That
said, one would understand completely if a clinic patient or staff
member faced with a fetus-wielding protestor were to abjure any efforts at dialogue and engagement.
In short, Professor Carter is undoubtedly correct to assert that religious dissenters should enjoy the same free speech privileges as those
who base their dissent on secular grounds. He also is correct to note
that religiously motivated speakers have led important social reform
movements, including both the abolition and civil rights movements.
At the same time, one should not forget that religiously motivated
speakers also led witch hunts, the Inquisition, and the Crusades. So,
just as federal judges do not possess perfect moral vision, one should
not suppose that religiously motivated dissenters always support justice (or, to use the language of belief, properly understand God's will).
To the extent that one does not share a religious dissenter's theological commitments, and to the extent that the religious dissenter's
they are killed"). Mr. Horsley seems to bear out Professor Carter's dire predictions; he justifies the murder of clinic personnel as follows:
The Federal government made up its mind to block any nonviolent attempt to stop abortion ....The Federal Government literally drove men mad, moved them to execute abortionists. When a Federal monolithic government begins to crush the rights of a minority, if
the issues truly matter, fighting men rise up and do the things that fighting men do. In the
life and death struggle to stop this unjustified slaughter, Christian men are looking down the
barrel of a rifle.

Id. Of course, given Mr. Horsley's description of his intended object - "stopping abortion"
- anything short of a total ban or prohibition on abortions would not be acceptable.
176. One should note that Professor Carter never embraces or endorses violence as a

consequence of failing to take religiously motivated dissenters seriously - he simply predicts that a failure to maintain a meaningful dialogue increases the probability of a resort to

violence, without reaching any definitive conclusions about the moral or legal status of such
a response. Pp. 9-13, 73-78, 80-86. In my view, dissatisfaction with the results of the political
process in the contemporary United States should almost never serve as an excuse to engage
in acts of political terrorism. See Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Civil Disobedienceand the

Law, 44 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3-9 (1969) (arguing that "strong moral conviction is not all that is
required to turn breaking the law into a service that benefits society," noting that "civil disobedience necessarily involves violation of the law, and the law can make no provision for its
violation except to hold the offender liable for punishment," rejecting, in unqualified lan-

guage, the use of violence in aid of any political, social, religious, or economic objective, and
concluding that, in the contemporary United States, one should embrace "an almost irrebutable presumption that civil disobedience is not justified"). Although Professor Carter does
not embrace violence as a response to marginalizing religious dissent, he does not squarely
denounce it. Pp. 75,77-78.
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position rests on these commitments, I disagree with Professor Carter
that merely pointing out that fact fails to constitute an adequate response by the community. If a religious dissenter asserts that "God
hates fags" and therefore sodomy laws should be strictly enforced, it is
more than an adequate response to assert that "my God does not hold
such an attitude toward sexual minorities." Religious dissenters do
not have a right to force the general community to defend autonomyenhancing legal norms by merely asserting that "God commands
thus." To the extent that Professor Carter suggests otherwise, he
makes an unreasonable demand on the general community."7
Dissent implies an opportunity to make your case, nothing more
and nothing less. Religious dissenters should enjoy the same rights of
access as those who offer secular reasons for their dissent. The
Supreme Court's recent cases involving protests at anti-abortion clinics represent an important and unfortunate derogation from this general principle." But a right to make your case does not imply a right
to win, should your case prove unpersuasive to the community.
Moreover, just as the state cannot prescribe the manner in which one
presents her case, the state should not attempt to prescribe the manner in which citizens decide to respond to the arguments of religiously
motivated dissenters.7 9
Finally, one might question the overall accuracy of Professor
Carter's assertion that government ignores the concerns and sensibilities of traditionally religious citizens. During the current election season, both Vice-President Al Gore and Texas Governor George W.
Bush have been at great pains to share their personal relationships
with Jesus with the general electorate." ° When asked to name his "fa177. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV.
352, 401 (1985) ("[T]o demand that other people act in accord with dominant religious beliefs is to promote or impose those beliefs in an impermissible way.").
178. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,
519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). Indeed, Justice Scalia has established a pattern of voting
against granting certiorari in abortion protest decisions because "experience suggests that
seeking to bring the First Amendment to the assistance of abortion protesters is more likely
to harm the former than help the latter." Lawson v. Murray, 119 S. Ct. 387, 388 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring in denial of a writ of certiorari); see also Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S.
1110, 1116 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in a denial of a writ of certiorari) ("Last Term's decision in Madsen... has damaged the First Amendment more quickly and more severely
than I feared," but opposing review because "clarification of Madsen is... unlikely to occur
in another case involving the currently disfavored class of antiabortion protesters."). But see
Williams v. Planned Parenthood of Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 1133 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of a writ of certiorari).
179. In this regard, a careful reader should note that Professor Carter's arguments are
not constitutional in nature, but rather represent policy-based recommendations about how
private citizens should respond to the phenomenon of religiously based dissent.
180. See Maureen Dowd, Playing the Jesus Card, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1999, at A23.
"About 74 percent of those polled described themselves as religious people." John Herbers,
Religion EntersA PoliticalRevival, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 1984, § 4, at 1. With numbers like
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vorite political philosopher," Governor Bush responded "Christ, be'
cause he changed my heart."181
Gore, anxious to establish his religious
credentials, has proclaimed himself to be a "born-again Christian" on
"60 Minutes" and told columnist Sally Quinn that he regularly asks
himself "W.W.J.D." 1 This evidence strongly suggests that religiously
motivated speakers should have little to fear from Washington. As
syndicated columnist Maureen Dowd astutely observed, "When the
Kansas board of education removed evolution from the science curriculum testing to make way for creationism, neither Mr. Gore nor Mr.
Bush could
bring himself to utter a word in defense of scientific
,,1
truth. n
In a recent book examining the increasing political muscle of religious conservatives, Wendy Kaminer argues that complaints about
marginalization to the contrary, religiously conscious citizens wield
more and more secular power."8 After all, Congress and state legislatures are busily trying to post the Ten Commandments in schools and
courthouses, not remove them. 8 In a similar vein, Professor William
Van Alstyne has suggested that the problem is not the marginalization
of religiously motivated citizens, but rather a creeping risk of
theocracy:
A constitutional neologism has nearly displaced the much different figure of speech, that of a "wall of separation" between church and state,
which Thomas Jefferson once used in commemorating the ratification of
the first amendment. The neologism is that insofar as most persons are
religious, it is altogether natural that government should itself reflect that
fact in its own practices. Thus according to this neologism, it is not helpful to regard the First Amendment as having emplaced a wall separating
the practices of religion from the practices of government,
1 86 for it is not
walls, but bridges, that the first amendment contemplates.
Van Alstyne's argument is that religiously motivated activists
threaten the secular state, rather than vice-versa. Considered from
this perspective, Professor Carter's thesis that pious citizens are systhat, it seems highly unlikely that members of mainstream religious groups face a serious
prospect of being either silenced or ignored.
181. Dowd, supra note 180.
182. Id. This acronym translates to "What would Jesus do?" See id.
183. Id.; see also Dan K. Thomasson, Religion and Politics: A Volatile Mix, SUN
HERALD (Biloxi, MS), Dec. 28, 1999, at B2 (quoting the author's father as warning him to
"[b]e careful of those who wear their religion on their sleeves or who find the need to certify
themselves as true believers. They can be dangerous to the rest of us").
184. See WENDY KAMINER, SLEEPING WITH EXTRA-TERRESTRIALS: THE RISE OF
IRRATIONALISM AND THE PERILS OF PIETY (1999).

185. See Angie Cannon, Civics or Religion?: Commandments Clash, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 28, 2000, at 36 (describing various legislative proposals for posting the
Ten Commandments in public schools and other public buildings).
186. Van Alstyne, supranote 134, at 771.
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temically ignored or disempowered, represents a disconnect from contemporary political realities - at least insofar as traditional (or
"mainstream") denominations are concerned.
IV. THE COMPELLING CASE FOR ACCOMMODATING RELIGIOUSLY
MOTIVATED DISSENT AIMED AT SECURING GREATER
RESPECT FOR CULTURAL PLURALISM

Professor Carter essentially describes two fundamentally different
kinds of dissent associated with religious minorities. Religious minorities sometimes enter general public policy debates in an attempt to ensure that the civil code reflects their subjective religious commitments.
In many respects, religious minorities engaged in protest against abortion rights or gay rights fit this profile. Throughout much of The
Dissent of the Governed, Professor Carter expressly embraces this
kind of dissent aimed at recreating the general community, comprised
of both believers and non-believers, in a religious community's own
image (pp. 89-95).
On the other hand, Professor Carter correctly posits that members
of religious communities voluntarily submit to an authority wholly independent of the secular state. "[S]elf-constituted communities of
meaning, unlike the Constitution-bound political sovereigns, may censor both the words and acts of their members" (p. 87). In creating
self-constituted communities of meaning, religious organizations require the ability to make and enforce demands of their adherents. "A
community that is unable to adopt and enforce its own vision of harm,
based on its own epistemology, quickly ceases to be a community that
can engage effectively in acts of self-definition" (p. 89). Here, Carter
is not talking about religious minorities imposing their views on the
general community, but rather enjoying some measure of selfdefinition within their own self-constituted communities, communities
that exist within the larger, general community. This is a huge distinction.
Professor Carter attempts to claim the same First Amendment
status for both kinds of religiously motivated dissent (pp. 89-99). Nevertheless, arguments in favor of creating legal breathing room for religious minorities stand on a very different footing than his pleas for
the general community to consider seriously dissent aimed at establishing a theocracy. Dissent in the service of securing legislation accommodating religious practice does not represent an attempt to hijack the institutions of the civil state in the service of jihad or pose any
serious threat to the maintenance of a pluralistic democracy (pp. 12230). Both kinds of dissent register disagreement with the policies of
the general community, but it seems to me that the general community
ought to treat quite differently offensive and defensive species of religiously motivated dissent.
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When a religious minority group complains that a general law unduly burdens the ability of its members to meet their obligations of
conscience, the community has an obligation to listen. By stipulation,
discrete religious minorities are unlikely to enjoy broad representation
within democratically elected state legislatures or in the federal Congress. Accordingly, the effects of general laws on discrete religious
communities might well fail to register on the political radar screen

when a legislative body enacts a general proscription against a particular behavior or an administrative agency enacts a rule regulating a
particular kind of behavior.1 7
The Supreme Court has refused to interpret the Free Exercise
Clause as excusing members of religious minorities from compliance

with general laws."s Thus, the ability of religious minorities to obtain
exemptions from highly burdensome laws is entirely contingent on

their ability to make their case to the general community in an attempt
to build a coalition of support for legislatively modifying the general
rule that impedes their ability to practice their faith."8 9 In this sense,
then, an appeal to the body politic constitutes the only potential route
of securing effective relief from general, but highly burdensome, laws
affecting the ability of a given religion's adherents to practice their
faith in deed as well as word.1"
187. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988);
see also Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 153 nA (1938) (noting, but not
deciding, that the effect of laws on fundamental liberties, such as freedom of speech and on
"discrete and insular minorities" might require a "more searching judicial inquiry" especially
if the law at issue might "tendn seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities"); ELY, supra note 120, at 73-88, 93-94,
101-16, 135-79 (arguing that the federal courts should carefully consider the effect of their
decisions on racial and cultural minorities and should, to the extent feasible, construe constitutional text to further the process of "representation reinforcement" (i.e., enhance the relative political voice of permanent racial and cultural minorities within the political community)).
188. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
189. Of course, if a legislative body enacted a facially neutral general law, but harbored
animus toward a particular religious group when enacting the law, such that the law's real
purpose was to burden the religious community, the Free Exercise Clause would provide a
source of relief. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993). Undoubtedly, some general laws are the product of religiously motivated animus or
hatred; most, however, are not. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the most burdensome laws to a given religion necessarily will be laws enacted in an effort to burden the
group. Thus, benign neglect can be just as deadly to religious minorities as intentional discrimination. Indeed, because instances of benign neglect will not support a free exercise
claim under the ruling in Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79, they constitute a much more important
impediment to the existence of self-defining religious communities.
190. See generally Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TExAS L. REv. 209, 212-17 (1994); Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. Cr. REV. 1, 7-10, 30-39, 41-59; William W. Van
Alstyne, The Failureof the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DuKE L.J. 291, 304-06 (1996); Eugene Volokh, A Common Law
Modelfor Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1465, 1481-89 (1999).
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Before the community denies a religious community the ability to
observe the dictates of the members' collective consciences, it ought to
afford the members a fair hearing. When a religious community seeks
to establish a system of voluntary rules for its own governance, the
community's rules might well run afoul of existing general laws."'
Perhaps the best recent example involves the Native American
Church's practice of ingesting peyote incident to a sacred rite. Many
jurisdicions - not to mention the federal government - classed peyote as an addictive, anti-social drug worthy of complete proscription.
The facts are a great deal more complicated: peyote is not particularly
addictive; it happens to be a powerful emetic, limiting its intrinsic appeal to a general audience; no general street traffic in peyote exists;
and the use of peyote is integral to the religious rites of the Native
American Church."9
On these facts, the case for prohibiting the Native American
Church's members from ingesting peyote is incredibly weak. Applying a general policy against the use of psychotropic drugs for recreational purposes simply does not make sense in these circumstances,
unless the general society is committed to enforcing its notions of morality on a discrete and insular religious minority simply because it has
the raw power to do so. Over time, most jurisdictions have enacted
legislation abandoning their prohibitions against peyote, at least if
used incident to religious rites by the Native American Church." A
dialogue about the necessity of applying general anti-drug laws and
policies to peyote facilitated a reasonable accommodation of a religious minority. This is the First Amendment at its best. Moreover, if
Professor Carter is correct to suppose that "repeated injuries" will be
met at some point with armed resistance (perhaps justifiably), it is far
better to engage in a dialogue in the hopes of reaching an arrangement
that meets the needs of both the general community and the religious
minority.
191. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding against a free
exercise claim, an Air Force regulation prohibiting non-uniform headgear, including yarmulkes); Volokh, supra note 190, at 1483-84 (describing how general laws against carrying
weapons in public, arguably preclude Sikhs from wearing religiously mandated ceremonial
daggers, or kirpans, and the potential application of zoning laws to prohibit a religious group
from meeting in a private'home located in a residential area); Eugene Volokh, Intermediate
Questions of Religious Exemptions - A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOzO L.
REv. 595, 655-56 (1999) (describing the potential effects of ordinary and seemingly reasonable government decisions on persons with nondominant cultural or religious obligations).
But cf Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the then-valid
Religious Freedoms Restoration Act and holding that Sikh school children may wear kirpans to school, subject to some elementary safety concerns).
192. See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division v. Smith, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 953, 963, 983 (1998) [hereinafter Epps, Unknown God];
Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.
563,579-80 (1998) [hereinafter Epps, Free Exercise].
193. See Epps, Unknown God,supra note 192, at 999.
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In this sense, then, Professor Carter's call for the general community to respect religious dissenters and engage in dialogue with them
makes a great deal of sense. When religious minorities are seeking to
preserve their very existence - rather than attempting to impose particular theistic commitments on the general community - they must
be heard. Of course, it probably would be asking too much of government to create a First Amendment jurisprudence that drew a line
between religious speech seeking accommodation and religious peech
seeking to establish theocracy. And, as Professor Carter notes, religious communities engage in speech aimed at both objectives.
The only plausible response is to afford all religious dissent a serious hearing. When the object of the dissent is a heartfelt desire to impose a theocratically inspired rule on the general community, a polite
"thanks but no thanks" is all the response that religious minorities can
rightly demand. Just as a Jehovah's Witness has no general right to
occupy a private individual's living room, religious communities have
no general right to hijack the institutions and agencies of the civil state
in order to implement a particular version of God's will. As the
maxim teaches, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. No
matter how well-intentioned, overtly religiously inspired, general
community regulations raise very serious problems in a pluralistic society.
On the other hand, when religionists seek an accommodation to
preserve their very existence or identity, the community should be put
to the task that Professor Carter proposes: in these circumstances, the
community should be required to offer reasons in support of the application of the general rule to the religious community. Make no mistake, this is not an argument about some absolute right of the religious
community to an exemption from a generally applicable law. Instead,
it is an argument that religious communities deserve reasons from
their fellow citizens when law severs the ability of a believer to put
faith into action.
It is, of course, far easier "to say, simply, Do this - and have it
done, like the servants of the centurion in the Gospel parable" (p. 99).
As Professor Carter cautions, "[t]hat is the sense in which power tends
to corrupt, even in a democracy: when one possesses power for too
long, law becomes less the glue that knits us together than the name
that we give to the conclusions for which we would rather not offer arguments" (p. 99). Carter rightly denominates as a dangerous form of
"fundamentalism" a system in which "law need not be explained as
long as it is spelled out (inerrantly) and obeyed (unquestioningly), for
we know it to be right" (p. 99). Thus, when a law denies conscience
the freedom to act and the community refuses to give reasons for
maintaining the law, religious minorities have a legitimate objection to
the community's insensitive behavior. Given the Supreme Court's
unwillingness to balance the claims of religious minorities against the
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ability of the general community to write and enforce general rules, it
is all the more essential that the body politic take seriously religious
dissent.
V.

CONCLUSION: HEARING (DIS)HARMONIES IN THE
CHORUS OF DISSENT

There is a kind of negative synergy between Professor Shiffrin's
and Professor Carter's dissent-based theories of free speech. Professor Shiffrin conceives of a dissent-based theory of free speech as enhancing the relative voice of cultural minorities to achieve a more just
state. This project probably does not include laws criminalizing abortion and homosexual sodomy, much less laws imposing other religiously inspired limitations on personal autonomy (particularly when
these rules further marginalize already marginalized cultural minorities). Nevertheless, a dissent-based theory of the First Amendment
should create as much possibility for reactionary change as it does for
progressive change. Thus, free speech critics are probably correct to
suppose that the free speech principle is not necessarily conducive to
achieving their social agenda.
Professor Shiffrin's effort to translate the free speech principle into
a device that empowers minorities fighting for progressive causes
seems unlikely to work. To the extent that dissent protects the reactionary or racist speaker as much as the progressive speaker, it conceivably does more harm than good to the project of securing progressive change. Indeed, Professor Carter's vision of dissent would
empower those working in direct opposition to many of the causes
that Professor Shiffrin appears to hold dear. Thus, if winning is the
most important objective, mainland China's approach to dissent seems
more likely to prove successful than a serious commitment to free and
open debate about matters of public concern.194
Similarly, Professor Shiffrin's theory of dissent in the service of
progressive change serves as a powerful proof of Professor Carter's
basic complaint: religious minorities are being denied their full measure of participation in the project of democratic deliberation. To the
extent that religious minorities position themselves in opposition to
progressive understandings on issues of race, gender, and sexual orientation, they increasingly face the prospect of being silenced by government officials who have come to embrace the progressives' value
structure.
194. See supra note 32; see also Charles Fried, Diversity: From Left to Far Left, WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 2000, at A19 (describing the Association of American Law School's refusal to
facilitate joint programs with the Federalist Society, the National Association of Scholars,
and the Christian Law Society, all conservative organizations, while cosponsoring events at
its annual meeting with the Society of American Law Teachers ("SALT"), a left-leaning organization).
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Professor Shiffrin plainly believes that dissent not only creates the
possibility of dialogue, but also facilitates change, citing the civil rights
movement as an example of how dissent can forge new understandings
of justice. If one were to implement fully Professor Carter's vision of
dissent, undoubtedly religious dissenters would prevail more often in
securing legislative changes that implement their religiously inspired
ideals of good governance. That said, Professor Carter's vision is palatable only to the extent that the "dialogue" does not simply exchange
one group of oppressed and alienated persons for another (i.e., religious conservatives for women or sexual minorities).
Shiffrin's confidence in the ability of dissent to promote change
raises serious questions about the potential effects of fully embracing
Carter's proposal for requiring the secular state to justify on the merits
every law or policy religious dissenters oppose. Given that dissent
provokes change, this sort of "dialogue" undoubtedly would portend
mixed results for women, racial minorities, and gays and lesbians, all
groups that historically have supported the kinds of "progressive" social policies often opposed by religious fundamentalists.
This, of course, is not an argument for silencing religious fundamentalists. It is, perhaps, an argument that legitimates a response that
simply rejects the religious premise of the fundamentalist dissenters;
whereas Carter would have the defenders of the secular state justify
existing policies on secular grounds in the face of religious opposition,
there is no reason that other members of the community (but not the
state itself) should not simply reject the religious premises underlying
the objections. The state, of course, can itself neither maintain nor
suppress particular theological commitments, but all citizens are free
to follow the dictates of their conscience, at least with respect to matters of belief. Given the potential effectiveness of dissent in moving
public policy, those opposed to one religious tradition should be free
to argue against proposed changes in terms that are either secular or
religious. Moreover, if religious dissenters lose this debate, it hardly
justifies making war against the state.
In sum, a meaningful commitment to dissent is a kind of social wager, an experiment that guarantees a process, but does not prefigure
any outcomes. 195 Considering the potential effect of a particular the195. In the immortal words of Justice Holmes:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not
every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.
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ory of freedom of expression on dissent provides an excellent means
of analyzing the plausibility of the theory; a free speech theory that
fails adequately to protect dissent should be highly suspect. Of course,
it is one thing to evaluate free speech theories according to how dissent would fare; it is entirely another to posit dissent as the sum and
substance of the Free Speech Clause. For the reasons set forth in this
Review, a dissent-based theory of free speech presents very serious
problems, at least insofar as one wishes to maintain viewpoint neutrality as a central component of the free speech project.
On the other hand, notwithstanding the definitional and operational difficulties, securing the protection of political speech of a "dissenting" cast has to be an important, indeed essential, objective of any
plausible theory of free speech. As Professor Vincent Blasi has explained, "the overriding objective at all times should be to equip the
first amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods
when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when
governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent systematically." 111 How best to achieve this objective, both jurisprudentially
and doctrinally, remains elusive. Although Blasi may be correct to
suppose that "[i]t is doubtful that legal standards could ever be designed with sufficient prescience and precision"'" to constrain effectively the lower federal courts' discretion when faced with difficult
free speech cases, a system that openly invites entirely intuitive or ad
hoe decisions about the relative value of speech activity surely presents a greater threat to project of democratic deliberation."' Because
the threat to free speech principles is likely to be most acute in times
when the value of dissent is potentially at its highest, 99 an ideal test
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
196. Blasi, supra note 23, at 449-50.

197. Id. at 467.
198. Indeed, Professor Blasi seems to recognize this:
Courts working within a first amendment tradition that authorized judicial inquiry into motivation, impact, and form would be tempted in pathological periods to find something distinctive in the speech of the most unpopular dissenters (concerted or surreptitious conduct,
indoctrination, nihilistic motivation, coercive or selective impact) that would place it outside
the ambit of first amendment protection. An expansive tradition regarding the reach of the
first amendment would make it more difficult for judges to invoke such characteristics as a
basis for suppressing speech.

Id. at 477-78. Justice Hugo Black, of course, strongly endorsed the utility of strict tests and
bright lines, believing such tests essential to prevent judicial backsliding. See Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Dennis v. United States,

341 U.S. 494, 579-81 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U, L. REV. 865, 866-67, 874-76, 880-81 (1960); see also Edmond Calm, Justice Black and

FirstAmendment "Absolutes". A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 552-55, 557-59
(1962); Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the FirstAmendment, 14
UCLA L. REv. 428,441-53 (1967).
199. See id. at 485 ("Any ad hoc assessment of the benefits and costs of speech that is
made during pathological times is bound to be tilted in the direction of regulation; that is an
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would therefore safeguard dissent even when the social or political
consequences of doing so might well be uncertain.2"
At least arguably, Professor Shiffrin's dissent theory does not take
seriously enough the problem of enforcement through personnel selected by majoritarian representatives - personnel who presumably
would share the attitudes, values, and prejudices of the dominant
groups within the community. 'Conversely, Professor Carter's basic
objection is that cultural elites already ignore or silence the speech of
religiously motivated dissenters. Neither Professor Shiffrin nor Professor Carter offers up a comprehensive and potentially effective program of reform - a prescription that would ensure that dissent remains an important component of the process of democratic
deliberation. That said, both authors significantly advance the debate
and bring a much needed renewed focus on centrality of dissent to the
free speech project.
Almost any free speech theory is likely to engender immediate
objections - objections that, as often as not, will lead to various
"clarifications" or "amendments." The author, thus, gradually refines
the theory to include speech that she believes should enjoy constitutional protection (but arguably does not under the initial articulation
of the theory).20 1 Over three decades ago, Professor Harry Kalven
suggested that a commitment to permitting free (even if factually inaccurate) commentary on the government constituted the "central
meaning" of the Free Speech Clause.2t 2 To be sure, this is a plausible
theory. On the other hand, myriad alternate theories exist, and it
would be difficult - if not impossible - to devise a single animating
purpose that adequately would encompass all the reasons why citizens
should view free speech as an essential right in a pluralistic, participatory democracy. Accordingly, discovering the "central meaning" of
the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause almost certainly will remain a work in progress, and attempts to limit attention to a single aspect of the free speech project are likely to do more harm than good.

inevitable consequence of the shift in attitudes regarding the desirability of free speech that
characterizes such periods.").

200. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); but
cf Blasi, supra note 23, at 507-09 (describing the failure of the federal courts to afford strong

protection to dissenters in periods of perceived national crisis).
201. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment, supra note 9, at 256-57 (modifying the
"democratic deliberation" theory of free speech to reach the arts and literature because an
educated population is necessary to sustain self-government). Of course, many would argue
that the arts and literature have value independent of the role they play (if any) in facilitatig self-government. Moreover, as Professor Robert Post has noted, Meiklejohn's original
thesis also fails to incorporate the importance of autonomy values to free speech theory. See
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTTrUTIONAL DOMAINs:
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,

MANAGEMENT 268-76,282-89 (1995).
202. See Kalven, supranote 7, at 204-21.
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Professors Shiffrin and Carter have provided rich commentaries on
the centrality of dissent to free speech theory and jurisprudence - albeit from different ideological perspectives. Their books are important contributions to the ongoing dialogue about the First Amendment. That said, I do not think that either has succeeded in ending the
quest for the central meaning of the First Amendment. Nor is this, in
any meaningful way, a bad thing. The journey - the search for the
ultimate answer - can sometimes be more important than attaining
the object of the quest. It seems fitting to conclude with another cautionary note from Justice Jackson's opinion in Barnette:
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many
good as well as by evil men.... Ultimate futility of such attempts to
compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort, from the Roman
drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles
as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.... It seems trite but necessary to say that the
First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends
by avoiding these beginnings. 2°3

203.

West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,640-41 (1943).

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING BIASED
Anthony M. Dillof*
PUNISHING HATE:

BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW. By
FrederickM. Lawrence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1999.

Pp. xi, 269. $39.95.
The war against bias crimes is far from finished. In contrast, the
battle over bias-crime laws is largely over. Bias-crime laws, as com-

monly formulated, increase the penalties for crimes motivated by bias.
The Supreme Court has held that such laws do not violate the First
Amendment.1 Virtually every state has enacted some sort of bias-

crime law.2 Even the federal government, which may consider itself

without power to enact a general bias-crime law,' has made bias a

* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. A.B. 1981,
Harvard; J.D. 1985, LL.M. 1996, Columbia. - Ed.
1. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 476 (1993). Some bias-crime laws may be
open to challenge on other constitutional grounds. In State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485 (N.J.),
cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999), the New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed a law that made
bias a sentencing factor that would increase the maximum sentence to which a defendant is
subject. According to the defendant, this law violated the Due Process Clause's guarantee
that every sentence increasing fact be found by a jury under the reasonable doubt standard.
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this contention based on its interpretation of
Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 493-95. The United States Supreme Court will rule on
the constitutionality of the New Jersey law this year. The constitutionality of the New Jersey
law is far from certain. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 (1999) (finding it
unsettled whether all sentence-range maximizing facts must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt). Even if the New Jersey law is struck down, however, states will be free to enforce
bias-crime laws in which the existence of bias is not treated as a sentencing factor, but as an
offense element to be proven at trial. Apprendi thus concerns the manner in which states
will be required to establish the existence of bias, not the constitutionality of bias-based penalty enhancements generally.
2. See The Staff of the Syracuse Journal of Legislation & Policy, Crimes Motivated by
Hatred: the Constitutionality and Impact of Hate Crime Legislation in the United States, 1
SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y, 29, 37 (1995) (reporting that, as of 1995, bias-crime legislation
of some sort had been enacted by 47 states) [hereinafter Staff].
3. Congress is undoubtedly aware of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence restricting its
power to criminalize conduct, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down
an act making carrying a gun in a school zone a federal offense), and has been informed that
its power to enact general bias-crime legislation is doubtful. See The Hate Crimes Prevention
Act of 1998: Hearing on S.J. Res. 1529 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 39-44 (1998) (testimony of Lawrence Alexander, Professor of Law, University of San
Diego) (urging that Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause and the
Thirteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause to enact a general bias-crime law).
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sentence-aggravating factor for the range of federal criminal offenses.4
Bias-crime laws thus are an established feature of the legal landscape.
Against this background, Frederick Lawrence has written
PunishingHate: Bias Crimes Under American Law. PunishingHate is
not a work of radical vision. It blazes no new trails in its method or its
conclusions. Rather, it is a careful reconstruction of reasons and arguments underlying the current consensus approval of bias-crime laws.
Accepting that bias should matter for the criminal law, it implies a better theory is needed of why bias should matter, and seeks to provide
that theory.
To explain the importance of being biased, Lawrence analyzes
bias-crime laws within the context of traditional moral theories and orthodox First Amendment concerns. He cogently explains the basic
form and function of bias-crime laws, offers some useful refinements
for their formulation, vigorously defends their moral soundness and
constitutionality, and forcefully advocates their adoption by the federal government. Throughout, Lawrence displays an unwavering
commitment to the ideal of equality, never leaving his readers in
doubt as to where his sympathies lie. Occasionally voyaging into sophisticated areas of moral philosophy, criminal theory and federal jurisprudence, Lawrence presents his subjects with accessible, deliberate, and sometimes stirring prose. Punishing Hate also includes a
number of extensive and well-researched appendices making the book
a useful scholarly tool. Thus, Lawrence has written what may come to
be regarded a classic liberal treatment of bias crimes and the laws governing them.
To say that Lawrence has presented a classic liberal treatment of
his topic, however, is not to say that his valorizing of bias-crime laws
will persuade the as-yet unconverted. Encompassing a variety of independent ideals, liberalism6 occasionally yields merely plausible answers to difficult social issues. As will be discussed, Lawrence in
PunishingHate often seems to give unjustified priority to the ideal of
equality. When the moral issues concerning desert become controversial, when the empirical evidence concerning social impact becomes
thin, when the proper formulation of a law becomes debatable, when
4. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(a) (1998-99). Section 3Al.l(a)
provides:
If the finder of fact at trial ... determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense of conviction because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person, increase by 3 levels.
5. Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
6. By "liberalism," I refer to a range of positions distinguished by.their commitment to
the rule of law, political and intellectual freedom, toleration, opposition to racial and sexual
discrimination, and respect for the tights of individuals. See Jeremy Waldron, Liberalism, in
5 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 598 (Edward Craig ed., 1998).
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the commands of the Constitution become unclear, when the meaning
expressed by an official act becomes ambiguous, Lawrence is willing to
let the rhetorical appeal of equality carry the day. Thus, while
Lawrence does not settle for simplistic answers to the questions he
asks, he often does not ask the hardest questions.
Intellectually, bias crimes are located at the intersection of sociology, moral philosophy, criminal justice, American history, clinical psychology, and cultural studies. PunishingHate thus attempts to cover
an enormously complex topic in relatively few pages. Lawrence's
strategy is to concentrate on the issues of greatest concern to his intended audience: the interested layperson, the lawyer, and the legislator. In this Review, I shall strategically limit myself to discussing the
three major issues of concern to Lawrence: the justification of biascrime laws, the constitutionality of bias-crime laws, and the role of the
federal government in prosecuting bias-crimes.
I.

THE JUSTIFICATION OF BIAs-CRIME LAWS

In Chapter Three, Lawrence examines the central normative question: Are the increased penalties provided by bias-crime laws morally
justified? Lawrence answers this question by applying both traditional
consequentialist/utilitarian and deontological/retributive theories of
punishment to bias-crime laws. Although such theories reflect deep
philosophical differences, in practice they often converge. Both theories recognize that, generally speaking, the greater the harm associated
with a criminal act, the greater the appropriate penalty. Likewise,
both theories recognize that the mental state of the perpetrator is
relevant in determining the magnitude of the penalty. There may, of
course, be instances where consequentialist concerns for deterrence or
incapacitation would authorize greater penalties than those recommended by desert-based forms of retributivism. Because such results
are arguably unjust, Lawrence rejects a pure utilitarian theory of
punishment in favor of a mixed theory, i.e., a utilitarian theory of
punishment with desert-based side-constraints (p. 50). He then examines bias crimes in light of the mental states and harms associated
with them. As discussed below, he concludes that both pure retributive and mixed theories of punishment support bias-crime laws

7. Lawrence's conclusion in Chapter Three that bias-crime laws are warranted is ambiguous at best. Lawrence writes, "[Chapter 3] argues that bias crimes ought to receive
punishment that is more severe than that imposed for parallel crimes." P. 45. To support
this claim, Lawrence invokes both positive retributivist as well as mixed theories of punishment. Pp. 46, 50. These theories purport to recommend when a particular punishment
ought to be imposed. Nevertheless, Lawrence later characterizes his discussion as merely
establishing that enhanced penalties may be imposed, not that they ought to be imposed. P.
161.
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Lawrence begins with a deontological justification based on the
bias criminal's mental state According to Lawrence, this deontological justification is the one espoused by "most supporters" of biascrime laws (p. 61). This justification asserts that bias criminals are
more deserving of punishment than other criminals without appealing
to the independent contingent premise that bias crimes cause greater
harm than similar crimes not motivated by bias ("parallel crimes").
The justification begins with the unassailable premise that those who
kill intentionally are more blameworthy, and hence more deserving of
punishment, than those who kill negligently (p. 60). Likewise, so goes
the argument, bias criminals are more blameworthy than other criminals. Why should bias criminals be especially blameworthy by virtue
of their motivation? Lawrence explains that "[tlhe motivation of the
bias-crime offender violates the equality principle, one of the most
deeply held tenets in our legal system and our culture" (p. 61).
It is unclear to what extent Lawrence endorses this most widely espoused justification of bias crimes. Lawrence states the justification
with implicit approval. Elsewhere in the book, he expresses similar
sentiments (pp. 38-39, 75). In explaining the grounds for bias-crime
laws, however, Lawrence often refers to only justifications based on
increased harms associated with bias crime (pp. 4, 5, 40, 45, 80, 95,
175).
Lawrence is sensible to de-emphasize this deontological justification of enhanced penalties. It is flawed. From a deontological perspective, mental states generally are considered relevant to blameworthiness because they speak to the responsibilityof the offender for her
wrongful act.' Purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence are
the four organizing mental states of the Model Penal Code." They
8. I pass over Lawrence's discussion of the consequentialist significance of the bias
criminal's mental state. Rather than looking at traditional consequentialist issues such as the
bias criminal's susceptibility to general deterrence or need for incapacitation, Lawrence argues that bias motivation is associated with more brutal crimes. P. 60. The argument, thus,
relies on the harmfulness of bias crimes relative to other crimes, a topic Lawrence treats
(and I discuss) in greater detail later.
Lawrence advances an additional consequentialist argument based on mental states.
According to Lawrence, just as intentional vehicular homicide should be punished more

than negligent vehicular homicide because negligent driving has some positive social value
(where no accident occurs), so bias crimes should be punished more than other intentional

crimes. P. 60. This is unconvincing. Unlike negligent conduct, the conduct involved in intentional crimes, whether motivated by bias or not, generally has no positive social value.
Thus, no distinction should be made between bias and other intentional crimes. Lawrence's

argument needs much greater elaboration.
9. See generally Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability,76 B.U. L. REV. 319,
319-25 (1996) (explicating relevance of mental states to culpability).
10. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962). The Model Penal Code does not explic-

itly define "negligently" as a mental state. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d). Nevertheless, a mental state is supposed. In order to be negligent with respect to a material ele-

ment, a person must be aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to be aware of a
substantial risk that a material element exists.
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serve to establish the precise degree of responsibility the wrongdoer
bears for the harm she has caused. An actor who rationally, intentionally, and deliberately commits an assault based on racial bias is no
more responsible for the assault than one who similarly commits an
assault based on greed. They both are, we might say, maximally responsible for the wrong of assault and so are equally blameworthy. Of
course, the greed-driven offender merely knows the race of his victim
and so is not as responsible for his victim's being of a particular race.
A bias criminal is exactly a criminal who may be held fully accountable not only for causing harm, but also for the harm's being caused to
a victim of a certain identifiable group. The group identity of the victim, however, is irrelevant to the wrongfulness of the assault. African
Americans, for example, have no greater right not to be assaulted than
whites and, as a general matter, deserve no greater protection."1 A
person who intentionally assaults an African American is not thereby
responsible for a greater right violation than a person who commits an
intentional assault indifferent to the race of his victim. Bias motivation does not increase the perpetrator's responsibility for any morally
relevant aspect of the assault. 2
On some accounts, however, mental states are relevant to blameworthiness not because they imply greater responsibility for a harm,
but because they reflect the flawed character that is the underlying
cause of the crime. 3 By rejecting the equality principle - "one of the
most deeply held tenets in our legal system and our culture" (p. 61) the bias criminal, it may be argued, reveals his character to be more
deeply flawed than that of the ordinary criminal. 4
Without taking a position on the general validity of character theories of punishment, I do not believe that such theories provide support
for bias-crime laws. The equality principle does not appear to possess
the privileged position that Lawrence ascribes to it. Although
11. Bias-crime laws protect all groups equally. A law that provided enhanced penalties
for crimes against only those of a particular racial or religious group likely would offend
principles of substantive equality. I do not know any advocates of such group-specific laws,
and I do not understand Lawrence as supporting bias-crime laws on the ground that they are
covert minority-protection laws.
12. This point, like many others raised in this Review, is more fully developed in my article on bias-crime laws. See Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the
TheoreticalFoundationsof Bias Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. L. REv. 1015 (1997).
13. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Choice, Character,and CriminalLiability, 12 L. & PHIL. 345,362
(1993) ("The proper focus of the criminal process is not, the 'character' theorist argues, on
the particular actions for which a defendant is formally convicted and sentenced, but on
some character-trait that his criminal act revealed."); Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character,
and Excuse, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 29,31-40.

14. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, The State's Interest in Retribution, 283 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 283, 285 (1994) (characterizing bias-crime laws as punishing in response to a person's
particularly great inner wickedness); see also Paul H. Robinson, Hate Crimes: Crimes of
Motive, Character,or Group Terror?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 605, 609 (considering,
but rejecting, such a theory as inconsistent with traditional criminal law theory).
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Lawrence does not explicitly define it, the equality principle roughly
appears to be the principle that individuals should be treated without
regard to race, color, religion, or other characteristics that historically
have been the basis for widespread discrimination (pp. 11-20). So defined, this principle has ascended undoubtedly in importance in our
culture and legal system in recent decades. Yet it is only one among
many important ideals. Our culture and legal system equally cherish
the principles of fairness, human dignity, autonomy, altruism, reciprocity, forgiveness, loyalty, and self-expression to name a few.
Sadists, wife-beaters, loan sharks, child molesters, drug pushers, and
their ilk generally act on motives as abhorrent as bias and generally
have characters that are equally flawed. The standard penalty levels
are believed sufficient to deliver the punishments they deserve. They
should be sufficient for bias criminals as well.
Lawrence's harm-based analysis is more convincing. In arguing
that bias crimes cause greater harms than parallel crimes, Lawrence
takes both an ex ante and an ex post perspective on bias crimes. 5 Ex
ante, Lawrence contends, a rational person would prefer to be the victim of a parallel crime because of the deep psychological harm that
bias crimes may inflict (pp. 61-62). Is this correct? Deep psychological harm can be caused by perceived attacks on one's identity or sense
of self. Some people's identities are based primarily on their race and
religious affiliations. Other people's however are based on their family, hobbies, profession, ties to their community, commitments to sport
teams, their college, state, and so on. Most people in our pluralistic
and polymorphous culture define themselves by reference to many independent categories. I, for example, am a law professor, a Mets fan,
a person of Ukrainian extraction, a cat owner, and an advocate of
abortion rights. If, one day, I found the tires of my car slashed, I am
not at all sure that, ex ante, I would prefer to learn that the perpetrator was a student appalled at my teaching ability, a law professor offended by my review of his book, a radical anti-abortion activist, or a
crazed Yankees fan who wanted to strike out at my team. Each scenario carries its particular pain.
Indeed, it is deeply disconcerting to be the target of "random"
violence. I remember being mugged as a teenager one night by a
group of older teens who, in retrospect, probably had nothing better to
do that night. As their blows rained down, I recall being overcome by
the sheer senselessness of why I, a completely anonymous person to
them, would be the target of their aggression. An explanation of any
type, even one that included the despicable proposition "they think
Jews deserve it" might have been more satisfying than contending
with the unanswerable existential question "Why me?" As Lawrence
15. Lawrence does not discuss the relation of these perspectives. It is not clear whether

he believes they are equivalent or, if they diverge, which should control.
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recognizes, bias crimes are crimes based neither on relatively unique
attributes of the individual (such as past personal relations with the
perpetrator) nor extremely common characteristics (such as carrying a
wallet) (pp. 9, 62). The characteristics on which bias crimes are based,
for example race and religion, fall somewhere in between. Lawrence,
however, does not explain why crimes based on such middle-level
characteristics result in "unique humiliation" (p. 62). Although in one
passage, Lawrence theorizes that minority victims of bias crimes experience attacks as forms of racial stigmatization (p. 41), elsewhere he
undercuts that theory by citing evidence that minority victims of bias
crime do not experience greater psychological trauma than white biascrime victims (p. 40).
More persuasive is Lawrence's harm-analysis from an ex post perspective. Here, Lawrence relies on newspaper accounts and sociological studies documenting the feeling of depression and anxiety among
bias-crime victims (pp. 63, 224 n.66). These works, however, suffer
from baseline questions. Bias-crime victims may suffer greater psychological harms, but compared to whom? As offenses vary greatly in
circumstance and participants, there are likely many categories of victims of a given offense who also suffer greater depression and anxiety
than the average offense victim. Those assaulted on holidays, by alcoholics, by spouses, in prisons, in public, or the complementary sets of
victims, may experience greater than average psychological harm. As
Lawrence recognizes, the criminal law can operate only with a small
number of levels of felonies and misdemeanors (p. 56). Thus, to justify an enhanced range of punishments, bias crimes must form a relatively tight class of crimes resulting in special psychological damage.
None of the research cited by Lawrence compares bias crimes with
other potentially psychologically harmful subclasses of parallel crimes
- such as assaults based on sadism, gang-violence, random victim selection, political affiliation, or intense personal animosity - all of
which can be accommodated, it is thought, under the standard set of
penalty levels.16
There is a further, generally unnoticed, issue associated with
Lawrence's claim that the greater psychological harm suffered by bias16. Studies cited by Lawrence, such as Joan C. Weiss, Ethnoviolence: Impact upon and
Response of Victims and the Community, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

AND LEGAL RESPONSES 174, 182 (1993), only compare bias crine to the general category of
"personal" crimes.
There is a second baseline question. It is not clear that the degree of physical violence is
held constant when the psychological impacts of bias and parallel crimes are compared. Bias
crimes tend to be more violent than parallel crimes (p. 39). Their greater violence, rather
than their victims' perceptions of bias motivation, could explain their greater psychological
impact. Moreover, the statistically greater physical violence involved in bias crimes does not
justify treating these crimes separately as a uniquely penalized class of offenses; the standard
set of criminal laws and penalty ranges is thought already sufficient to accommodate the
subclass of particularly violent instances of crime.
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crime victims justifies the harsher punishment of bias criminals.
Harm, as used in either consequentialist or retributive theories, is a
concept with a normative component. Not every unwanted occurrence constitutes a harm that justifies deterring the conduct that produced the unwanted occurrence. Likewise, not every setback of interests constitutes a harm that is relevant to determining the punishment
an actor deserves. For example, if a man is greatly disturbed by the
knowledge that his neighbor reads heretical literature on Sunday, this
disturbance should not be recognized as a harm for purposes of punishment. One way to reach this conclusion is to reason in a Rawlsian
manner that self-interested individuals who value liberty would not
agree in advance to restrictions on intellectual liberty based on the potentially unlimited sensitivity of second parties.18 Another way to
reach the conclusion is to rely on the basic moral premise that it is
simply no business of one person what another reads - a person has a
sphere of privacy and others have no claim to control what goes on
within that sphere. One's thoughts, to the extent they do not evidence future wrongdoing, are arguably within such a sphere. 0 Our
thoughts are paradigmatically private matters. They help define who
we are and reflect only our subjective beliefs and values. It would be
generally conceded that adhering to racism as an abstract principle or
even engaging in generally lawful and innocuous activities because of
one's racism, such as closing one's store to honor Hitler's birthday,
should not be grounds for punishment even if the fact of one's racism
or the racist reason for one's action may greatly disturb another' Indeed, the appreciation that such actions are another's, and hence not
17. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31-36 (1984) (distinguishing setbacks from
harms and noting that a sense of harm carries normative implications).
18. See JOHN RAWS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE ch. 111 (1971).
19. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (invalidating a state statute prohibiting possession of obscene materials in the privacy of the home).
20. The claim to dominion over one's own thoughts has Lockean roots. See JOHN
LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government § 27, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter
Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967); see also Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REv. 65,78 (1997) ("If we have the rights to control anything, it is the
contents of our minds."); III Lysander Spooner, The Law of Intellectual Property: or An Essay on the Right of Authors and Inventors to a PerpetualProperty in Their Ideas, in THE
COLLECrED WORKS OF LYSANDER SPOONER 58 (Charles Shively ed., 1971) ("Nothing is,
by its own essence and nature, more perfectly susceptible of exclusive appropriation, than a
thought.").
21. Concerning the feelings of outrage that one person's religious views might cause another, John Stuart Mill argued:
Where is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of
another who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take
a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as much his own
peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY WITH THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN AND CHAPTERS ON

SOcIALISM 84 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859).
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part of our individual identity, enables us to live with another's objectionable attitudes. Admittedly more controversial are cases where the
attitudes give rise to actions, such as bias crimes, that wrongfully impinge on others. Perhaps here, the victim has some claim to being
psychologically harmed by thoughts that generally are not cognizable
grounds for complaint. But there is a respectable normative argument
that only the conduct, or, at most, the intent to engage in the conduct,
is the legitimate concern of the victim.'2 This argument undoubtedly is
bolstered by the proposition, advanced earlier,u3 that motives relating
to race or other morally neutral characteristics do not increase the actor's responsibility for a given wrong or manifest a worse character. If
a particular motive should not matter to a person determining the actor's punishment, why should it matter to the person harmed? Following this line of reasoning, the actor's motives, even if they generally
are of concern to the victim, should not be. One's legitimate area of
grievance ends where another's underlying thought processes begin.
Any complete inquiry into the moral justification of bias-crime laws
should address this issue. 4
A further short-coming of Lawrence's attempt to justify bias-crime
laws is his failure to apply his theoretical justifications to either existing bias-crime laws or his own model bias-crime law. It is fair to concede that bias crimes, generally speaking, create greater apprehension
in the target community and produce greater trauma in society at large
than crimes from other motivations. These effects, however, are diffuse. Compared to the other sorts of harms the criminal law seeks to
prevent, these effects are difficult to identify and quantify. In contrast,
the enhanced penalties authorized by bias-crime laws are concrete and
specific. Such laws cannot be considered justified unless the amount
of the additional penalty is justified. If the devil is in the details,
Lawrence's failure to deal with these details bedevils his argument. A
hypothetical bias-crime law that imposed a $20 fine in addition to the
penalty for the underlying crime likely would meet little objection
from those who believe that desert should place a ceiling on unjustified punishment. A bias-crime law that imposed a mandatory additional twenty-year penalty likely would be considered objectionable
22. It may be that "even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being
kicked." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,

Belknap Press 1963) (1881). It is another question whether the dog cares what inadequate
reason motivated the kick.

23. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
24. In a later part of the book, Lawrence in fact distinguishes between an offense caused
by racial motivation and apprehension of future physical harm that may be caused by a bias
crime. He argues that, for the purpose of justifying bias-crime laws under the First Amendment, only the apprehension of future physical harm is relevant. P. 102. He does not, however, elaborate on the grounds of the distinction, and it is not clear whether he thinks it reflects a general moral principle as suggested above.
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by even hard-core supporters of bias-crime laws. In fact, the penalty
enhancements established by most bias-crime laws fall somewhere in
between 5
Lawrence concludes his book by offering a model bias-crime law
that is supposed to embody his considered opinions concerning the nature, scope, and necessity of bias-crime laws (pp. 170-71). Lawrence's
model law takes the not uncommon approach of providing for a penalty enhancement of one or two sentencing levels. Assuming a background penal code like the Model Penal Code, Lawrence's model law
would authorize the punishment of a bias-motivated act of criminal
trespass resulting in a loss of under $25 at the level of an assault with a
deadly weapon; a simple assault based on bias at the level of an aggravated assault manifesting extreme indifference to human life; and a
bias assault with a deadly weapon as a murder.26 Even in qualitative
terms, these are significant penalty enhancements. To my mind, the
equivalences in desert they suggest are problematic 7 Lawrence admits that his purpose is not to determine the precise amount of penalty
enhancement appropriate for every possible bias offense (pp. 222-30).
But unless he demonstrates that the appropriate penalty enhancement
is great enough to, at least, move a bias crime into the next highest
penalty level, he cannot claim to have presented a full defense of biascrime laws.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BIAs-CRIME LAWS

In Chapter Five, Lawrence asks "[a]re bias-crime laws constitutional" (p. 80)? The quick and easy answer, based on Wisconsin v.
Mitchell," is "yes." In Mitchell, the Supreme Court squarely held that
a Wisconsin statute establishing increased sentences for bias crimes
did not violate the First Amendment.29 Lawrence, however, does not
rest with the positive law orthodoxy of the current Court. Nor does he
attempt to work through the thicket of First Amendment cases and

25. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 480 (1993) (upholding a state biascrime law that permitted a five-year sentencing enhancement).
26. See MODELPENAL CODE §§ 210.2,211.1,2203 (1962).
27. Cf Lawrence Crocker, Hate Crime Statutes: Just? Constitutional? Wise?, 1992/1993
ANN. SURv. AM. L. 485, 495 ("[M]y own intuition.. .[is] that it is excessive for an assault
that would otherwise receive a two-year sentence to receive instead a seven-year sentence .... ").
28. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
29. Bias-crime laws are open to challenge on grounds other than the First Amendment.
Such challenges, however, are directed at only the procedures that implement bias-triggered
penalty enhancements, and so only contingently involve bias-crime laws. See supra note 1.
Lawrence reasonably limits his discussion of the constitutionality of bias-crime laws to their
consistency with the First Amendment and their arguably novel focus on motive.
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doctrine that the extensive literature on the topic engages. 0 Rather,
Lawrence seeks to explore whether bias-crime laws are consistent with
the deep and well-established values and principles lying at the heart
of the First Amendment. 1 Lawrence does not give these values and
principles short shrift. He portrays himself as a First Amendment

stalwart in his view that racist speech should be protected (p. 82).
Nevertheless, Lawrence ultimately concludes that bias-crime laws and
the First Amendment are consistent and that it is possible "both to

punish the bias criminal [pursuant to bias-crime laws] and to protect
the right of the bigot to express his beliefs" (p. 80). Lawrence thus
sets himself the project of distinguishing between bias crimes, which

may be subject to enhanced penalties, and bias speech, which may not.
This is a challenging project given that some speech may be criminal,
some criminal conduct may be expressive, and both may be motivated
by bias.
A.

Bias-CrimeLaws and FreeSpeech

Where does bias speech end and bias crime begin? To answer this
question, Lawrence proposes a "reformation" (p. 99) of the "fighting
words" doctrine. The fighting words doctrine, as it now exists, permits
the banning of words that tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. 2 Lawrence points out, however, that the doctrine, as it was
originally formulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,3 permitted the

banning of, not only words that tended to incite an immediate breach
of the peace, but also those that by their very utterance inflicted in-

jury. According to Lawrence, the Supreme Court, in choosing to em30. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Heath Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 762-64 (1994) (holding that
an injunction against anti-abortion protests was not improperly content based); Forsyth
County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) (stating that listeners' reaction to
a speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S.
560 (1991) (considering the First Amendment protections of nude dancing); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105-23 (1991) (invalidating content-based regulation on speech intended to benefit crime victims); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating a state restriction on burning the American flag);
City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986) (discussing the significance of a legislative motive to suppress speech); California v. Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
(recognizing the constitutional right to wear a jacket bearing an offensive slogan about the
draft).
31. Lawrence identifies "the right to free expression" as lying at the heart of our legal
culture. P. 80.
32 See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972) (defining fighting words as
"those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace" (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,315 U.S. 568,572 (1942))). The scope of
the fighting words doctrine as it currently exists, is discussed in Melody L. Hurdle, Recent
Development, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: The Continuing Confusion of the Fighting Words
Doctrine,47 VAND. L. REV. 1143, 1174 (1994) (suggesting that fighting words should be defined in terms of their minimal contribution to the marketplace of ideas).
33. 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942).
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phasize the first type of fighting words and ignore the second, took the
wrong path. Lawrence writes, "If Chaplinsky is to have any contemporary vitality, it must be understood to place outside the First
Amendment's reach those words that are intended to and have the
likely effect of creating fear of injury in the addressee" (p. 102).
Lawrence, however, is careful to distinguish the fear of injury and the
mere wounding of feelings. "Words that have the intent to hurt the
addressee's feelings, even those that also have that effect, however unfortunate, do not come under this understanding of fighting words" (p.
102). This distinction between words that portend harm and words
that merely wound feelings, not that between "conduct" and "speech,"
is the key to drawing the line between constitutionally proscribable
bias crimes and constitutionally protected hate speech. Thus,
Lawrence concludes, "Racially targeted actions that are intended to
create fear in the addressee and that are likely to do so may be treated
as bias crimes .... [RIacially targeted behavior that vents the actor's
racism is racial speech that is protected, even if it disturbs the observer

greatly" (p. 102).
It is not clear that Lawrence needs to reformulate the Supreme
Court's fighting words jurisprudence to get where he wants to go.
Words used to communicate realistic threats of violence - "Your
money or your life" - are uncontroversially subject to state control.
There are no serious First Amendment challenges to the tort of assault
or the crime of menacing even though words often are used in conjunction with other factors to perpetrate these unlawful acts. There
are, however, three difficulties with drawing the distinction between
proscribable conduct and protected speech along the lines Lawrence
suggests.
First, the distinction between racially targeted action that creates
fear of injury and racially targeted conduct that vents the actor's racism is unsound. Racially motivated conduct may simultaneously create fear and vent racism. The distinction thus is as problematic as the
distinction between verbal acts ("speech") and nonverbal acts ("conduct") that Lawrence rejects as inadequate to demarcate the
protected/proscribable boundary (pp. 89-92). Furthermore, racially
based conduct that may be proscribed (bias crimes) should not be
identified with acts that create fear of injury in the addressee. Under
most bias-crime lawsM a white teenager who anonymously slashes the
tires of an African-American person's car because of bias commits a
bias crime even if he reasonably believes his act will be perceived as
one of random vandalism, not bias. If the enhanced punishment of
this act as a bias crime is constitutional, it cannot be because it involves the intent or effect of creating fear of injury in the addressee.
34. See Apps. B-E (presenting representative bias-crime laws).
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Second, Lawrence's identification of bias crimes with acts that are

intended to and will have the likely effect of creating fear of injury
does not extend sufficient protection to racially motivated expressive

conduct. The march of Nazi sympathizers in Skokie, Illinois might be
described as a "[r]acially targeted action[] that [is] intended to create
fear in the addressee and [is] likely to do so" (p. 102). Likewise, in the
1950s, the public advocacy of communism may have created in some
the fear of being injured in the course of a violent uprising. Such acts,
however, clearly are protected under the First Amendment." They
critically differ from assault and menacing because these latter acts, by
definition, require the creation of at least the fear of immediate injury.36 The First Amendment traditionally has required courts to consider the concreteness and temporal proximity of the threatened
harms.37 Are the fears of future injury caused by bias crimes closer to

the fears of immediate injury associated with assault and menacing or
the speculative fears associated with neo-Nazism or a possible
communist-inspired uprising? In the latter cases, the time frame, perpetrator, circumstances, and type of violence feared are indefinite and
unspecified. Likewise, the fear of injury, or "heightened sense of vul-

nerability" (p. 40), that bias crimes create are indeterminate in these
respects. Just as the general apprehension generated by racist demagoguery and demonstration should not support a prison term under

free speech principles, so the general apprehension produced by bias
crimes should not support an additional prison term."'

35. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (striking down a law that criminalized
advocating violence to effect political reform); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978),
cerL denied,439 U.S. 916 (1978) (invalidating an ordinance that would have denied a parade
permit to a neo-Nazi group).
36. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(c) (1962); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-23 (1994);
Ky.REv. STAT. § 508.050 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-05 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.190 (1997).
37. The "clear and present danger" test can be seen in a chronology of Supreme Court
cases forming and incorporating the test. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam) (reversing a conviction for a statement generally advocating lawlessness at an indefinite future time); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (per curiam) (stating
that advocacy, to be criminalized, must be "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action..."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)
(requiring "clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil" for criminalization);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (introducing the "clear and present danger"
test). While the clear and present danger test has not always been applied vigorously by the
Supreme Court, see Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52, strong arguments can be made for the test's
theoretical soundness. See Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawfid Conduct and the First
Amendment: In Defense of Clearand PresentDanger,70 CAL. L. REv. 1159 (1982).
38. Lawrence's fear-based criterion for bias crimes is also too narrow. Lawrence writes,
"racially targeted behavior that vents the actor's racism is racial speech that is protected by
the First Amendment, even if it disturbs the observer greatly." P. 102. A racially targeted
assault may be behavior that vents the actor's racism, but it is not protected speech even in
the absence of the intent or effect to create fear in the addressee. The First Amendment
protects neither conduct nor speech, e.g., a bomb threat, that causes substantial direct harm.
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Finally, Lawrence's theory leaves bias-crime laws open to the criticism of being improperly content based. Even if bias crimes could be
subjected to significant penalties based on the fact that they, in causing
fear of injury, are analogous to fighting words, the question remains
whether bias crimes can be so singled out for enhanced penalization.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court struck down a local
ordinance that prohibited cross burning and like acts that were likely
to cause alarm in others "on the basis of race, color creed, religion or
gender."39 The Court reasoned that although the ordinance banned
only fighting words, it violated the First Amendment because the ban
was limited to an improper content-defined subcategory of fighting
words (essentially bias-motivated fighting words).4" As Lawrence recognizes, bias-crime laws might be open to similar challenges that they
are not appropriately content neutral (p. 105). In Mitchell, the Court
rejected such a challenge, in part, on the ground that bias-crime laws
regulated conduct and not speech and so were not content based.41
Lawrence, however, rejects as superficial the speech/conduct distinction. He believes that bias crimes have an expressive aspect and,
as such, should be afforded the protection available to speech (pp. 8992). Lawrence thus accepts that the First Amendment's presumption
against content-based restrictions applies to bias-crime laws. According to Lawrence, the proper inquiry is whether the state can "advance
a nonpretextual justification for the distinction drawn in its criminal
law, a justification that stands independent of any effort to suppress
the expression of ideas" (p. 104). Similarly, Lawrence writes, "[w]e
must ask whether bias crime statutes further an important interest unrelated to the suppression of racist speech" (p. 106). Lawrence identifies three such interests: the need to deter a rapidly increasing form of
crime, the need to specifically deter a perpetrator with a high degree
of potential dangerousness, and the desire to address a crime that has
a particularly injurious effect on the victim, the targeted group, and
society at large (p. 106). Thus, based on considerations not very different from those identified in Mitchell,42 Lawrence concludes that
bias-crime laws do not employ a constitutionally defective contentbased distinction.

39. 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992).
40. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 391-94.
41. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,487 (1993).
42. 508 U.S. at 487-88. The Court stated that:
[T]he Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm. For example, according to the
State and its amici, bias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest.
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Lawrence's defense of bias-crime laws is not satisfactory. As a
general matter, in order to defend bias-crime laws against the claim
that they are improperly content based, it is insufficient to show they
further an important state interest unrelated to the suppression of
speech. Such a showing entirely misses the point of the requirement
of content neutrality. Preserving the peace and tranquility of a residential neighborhood is an important state interest unrelated to the
suppression of speech.43 An ordinance banning sound trucks that announce the communist manifesto from residential neighborhoods advances that interest. Nevertheless, the ordinance clearly would be an
unconstitutional content-based restriction. Because the interest advanced does not explain why the ordinance is limited to a certain class
of peace-disrupting conduct, the interest appears pretextual.
More specifically, the three harm-based justifications advanced by
Lawrence have a disturbing air of pretext about them. Consider the
alleged need to deter a rapidly increasing form of crime. As Lawrence
recognizes, there is little solid evidence that the rate of bias crimes is
increasing rapidly. Lawrence writes, "it remains difficult.., to gauge
whether the bias crime problem has actually worsened or merely appears to have done so [due to heightened awareness of the problem]"
(p. 20). The issue is fogged by "incomplete data" (p. 24). The best argument for an increase in bias crimes, Lawrence believes, is the historical parallel between bias-crime rates and conditions of economic
unrest (pp. 25-26). Characterizing the state of the current economy as
"adverse" (p. 26), Lawrence infers a relatively high rate of bias crimes
today. The general fall of the crime rate over the last few years,4
however, belies the supposition that current economic conditions are
fertile ground for antisocial sentiment and behavior. Furthermore,
even assuming that the rising rate of bias crimes could be satisfactorily
established, there remains a serious problem with relying on this fact
as a nonpretextual justification. According to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's data for the period of 1985 to 1994, the rates of murder,
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, larceny, and car theft increased."
Nevertheless, during that period, there was no across-the-board in-

43. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) ("The State's interest in protecting the
well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and
civilized society."); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (implying that reasonable
time, manner, and place restrictions are permissible to regulate loudspeakers).
44. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1998, at 173 tbl.3.2 (1999) (describing the approximately 22% and 25% drop in rates of personal and property crimes (respectively) from 1995
to 1998).
45. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997, at 201 tbl.313 (117th ed. 1997).
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crease in penalties. To single out bias crimes as being particularly
in
46
need of increased penalties based on rising rates seems pretextual.
Equally questionable is Lawrence's reliance on the need to specifically deter perpetrators with a high degree of potential dangerousness.
Lawrence cites a study that found that assaults based on bias are more
than twice as likely to result in physical injury as other assaults (p. 39).
To the extent that bias crimes are, on average, more dangerous than
their counterpart crimes without bias, it would seem that specific deterrence could be achieved more directly through increased punishment of crimes actually involving physical injuries. Furthermore, an
individual's potential dangerousness is a function of both the
dangerousness of the crime and of the likelihood of an individual's
committing a crime. Lawrence presents neither direct nor circumstantial evidence that bias criminals have an especially high rate of recidivism. While a term in prison is unlikely to negate the many factors
that lead a person to commit a bias crime, the rehabilitative effects of
prison are undoubtedly weak for many classes of offenders. Those
who commit crimes motivated by the need to support a drug habit, the
dislike of authority, religious conviction, uncontrollable anger, or
deep-seated alienation are likely in need of specific deterrence.
There remains the claim that "the desire to address a crime that
has a particularly injurious effect on the victim, the targeted group,
and the society at large" (p. 106) constitutes a nonpretextual reason
for bias-crime laws. These particularly injurious effects are undoubtedly central to the case for bias-crime laws. Let me, however, suggest
three reasons to doubt that their invocation is anything more than a
convenient pretext.
First, racism and other varieties of bigotry are disfavored ideologies in our society. In some individuals, these forms of bias exist as no
more than unarticulated or barely conscious prompting. A man who
chooses his seat on the bus to avoid sitting next to a person of a different color need not subscribe to a racist "ideology." Those who are
subject to prosecution under bias-crime laws, however, are often extremists who ascribe to coherent, if baseless, theories of racism, intolerance, and bigotry. Lawrence himself characterizes these forms of
bias as an ideology, and indeed, makes their status as an ideology an
essential element in the justification of their prohibition (pp. 11-12).
Bias-crime laws today are thus analogous to a hypothetical Cold War
46. Furthermore, while the end of stemming the rising rate of bias crimes may be a con-

stitutionally legitimate one, it cannot justify, from a deontological perspective, more severe
punishment. From a deontological perspective, the perpetrator's personal desert, not her
membership in a contingently expanding class of like perpetrators, must dictate the punishment. Lawrence does not set for himself the goal of developing a unified justification of
bias-crime laws consistent with both deontological constraints and the Constitution. Such a

justification, however, would be more intellectually satisfying than the diverse moral and
constitutional justifications Lawrence presents.

1694

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1678

era law providing enhanced penalties for crimes "motivated by
Marxism." Such a hypothetical law might be defended based on the
particularly great injuries that Marxist-motivated crimes arguably tend
to produce (economic instability, pervasive suspicion and fear, reactionary responses, etc.). In light of its facial targeting of an unpopular
ideology, any such defense should be greeted with some degree of
skepticism, if not heightened scrutiny. The same skepticism is appropriate for the rationales Lawrence advances in support of bias crimes.
Second, these harm-based rationales are not the ones that actually
explain the enactment of bias-crime laws. The "desire to address a
crime that has a particularly injurious effect" (p. 106) suggests a consequential desire to do something about a particularly virulent social
problem. According to Lawrence, however, "[t]he rhetoric surrounding the enactment of bias-crime laws suggests that most supporters of
such legislation espouse a thoroughly deontological justification"
based on the bias criminal's greater culpability for violating "the
equality principle" (p. 61). This deontological justification undercuts
the harm-based justifications Lawrence advances.
Finally, Lawrence himself seems to be motivated by concerns other
than the harms to the victim, her group, and society that bias crimes
allegedly cause. The most telling evidence that these concerns are
pretextual is perhaps the very language of Lawrdnce's model biascrime law. Lawrence's model statute establishes three means of committing a bias crime. Under the model statute, a person is guilty of a
first-degree bias crime if he commits any crime "with the knowledge
that.., his conduct will be perceived... [as] motivated.., by ill
will ... due to the ... race, color [or] religion.., of the victim" (p. 170;
emphasis added). A person is guilty of a second-degree bias crime if
he commits any crime "with conscious disregardfor the substantialand
unjustifiable risk that his conduct will be perceived... [as] motivated... by ill will... due to the... race, color [or] religion.., of
the victim" (p. 171; emphasis added). Given the Model Penal Code's
well-known purpose-knowledge-recklessness-negligence culpability
scheme, one naturally would expect that the third way of committing a
bias crime would be acting with the purpose that such action would be
perceived as based on bias.47 Such a provision would be consistent
with the harm-based justification of bias-crime laws, which looks to
the impact of the perception of bias. In fact, the third way to commit a
bias crime under Lawrence's statute is to commit any crime "motivated ... by ill will... due to the ... race, color, [or] religion ... of the
victim" (p. 170).
By including a provision that focuses on the motivation itself, as
opposed to consistently addressing the perception of the actor's con47. Lawrence believes that permitting liability based on mere negligence improperly
would minimize the gravity of bias crimes. P. 73.
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duct, Lawrence's model law is underinclusive with respect to the
harms that allegedly ground it. Lawrence's model law fails to cover
those who act with the purpose of causing the mistaken perception of
a biased crime. For example, outside the scope of Lawrence's model
statute would be the Protective Property Owner and the Misleading
Arsonist. The Protective Property Owner is a racially tolerant person
who is afraid that if minorities come to live in his neighborhood, the
property value of his house will diminish significantly, and thus, for
purely economic reasons, he, out of desperation, dents the fender of
his minority neighbor's car hoping that his neighbor will interpret this
as racially biased and leave the neighborhood, but lacking the belief
that there is a substantial likelihood that his act will be so interpreted.
The Misleading Arsonist is an arsonist who, before destroying a competitor's store, paints a swastika on the property on the off-chance the
arson will be attributed to a hate group and the ensuing investigation
will be directed away from him. Though the Protective Property
Owner and the Misleading Arsonist intend to cause the relevant
harms, they slip through the model statute.
Likewise, by shifting from a focus on perception to motivation,
Lawrence's model law is overinclusive with respect to the harms that
allegedly ground it. Lawrence specifically considers the case of a person who conceals his bias motivation from the victim and her community so that "no one might even suspect that it was a bias crime" (p.
67). Thus, he assumes that "the actor.., has not caused the objective
harms associated with bias crimes" (p. 67). Lawrence labels such a
person "The Clever Bias Criminal" (p. 65). If the harm-based justifications advanced by Lawrence were actually at work, one would expect the Clever Bias Criminal not to be subject to any additional punishment based on his underlying motives. Not only has he caused no
additional harm, but because he has no reason to believe that his secretly bias-motivated crime will result in additional harm, the Clever
Bias Criminal is no more blameworthy than a person who merely
commits a parallel crime. Yet Lawrence's model bias-crime law, by
permitting liability to be triggered by bias motivation alone, explicitly
is formulated to reach the Clever Bias Criminal.4"
In general, Lawrence displays admirable sensitivity to the subtleties and reach of the language of bias-crime laws. Lawrence clearly
recognizes that there is a logical gap between his harm-based justifications of bias-crime laws and his motivation-based formulations of biascrime laws (p. 64). Lawrence, however, does not even consider trying
to minimize that gap through statutes that directly address the harms
48. P. 170. Inexplicably, Lawrence states that the Clever Bias Criminal is guilty of an
attempted bias crime. P. 67. Under all actual bias-crime laws, as well as Lawrence's model

law, he would be liable for committing a bias crime, assuming that he completed an
underlying crime.

1696

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1678

associated with bias crimes. For example, statutes might create enhanced penalties where:
1. The offender acted with the specific intent to create (or with knowledge that he was likely to create) terror within a definable community.
2. The offender acted with specific intent to create (or with knowledge
that he was likely to create) a threat of further crime.
3. The offender knew or should have known that a victim was particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.
4. The offender, in the commission of the offense, intended to inflict serious emotional distress.
5. The commission of the offense created serious psychological harm
(comparable to 'serious physical harm' specifications that enhance penalties).
6. The offender acted with specific intent to interfere with another's exercise of constitutional or statutory rights, or another's enjoyment of or
access to public facilities, or another's enjoyment of equal opportunity. 9
Nor does Lawrence even consider a statute that consistently focuses
on only conduct creating the perception of bias motivation. Such a
statute would seem to be more consistent with the harm-based justifications Lawrence advances. These facts appear to undercut the sincerity of Lawrence's proffered rationales.
What does Lawrence really have in mind when he speaks of "the
desire to address a crime that has a particularly injurious effect" (p.
106)? Surprisingly nowhere in his book does he directly advance the
claim that bias-crime laws will reduce the number of bias crimes or the
harms associated with them. Such a claim would require complicated
empirical argument concerning the causes and effects of bias crime
that outstrips the current data." By "address" Lawrence means something other than "prevent." Only in the final chapter of the book, entitled "Why Punish Hate," far away from his First Amendment discussion, does Lawrence reveal his true grounds for believing bias-crime
laws are desirable (as opposed to merely permissible (p. 161)). Invoking an expressive theory of punishment, Lawrence writes that
"[t]he punishment of bias crimes is necessary for the full expression of
commitment to the American values of equality of treatment and opportunity" (p. 169). Lawrence appears to believe that such expression
has both a noninstrumental symbolic value and also some consequentialist aspect for law-abiding citizens (pp. 166-67), but his discussion in
this regard is lofty and abstract. Unfortunately, Lawrence does not
49. Susan Gellman, Hate Crime Laws Are Thought Crime Laws, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 509,511 (proposing penalty enhancement for those situations) (footnotes omitted).
50. The success of bias-crime laws in deterring bias crimes is unknown. See Staff, supra
note 2, at 64 (finding that the impact of bias-crime laws on bias crime is "relatively inconclusive" and conclusions are "difficult to draw").
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address whether expressing opposition to an ideology is a legitimate
motive for enhancing criminal sanctions for conduct based on the ideology. Could Marxist-motivated crime (or speech) be punished more
severely simply because our society wants to express its objection to
Marxism? Surely not. Relying on an expressive theory of punishment
to justify content-based punishment seems far too easy a path to
content-based criminal laws. Lawrence writes that "[e]xpressive theory may be concerned less with providing a full justification of punishment than with understanding the full impact of the punishment"
(p. 167). But if the expressive theory is the key to understanding why
a state "should" (p. 161) have bias-crime laws, and non-pretextual reasons determine constitutionality, its validity deserves closer scrutiny.
B.

Bias-CrimeLaws and Motives

At the end of Chapter Five, Lawrence considers an additional First
Amendment argument raised against bias-crime statutes: the argument that bias-crime laws violate the First Amendment because they
criminalize motives (pp. 106-09). Lawrence rejects the argument in
part because he considers the distinction between motives (which allegedly should not bear on liability) and intent (which obviously may)
to be only a "formal" distinction bearing no substantive weight. Specifically, Lawrence believes that motives are definitionally just intentions that have not been established by the positive law as bearing on
liability. Insofar as bias-crime laws establish that bias is relevant to iability, bias becomes an intention and is indistinguishable from other
intentions the law may properly criminalize. Lawrence writes,
"[w]hether bias-crime laws punish motivation or intent is not inherent
in those prohibitions. Rather, the distinction simply mirrors the way
in which we choose to describe them" (p. 109). Thus, Lawrence concludes, the motive-based argument against bias crimes cannot get off
the ground.
While I do not subscribe to the proposition that the First
Amendment contains an absolute prohibition against the criminalization of motives, I believe there is more to the intent/motive distinction
than Lawrence recognizes. Lawrence is correct that many uncontroversial criminal law doctrines could be characterized as criminalizing
motives. Burglary could be reformulated as trespassing with the motive to commit a felony on the unlawfully entered premises; the defense of necessity (or putative necessity) could be reformulated as
committing a crime with the motive to avoid a greater evil; attempted
homicide could be reformulated as acting with the motive of causing
death. The much-repeated maxim against punishing motives, how-
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ever, is not dismissed so easily. There is a core of truth to it."' As illustrated above, the motivations relevant to criminal law share a
common quality: they directly reflect the perpetrator's intent to
achieve a significant social harm or good beyond that associated with
the prohibited conduct. In H.L.A. Hart's terminology, they are "further intention[s]."52 In contrast, the criminal law has virtually never
found relevant to liability motives that directly reflect only a further
intent to achieve a socially insignificant end, such as the demonstration
of manhood, the satisfaction of a material desire, the elimination of a
romantic rival, the obtaining of funds to pay a personal debt, and so
on. 3 The irrelevance of such intentions to liability is the maxim's core
of truth. Thus, contra Lawrence, the maxim embodies more than a
"formal" requirement - it reflects a substantive distinction between
mental states that would make the actor accountable for significant
social harms or benefits and those that would not 4 Bias falls in the
latter category. To act from bias is not logically equivalent to acting
with the further intent to humiliate the victim, to spread fear through
the victim's community, to provoke a race war, 5 or to achieve any
other result, much less achieve a significant further social harm. Because bias-crime laws cannot be reformulated as prohibiting criminal
conduct with the intent of achieving any further socially significant
harm, they are contrary to the core truth of the general rule that
criminal law does not punish motives. 6 Thus, even if the criminalization of motive is not per se offensive to the First Amendment, the argument may not be dismissed as easily as Lawrence suggests 7
51. As George Fletcher has written:
At one level, the claim that motives do not typically bear on criminal liability is a technical
point about the way offenses are usually defined. But there is also a deeper point suggested
by the claim that the actor's ultimate purposes do not bear on his or her culpability for
criminal conduct.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RErHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 452 (1979).
52. H.L.A. Hart, Intention andPunishment, 4 OXFORD REV. (1967), reprintedin H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 117-18

(1968).
53. A narrow exception is MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 (1962), which provides that "[a]
person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of
himselfor of any person other than his spouse, he exposes his genitals under circumstances in

which he knows his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm.") (emphasis added). The
provision would seem more just and effective if the italicized language concerning motivation were removed.

54. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
55. Cf.Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949-51 (1983) (holding that a desire to start a
race war may be relevant to several statutory aggravating factors).
56. Cf. Douglas N. Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,

WINTERJSPRING 1989, at 3; Paul H. Robins, Hate Crimes: Crimes of Motive, Character,or
Group Terror? 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 605,606-09.
57. In a recent article, Carol S. Steiker argues that criminalizing bias is consistent with
the criminal law's general treatment of motive. See Carol S. Steiker, PunishingHateful Mo-
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In sum, Lawrence's First Amendment defense succeeds in going a
long way on very little. Abjuring the problematic distinctions between
conduct and speech and between motive and ideology, Lawrence rests

his case on a variety of relatively value-neutral, harm-based policy
ends, such as protecting victims, their community, and society at large
from injuries analogous to those caused by verbal assaults and men-

acing. Such an approach, if legally sound, still invites suspicion. Its
empirical foundation in rising bias-crime rates, future dangerousness

of bias criminals, and deterability of bias crimes is weak; its air of being motivated by hostility to a disfavored ideology is strong. Never-

theless, to anyone ,dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's treatment of
the issue in Mitchell, Lawrence's account offers an alternative ap-

proach with appeal and potential.
III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN PROSECUTING
BIAS CRIMES

The final major topic that Lawrence considers is the federal gov-

ernment's role in prosecuting bias crimes. Because there are currently
no federal laws prohibiting bias crimes per se, a compelling argument

for the expansion of the federal government into this area would be a
significant contribution to an open policy issue.

In this regard,

PunishingHate presents a generally persuasive, if not fully developed,
case that the federal government should enact bias-crime laws and
play some role in their enforcement 8
Lawrence organizes his discussion of the federal prosecution of
bias crimes around three questions: the constitutional, the prudential
tives: Old Wine in a New Bottle Revives Calls for Prohibition,97 MICH. L. REV. 1857 (1999)
(book review). She argues that all or many determinations of the criminal law to make motive relevant are "political to the core" in just the way the bias-crime laws allegedly are. Id.
at 1866 (citations omitted). She offers the example of the manslaughter provocation doctrine according to which consuming passion caused by the discovery of infidelity is partially
exculpatory. See id. at 1863. In contrast, Streiker notes, consuming passion caused by the
discovery of one's daughter in bed with a man of another race wil not be exculpatory. See
id. at 1865. If this distinction between motives is not thought objectionable, why should the
enhancement of a penalty due to bias be objectionable? The answer is that the manslaughter example involves the intention to kill and the further intention to revenge an act of adultery. This further intention is one that is considered socially valid, or at least "understandable." This assessment of the further intention undeniably involves a value judgment: the
judgment that one's status as an adulterer is, at least arguably, morally relevant. In contrast,
the status of being Asian-American, for example, is not morally relevant. Thus, to act based
on bias is worse than to act based on the discovery of infidelity, which may mitigate culpability. But it is not worse than other "generic" motivations, like envy, which involve no socially acceptable further intentions.
58. The issue of whether the federal government should enact and enforce bias-crime
laws is, of course, logically independent from the question, addressed in Part I, whether such
laws are justified. The latter question concerned the appropriate penalty level for bias
crimes. Assuming it were appropriate for the federal government to enact bias-crime laws,
those laws could impose penalties that were either equal to or greater than the penalties for
parallel crimes in the same jurisdiction.
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and the pragmatic. With respect to the first question - Congress's
constitutional authority to enact bias-crime laws - Lawrence's discussion would benefit from greater depth. Lawrence concedes that the
Commerce Clause is "a poor[] fit" (p. 152) and the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments are inadequate bases for a federal bias-crime
law because of the state-action requirement (p. 153). This leaves the
Thirteenth Amendment as the remaining potential source for the
authority to regulate bias crimes. The Thirteenth Amendment, by its
terms, expressly prohibits only slavery and involuntary servitude; bias
crimes are neither. The Amendment's Enabling Clause, however, has
been interpreted broadly to permit legislation to eradicate so-called
"badges and incidents" of slavery.59 Following such broad interpretation, racially motivated violence against African Americans could be
deemed a badge or incidence of slavery because the hostility producing such violence can be traced to the fact that African Americans
were once the subjects of slavery in this country. Bias crimes against
African Americans, however, have composed only about forty percent
of reported bias crimes.'
Lawrence's Thirteenth Amendment arguments for the constitutionality of bias-crime laws that reach beyond the protection of
African Americans are comparatively weak. Lawrence notes that in
the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court suggested that the
Thirteenth Amendment would prohibit "Mexican peonage" and
"Chinese coolie labor systems."61 The Thirteenth Amendment undoubtedly covers the actual slavery of all people both de jure and de
facto, and, perhaps, analogous institutions such as the forced prostitution of illegal immigrants, as well as the badges and incidents thereof.
It seems a stretch, however, to claim it covers discrete bias-motivated
acts of violence against groups that have no history of subjugation in
the United States. Lawrence asserts that modem cases have extended
the Thirteen Amendment's protections to religious groups (p. 154).
The cases he cites in support of this proposition,62 however, only addressed the scope of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. The Court made no
reference to their roots in the Thirteenth Amendment. Furthermore,
in those cases, the Court stated that discrimination based solely on re-

59. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3,20 (1883).
60. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1998, at 215 tbl.344 (118th ed. 1998).
61. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1873) (noting that such systems would have
to develop into slavery of those races).

62. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (holding that a person
of Arabian ancestry may be protected from racial discrimination under § 1981); Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (holding that because Jews were considered a distinct race they may assert claims under § 1982).
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ligion or place of origin was not within the scope of section 1981.1
These cases are slender reeds to support his position.
In the end, Lawrence's call for this expansion of the Thirteenth
Amendment seems to rest on the following passage:
The broad reach of the Thirteenth Amendment as understood today
goes beyond a prohibition of re-enslavement of those who have previously been enslaved. By protecting ethnic, religious, and national-origin
minority groups, the Thirteenth Amendment is now more consonant
with a positive guarantee of freedom and equal participation in civil society. Violence, directed against an individual out of motive of group bias,
violates this concept.... ." [p. 154; footnote omitted]
This argument, in my view, is too facile and abstract, resting more on
wishful thinking and an assumed shared understanding of "a positive
guarantee of freedom and equal participation," than on solid legal
authority and analysis. Lawrence devotes thirty-six pages to reviewing
this country's convoluted history of federal civil rights enforcement
(pp. 113-49). Given this introduction, one would expect greater attention to the substantive constitutional question at issue. While there is
room to argue that the Thirteenth Amendment might support broad
bias-crime legislation,64 Lawrence does not make that argument convincingly.
Lawrence's discussion of the prudential and pragmatic questions
relating to the federal bias crime prosecution is more persuasive, even
if its practical significance is less than clear. Lawrence argues that
there is a strong federal interest in supplementing states' historically
lax prosecution of bias crimes, because racial equality is an important
component of the "national social contract" (pp. 155-57). Lawrence
advocates neither a massive federal "war" against bias crimes nor a
barrage of dual state-federal prosecutions. Rather, he envisions a process in which "federal and state law enforcement work together, particularly at the investigatory stage, and then, when it comes time to determine which criminal charges are to be brought, the merits of each
are weighed" (p. 160). Such a relationship, Lawrence believes, might
resemble that between federal and state authorities in the area of police brutality prosecutions (p. 158). Would such a relationship work in
practice? Lawrence thinks that local-federal turf battles are avoidable
(p. 160). He, however, does not address the issues of whether dual jurisdiction over bias crimes might result in buck passing between local
63. See, e.g., Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 613 ("If respondent on remand can prove
that he was subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he was born an
Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin, or his religion, he will have
made out a case under § 1981.").
64. See, e.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, Rationality - and The IrrationalUnderinclusiveness
of the Civil Rights Laws, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 67 n.214 (1988); G. Sidney Buchanan,
The Questfor Freedom.: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1,
7-15 (1974).
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and federal authorities or unduly complicate investigations. Nor does
he consider whether it is a sound expenditure of limited federal resources to prosecute the typical bias crime involving minor property
damage or personal injury. Likely, Lawrence would rely on the
Justice Department to intelligently assess these matters before involving itself. It is difficult to object to the grant of power where the
use of that power will be guided by intelligent discretion. Still, one
wonders whether Lawrence's call for the federal prosecution of bias
crimes is a proposal for a significant policy change with large-scale repercussions or merely for a symbolic expansion of federal authority
with a negligible impact. Just as it is difficult to assess the validity of
bias-crime laws without knowing the amount of the proposed penalty
enhancements, it is difficult to assess the practicality of federal biascrime enforcement without knowing the amount of the proposed activity.
CONCLUSION

PunishingHate presents a well-organized and coherent defense of
bias-crime laws. Nevertheless, it at points appears to reflect an unresolved tension in the thinking of the defenders of bias-crime laws.
This tension is best exemplified by Lawrence's model bias-crime law.
This law authorizes additional punishment based on the existence of
bias, as well as the appearance, or perception, thereof. The latter condition ties into the harm-based rationales for bias-crime laws that inform most of Lawrence's defense of bias-crime laws. The appearance
of bias is the more proximate cause of the harms associated with bias
crimes since these harms follow from actual bias only insofar as the
bias is perceived. It is, however, the former condition - the triggering
of punishment by bias itself - that most raises the hackles of those
who oppose bias-crime laws. The most likely explanation for going
further and criminalizing motive is that only such a provision would
make a statement directly against bias. It is doubtful that a hypothetical bill targeting "the appearance of a bias-motivated crime" would
garner significant legislative support. Rather, one suspects, only insofar as bias-crime bills can be understood as striking at racism, intolerance, and bigotry, will they be elevated to law. Indeed, Lawrence's
desire to be seen as striking at racism, intolerance, and bigotry itself
may explain Lawrence's repeated statements that bias crimes are necessarily matters of motive65 - a claim plainly inconsistent with
Lawrence's model statute, which permits liability based on merely the
perception of motive irrespective of actual motive.
65. Lawrence begins his book by defining a bias crime as "a crime committed as an act
of prejudice," p. 9, and later reasserts, after lengthy analysis, that "precisely what we are
punishing" with bias-crime laws is "conduct grounded in racial animus." P. 79.
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One senses in PunishingHate a mild form of schizophrenia. On
the one hand, Lawrence frequently adheres to a safe liberal/libertarian
defense of bias-crime laws that turns on the harms that are produced
contingently when bias-motivated acts are perceived as such. In this
light, bias-crime laws are little more controversial than laws prohibiting menacing, verbal assault, or other plainly unprotected expression.
On the other hand, Lawrence sometimes presents a more politically
correct, but philosophically problematic position that bias motivation,
and the objectionable values that inform it, are the evils that must be
driven from our society. This sentiment arises both in the context of
Lawrence's deontological justification of bias-crime laws as well as in
the final chapter of PunishingHate where Lawrence advances his expressive account of bias-crime laws untethered to the claim that they
will reduce the number of bias crimes.
Perhaps my diagnosis is too strong. Perhaps it is legitimate to
point to the harms contingently associated with bias crimes when responding to fastidious punishment theorists or zealous First
Amendment advocates and to point to symbolic importance of equality when addressing an audience prone to reading appealing values
into bias-crime laws. But an expressive account of bias-crime laws
adds little to the debate. If bias-crime laws are not supported adequately by harm-based arguments, but trammel on First Amendment
values, enacting them expresses a lack of respect for those First
Amendment values. Conversely, if bias-crime laws are justified on
harm-based grounds, then enacting them in an open society expresses
the exact values underlying those grounds, such as the evil of humiliating another, not the ideal of equality. Ultimately, the place of biascrime laws in our society must turn on the validity of those harmbased defenses that Lawrence so well identifies, not the importance of
equality as an abstract ideal that Lawrence so elegantly articulates.

BUILDING COMMUNITY IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: A POST-INTEGRATIONIST
VISION FOR THE AMERICAN METROPOLIS
Sheryll D. Cashin*
CITY MAKING:

BUILDING

COMMUNITIES

WITHOUT BUILDING

WALLS. By Gerald E. Frug. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

1999. Pp. ix, 223. $35.
"[T]he problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the
color-line."'
When W.E.B. DuBois wrote this prophetic statement at the dawn
of the twentieth century, the American metropolis did not yet exist.
Perhaps DuBois could not have predicted the sprawled, socioeconomically fragmented landscape that is so familiar to the majority
of Americans who now live and work in metropolitan regions. But his
prediction of a "color line" that would sear our consciousness and present the chief social struggle for the new century proved all too correct. As we contemplate the twenty-first century, Gerald Frug's2
book, City Making, makes clear that the problem of the color line continues in the form of local political borders. Local government borders define who gets what public benefits. They demarcate communities by race and income. They separate good school districts from bad.
And, most importantly, they form the geographic boundary for local
powers that can be wielded by those living within in ways that can
harm those living without.
City Making attacks this problem of borders at its roots. It is an
important book that deserves serious consideration by all who care
about democracy and race relations in America. Frug analyzes our
system of local government law, identifying clearly how the current
structure of city power has "segregated metropolitan areas into 'two
nations,' rich and poor, white and black, expanding and contracting"
(p. 4). Undoubtedly, Frug's analysis will be familiar to those well-

* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.E. 1984,
Vanderbilt; M.A. 1986, Oxford, U.K.; J.D. 1989, Harvard. - Ed. The author would like to
thank Lisa Heinzerling and Florence Roisman for their most helpful comments and Katrina
Lederer for her excellent research assistance.
1. W.E. BURGHARDT Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK vii
(3d ed. 1903).
2. Gerald Frug is the Samuel R. Rosenthal Professor of Law at Harvard University.
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acquainted with the legal literature on local governance? But in the
book, he offers fresh insights in a highly readable format that should
be accessible to those unfamiliar with such scholarship.
The problem, as Frug sees it, is that our current legal conception of
the city creates a duality of city power and city powerlessness, both of
which "undermine the fundamental democratic experience of working
with different kinds of people to find solutions to common problems"
(p. 8). Affluent suburban localities benefit from a privatized conception of local autonomy because the legal system equates suburban local powers with "the protection of home and family and of private
property" (p. 7). By contrast, central cities and older suburbs, saddled
with increasing populations of poor people and attendant demands on
their tax base, are incapable of using local powers in ways that wall out
"undesirables." Thus, as Richard Briffault has argued, only affluent
suburbs are truly free to use local powers in ways that shape their economic destinies.4
On the other hand, Frug chafes at the limits states place on city
power. Cities, unlike corporations, are powerless to pursue fully the
collective vision of their citizen-members. They must rely on enumerated powers conferred by the state, rather than on any inherent
authority to define their goals and powers from within (pp. 8-9). It is
ironic that Frug is troubled by this subservience of cities to state laws
and policies, given the invitation to self-interest wrought by suburban
local autonomy. But he believes that only by reconceiving cities in a
manner that frees them to negotiate the scope of their powers can the
fundamental democratic enterprise for which cities were created be
recaptured.
Frug aims to solve the twinfold problems of local selfishness (city
power) and local subservience (city powerlessness). Proposing "a local government law for the twenty-first century" (p. 5), he seeks "to
defend a version of city power that does not rely on the notion of local
autonomy" (p. 9). He would reject the vision of cities as something
akin to autonomous individuals or sovereign nation-states - "cen3. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980)
[hereinafter Frug, Legal Concept]; Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization,60 U. CHI. L.

REV. 253 (1993); Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047 (1996);
Jerry Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (1998). See also Richard Briffault, Our Localism. PartI - The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990)
[hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part 1]; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 346 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: PartII]; Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropoli-

tan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1996) [hereinafter Briffault, Local Government Boundary
Problem]; Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the FavoredQuarter:
Addressing the Barriersto New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.T. (forthcoming July 2000, on file
with author); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994); Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective Indi-

vidualism: Deconstructingthe Legal City, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 607 (1997).
4. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part11,supra note 3, at 355,408.
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tered subjects" in the vocabulary of the theoretical literature
Instead, Frug would revolutionize local government law by premising
cities on the image of the "situated" or "postmodern" self (pp. 73-89,
92-109). In other words, he would transform the legal definition of a
city from one that equates city power with the ability to act like a selfinterested individual, in order to account for the fact that no individual
locality within a metropolitan region is an island. It is necessarily interconnected, in ways profound and minor, to the myriad of other localities, races, and socio-economic classes that make up the metropolis. By embracing these interlocal connections as part of the definition
of what a city is, Frug reasons that local government law would be
transformed so as to promote rather than frustrate regional collaboration on metropolitan problems (p. 10).
In transforming the legal definition of the city, Frug argues for "a
new role for cities in American life," namely "community building" (p.
10). By "community building" he means "increasing the capacity of
all metropolitan residents - African American as well as white, gay as
well as fundamentalist, rich as well as poor - to live in a world filled
with those they find unfamiliar, strange, even offensive" (p. 11). He
offers a number of practical suggestions to facilitate this "being together of strangers" (p. 11). First and foremost, he would create "a
wider public.., that would produce a more meaningful experience of
public freedom than is now available in many contemporary suburbs
and city neighborhoods" (p. 22). The chief vehicle for realizing this
aspiration would be a regional legislature through which representatives from disparate communities would negotiate how power would
be exercised by the localities in a given metropolitan region (pp. 86-87,
162-63). Thus, Frug imagines that intercity negotiation and compromise, rather than state control, would best curb local selfishness (p.
63). This reliance on democratic participation and negotiation, rather
than on state-level mandates, is crucial, Frug believes, to achieving
long-term sustainable change. For only if citizens experience the exercise of city power and the resolution of intercity conflict will they begin to eschew selfishness (pp. 80-81). Thus, for Frug, the route to a
more capacious metropolitanism6 is more public freedom at the local
level, not less.
In addition to these central ideas, Frug offers an extended legal
history of cities, underscoring that "a complex transformation occurred over a period of hundreds of years... that increasingly narrowed the definition of the city's nature to that of a state subdivision
authorized to solve purely local political problems" (p. 52). Frug also
5. See, e.g., id. at 444-45 (describing the localist definition of cities as "individuals" with

strictly defined boundaries and a limited range of issues that concern them).
6. Throughout this review I use "metropolitanism" to mean an ability of citizens of the
metropolis to be with, collaborate with, and support one another.
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offers a number of practical suggestions for how city powers and functions might be reconstructed in light of his reformulated definition of
the city.7 In this review, however, I will focus only on Frug's struggle
with the conundrum of city power and powerlessness. In my view, this
struggle is critical because it mirrors the real-world tensions that metropolitan America must come to terms with if we are to achieve an
equilibrium that bodes well for democracy and race relations in the
twenty-first century.
There is much that Frug gets right in this book, particularly his insightful analysis of the impact of our local governance regime in encouraging and rewarding selfish or self-maximizing behavior on the
part of localities and neighborhoods. I believe he also is correct to
adopt a realistic approach to community building which accepts that
the romantic ideal of community or full integration is not likely to be
achievable. Finally, Frug is also quite right to acknowledge the sheer
difficulty of bringing his vision of a " 'being together of strangers' " to
fruition.8
That said, I believe Frug's proposed solutions are misguided because they do not account sufficiently for the real-world realities of
metropolitan politics. In short, enacting the structural changes he suggests, ab initio, would require the type of coalition politics that his
proposals are designed to foster. Thus, it is unclear how his proposed
reforms would ever come into being. More fundamentally, I believe
effective metropolitanism will require strong regional institutions that
wield some of the power now vested in cities. We may need to reduce
the power of individual cities in order expand the capacity of metropolitan regions to solve serious problems that transcend local borders.,
Finally, although Frug is unclear about the degree of consensus he

7. In the final part of the book, for example, Frug offers an alternative way of understanding and organizing the delivery of city services, including education and police policies,
that rejects a "consumer-oriented" model premised on residency and individual tastes. Instead, he offers a number of suggestions "to transform city services into vehicles for community building." P. 175.
8. P. 116 (quoting IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
237-38 (1990)).
9. Such regionalist proposals have been suggested by a number of policy writers and
advocates. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNs, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA
(1994) (advocating metropolitan-wide cooperation); MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLrrCs: A
REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNrrY AND STABILITY 11-12 (1997) (advocating, inter alia,
regional fair housing, property tax-base sharing, land use planning and growth management,
public works and transportation reform, and an elected metropolitan coordinating structure); NEAL R. PEIRCE, CITISTATES (1993) (arguing for regional approaches to economic
development, environmental concerns, transportation, and other issues); DAVID RUSK,
INSIDE GAME / OUrSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA
147, 327-33 (1999) (advocating regional land use planning, tax-base sharing, and "social
housing"); DAVID RUSK, CrITES WITHOUT SUBURBS (2d ed. 1995) (advocating annexation
and regional governance); Anthony Downs, Ecosystem: Suburban, Inner City, J. PROP.
MGMT., Nov./Dec. 1997, at 60 (advocating regional governance and tax-base sharing).
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would require in order for a regional legislature to effect a change in
local governance, I believe affluent suburbs will never be willing to
negotiate away the degree of power and influence that they currently
wield in metropolitan and state politics.
But the chief value of Frug's book is not in his ultimate proposals.
Rather, by struggling mightily to imagine a different legal order from
the one so well-entrenched in the American psyche, he illuminates the
possibilities. He persuades the reader that the existing fragmented
metropolitan landscape is not a pure market phenomenon dictated
merely by popular preferences for suburban living. More importantly,
he should convince most readers that a change in legal paradigms is
necessary if we truly value social cohesion and the long-term stability
of metropolitan regions. In my view, there is no more pressing issue
for the new millennium. Under the current system, as the United
States becomes more diverse, we are likely to see an acceleration of
existing trends. Gated communities and homogeneous suburban enclaves that give residents a sense of comfort and control over their social and economic destinies will continue to proliferate. In turn, such
balkanization of the metropolitan polity is likely to harden attitudes,
entrenching an unfamiliarity and discomfort on the part of all citizens
with anyone who can be described as "other." As our collective capacity for empathy with persons who are different subsides, it will become much more difficult to forge coalitions across boundaries of geography, class and race. It will become much more difficult for society
to solve problems that may require shared sacrifice. Frug points us in
a different direction, offering some hope that we could conceive and
pursue a more positive course.
I.

THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS: TRANSFORMING THE LEGAL
CONCEPTION OF THE CITY

The starting point for Frug's critique is the legal definition of the
city. As he established in his seminal article, The City as a Legal Concept,10 courts struggled for several centuries with the question
"whether cities are an exercise of individual freedom or a threat to
that freedom" (p. 24). "[T]he general answer developed by the legal
system has been to identify the city with the state and to conceive of it
as a threat to freedom" (p. 24). Early American cities, like medieval
European towns, had been bulwarks against state authority. Like private corporations, they exercised a degree of self-defined authority
based upon values of property, freedom of association, and selfgovernment (p. 43). By the late nineteenth century, however, city

10. Frug, Legal Concept,supra note 3.
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powerlessness was crystallized in legal doctrines, like Dillon's Rule,"
that formally rendered cities subject to state authority. As a result,
Frug laments, "[c]ities... lost their economic strength and their connection with the freedom of association, elements of city life that had
formerly enabled cities to play an important part in the development
of Western society" (p. 53).
Frug seeks to resurrect an important mission for cities in American
society. His aim is to reconceive cities in a manner that reestablishes
their importance in the lives of their inhabitants and confers upon
them an indispensable place in American society (p. 55). In Frug's
view, this venture is worthwhile because cities "offer the possibility of
dealing with the problematic nature of group power [in the American
metropolis] by reinvigorating the idea of 'the public'" (p. 60). Much
of the book - indeed its most interesting aspect - is dedicated to exploring what private individuals will gain from the creation of a broadened public sphere. But a prerequisite to creating this broader public
is a transformation of the concept of the city. We must, Frug argues,
do away with the privatized conception of local autonomy so dear to
many suburbanites. By equating cities with individual, albeit collective, autonomy, the current legal definition of the city encourages
inward-looking maximization of self-interest and "fuels a desire to
avoid, rather than to engage with, those who live on the other side of
the city line" (p. 62). Local government law thus creates a privatized
relationship between cities: because cities are creatures of the state,
their only meaningful intergovernmental relationship is the one they
have with the state. And if a city can "seek rents" with the state, what
incentive does it have to collaborate with other localities in the metropolitan region (p. 62)?
Indeed, this is the precise dynamic that is fueling the disaggregation of wealth and political power from social service needs in the
American metropolis. Frequently, an affluent "favored quarter" garners the vast majority of its region's economic growth. In addition,
these high-growth quadrants typically receive the majority of the regional public infrastructure investments - roads, sewers, utility lines,
etc. - that fuel economic growth. At the same time, through the retention of local powers, such affluent suburbs can avoid taking on any
of the region's social service burdens and can export a substantial portion of the costs of their considerable growth to other, less affluent
localities. 2
11. Seeking to protect private property against abuse by local majorities and against
abuse by private economic power, John Dillon, in his 1872 treatise on municipal corporations, advocated strict state control of cities. Pp. 45-46 (citing JOHN DILLON, TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1st ed. 1872)).
12. For an extensive exploration of the power dynamics and public investment patterns
in U.S. metropolitan regions and the manner in which our system of local governance contributes to the phenomenon, see Cashin, supra note 3.
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Frug offers a counterintuitive solution to this problem of local
selfishness. Rather than reduce local powers in a way that curbs the
ability of cities to act in selfish ways, his laudatory aspiration is to enhance the ability of all localities, particularly affluent suburbs, to forge
intercity alliances. In a context of intercity collaboration, Frug apparently hopes that cities will reach a consensus to define and deploy local powers in a way that does not harm their neighbors. At minimum,
he believes that society will be better off if we can increase the capacity of localities "to solve the problems generated by intercity conflict
themselves" (p. 63) rather than rely on state mandates.
Frug fully acknowledges the seeming naivet6 of his vision (p. 19).
In essence, he is asking us to suspend our current conceptions of the
limited civic-mindedness of our neighbors and ourselves. He wants to
take us on a journey toward the possible, if not the ideal. And I believe it is a trip worth making because so few thinkers are struggling
with this question of how to give effect to the ideal of local (read suburban) self-determination while cultivating a sense of collective responsibility for the consequences of our individual choices.
To transform the legal concept of the city in a way that achieves
the Herculean feat of promoting intercity collaboration, Frug deploys
the theoretical literature on identity and the self. His aim is to create a
definition of the city imbued with the idea of connection or reconnection to "other." In practical terms, he ultimately conceives of the city
not as an autonomous construct, analogous to a sovereign, but as a
public entity embedded in a web of regional interconnections. If such
connections are part and parcel of what it means to be a city, then a
city's powers should be defined not by the state but by the regional
community as a whole. I address Frug's proposal of a regional legislature - the practical consequence of his theoretical critique - in Part
II, below. First, however, I will consider Frug's use of the theoretical
literature in addressing the difficult conundrum of power dynamics in
the metropolis.
Frug's goal is to formulate a definition of the city that will transform the subjectivity of the city, and its residents. The current legal
definition is premised on collective individualism. Moreover, he asserts, "local government law has endowed these collective individuals
with a particular conception of subjectivity, one that is commonly
called a centered sense of self" (p. 64). Frug challenges this "centered" subjectivity, with its emphasis on separateness - the distinction of "self' from "other." Local government law has clearly adapted
this centered concept of self to cities, encouraging a "localism" in
which regulation of land use, schools, and tax policy are determined
locally, solely to meet the desires of the residents within a defined
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border.13 Frug's intellectual project is to endow local government law
with a new subjectivity - "one that is decentered [and] ... that questions the sharp self/other distinction that now dominates legal decision
making" (p. 65). Drawing on a well-developed theoretical critique of
the idea of the centered self, he underscores that notions of the self
are contestable and subject to multiple interpretations. The idea of
distinguishing "self" from "other" presupposes that there is an identifiable "self' that is clearly distinguishable from other persons and influences. Yet the literature on the centered subject rejects the notion
of a stable identity for the self. In doing so, it offers up other possibilities for the subjectivity of the self. Frug takes this cue, formulating
two possible alternatives for "a new subjectivity for localities in local
government law": the "situated self" and the "postmodern self" (p.

69).

Canvassing the work of thinkers as disparate as Carol Gilligan, 4
Michael Sandel,15 and Frank Michelman, 6 Frug finds several sources
for the idea of the "situated self." The situated subject, like the person
who is born into but does not choose her family, is inextricably bound
by a number of involuntary associations. Similarly, like it or not, cities
and suburbs are inextricably entangled. A depressed urban core constitutes a drag on the economic vitality of outer-ring suburbs, just as a
vital urban core enhances their fiscal health.' As Frug suggests, the
"self/other" dichotomy simply does not fit the empirical reality of metropolitan economies, which operate as a region-wide system. Thus,
local government law errs in retaining an "insider/outsider framework
of the centered subject" (p. 79).
Nowhere is this embrace of the centered subject more pronounced
than in the law of zoning. A handful of forward-thinking state supreme courts and legislatures have mandated some form of affordable

13. For an eloquent, persuasive treatment on the manner in which local government law
doctrine, as developed by courts and legislatures, promotes an "ideology" of localism, see
Briffault, Our Localism: PartI, supra note 3, at 113 ("Local autonomy is to a considerable
extent the result of and reinforced by a systemic belief in the social and political value of
local decision making."). See generally Briffault, OurLocalism: PartII, supra note 3.
14. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOIcE (1982).
15. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITs OF JusTicE (1982).
16. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Frank Michelman,
The Supreme Court,1985 Term Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4

(1986).
17. Cf LARRY C. LEDEBUR & WILLIAM R. BARNEs, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES,
CITY DISTRESS, METROPOLITAN DIsPARrrms AND ECONOMIc GROWVTH 14 (1992) (main-

taining that metropolitan areas with greater than average income disparities between central
cities and outer suburbs sustained net declines in employment growth, while those with less
than average income disparities had modest employment growth); H.V. Savitch et al., Ties
That Bind.- CentralCities, Suburbs, and the New MetropolitanRegion, 7 ECON. DEv. Q. 341,
343-44 (1993) (analyzing income data for 59 metropolitan areas and concluding that areas
with higher central city income levels have higher suburban income levels).
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housing requirement that might be understood to be premised on a
regional construction of local identity. 8 But the vast majority of state
courts and legislatures have taken their cue from the U.S. Supreme
Court, envisioning zoning as a matter of purely local selfdetermination. 9 Thus, local communities are free to pursue their collective vision of the highest and best use of land, which typically results in the elevation of the single-family home over all other uses.2"
By contrast, a transformation of the law of zoning that would give effect to the image of the situated self would require zoning policies to
be "worked out not centrally or by each municipality alone but
through regional negotiations" (p. 80). Consistent with civic republican thought, this new, situated self would be formed through dialogue.
Dialogue is crucial in the republican tradition because it views identity
as politically constructed. In the words of de Tocqueville, " '[f]eelings
and ideas are renewed, the heart enlarged, and understanding developed... only by reciprocal action of men one upon another.' "21
While Frug is fierce in his devotion to this functional role of dialogue in altering citizen consciousness, he also recognizes just how difficult it will be to bring about doctrinal changes that reflect a new
subjectivity of the situated subject. This is so because:
[c]urrent law not only has fragmented the metropolitan area but [it] is
perpetuated by the kind of person this fragmentation has nurtured. The
problem with implementing [regional] reforms is the power of this status
quo. A central government's attempt to change it would be experienced
by the people who benefit from it as an astonishing invasion of their personal freedom. Yet it is unlikely that those who profit from current law
will undo it themselves. How, then, can centered subjects ever come to
embrace a vision of themselves as decentered, as interdependent? [p. 80]
Frug's hope is that the suburban inclination to self-protection will
be broken down by organizing regional negotiations in such a way that
there are negative consequences of failing to reach agreement and by
exploiting the fact that some suburban sub-groups - for example,

18. See Cashin, supra note 3 (manuscript at 45-46 & n.256, on file with author) (citing
legislative and judicial examples from New Jersey, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and
Connecticut).
19. See, e.g., Bernard K. Ham, Exclusionary Zoning and Racial Segregation: A Recon-

sideration of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 7 SETON HALL CONsT. LJ. 577 (1997) (pointing
out the historical and current power localities have had over zoning decisions); Shelley Ross

Saxer, Local Autonomy or Regionalism?: Sharing the Benefits and Burdens of Suburban
CommercialDevelopment, 30 IND. L. REV. 659 (1997) (enumerating the problems caused by

the great deal of power over zoning that localities in most states possess).
20. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (offering a

nuisance rationale for allowing the Village to use local zoning powers to segregate "parasit[ic]" apartment houses from single-family homes).
21. P. 80 (citing ALEXMS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 515 (George

Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969)).
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women, the elderly - may have special positive incentives for forging
a regional alliance (pp. 81, 154-61)."
An alternative subjectivity Frug explores is that of the "postmodem self." Drawing on literature that extends the critique of the
centered self, including postmodernism, feminism, and critical race
theory, he defines the "postmodem condition" of the American metropolis. Postmodem subjects experience living in the world without
any core sense of self. Unlike situated subjects, who see interconnections as a positive way of defining their identity, postmodern subjects
"deny themselves [the solace of interconnectedness], this hope of
bringing the mysterious hidden core of the self to the surface and
sharing it with others" (p. 94). Thus, for the postmodern subject, "relationship with others - and with the world at large - is an experience not of consensus.., but of conflicting multiplicities" (p. 94).
A postmodern conception of localities, then, would envision people as being located not on one side or the other of a city/suburban
border, but at "nodal points of specific communication circuits spread
throughout the [metropolitan] area" (p. 97; citations omitted). Under
this vision, the metropolis is "a hodgepodge of elements - shopping/office/hotel complexes, strip shopping malls, industrial parks, office buildings, department stores, neighborhoods, subdivisions, condominium communities - that is 'impossible to comprehend,'
'vertigo-inducing'" (p. 99). As they live, work, shop and play, citizens
of the metropolis cross local jurisdictional boundaries on a daily basis,
often without awareness of such boundaries. To borrow a phrase
coined by Michael Sorkin,' the postmodern American metropolis is
an "'ageographical city'" (p. 100). Best typified by Los Angeles, the
ageographical city is a "pastiche of highways, skyscrapers, malls,
housing developments, and chain stores... [an] "endless urban landscape of copies without an original - that constitute the place
bites... of modem America" (p. 100). In short, it is the urban physical equivalent of the 800-number, an area code that is not tied to any
particular place (p. 100).
To adapt local government law to this postmodern subjectivity,
Frug argues that we must stop building doctrine on residency and
should de-emphasize local jurisdictional boundaries. We must recognize that people are not located solely in one place, but that they move
daily through a variety of networks of influence that affect their lives
(p. 102). Rather than relying solely upon residency within a city limit

22. Frug argues, for example, that women and the elderly are especially impacted by
suburban fragmentation, inter alia, because of the isolation, traffic congestion, and limited
transportation options wrought by fragmented sprawl. Pp. 154-59.
23. See Michael Sorkin, Introduction: Variations on a Theme Parkin VARIATIONS ON A
THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE xi (Michael

Sorkin ed., 1992).

1714

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1704

to determine a person's legal rights, a postmodern subjectivity would
transform local government law. Eligibility for voting and our system
of local government financing, for example, would no longer depend
on physical residency within a city's limits (p. 102). In particular, Frug
argues that the difficult problem of interlocal tax-base inequity - the
concentration of tax-base wealth in outer suburbs and of revenue
needs in the urban core - would be remedied by a local government
law that embraced the postmodern subject (pp. 104-05). This new
subjectivity could form the theoretical basis for a regional system of
revenue sharing and service entitlement. And, in Frug's view, it offers
a "most promising source of ideas for changing the present-day allocation of power in metropolitan areas" (p. 106). One possible avenue to
achieving this new subjectivity would be through a revised model of
voter representation. Frug suggests, for example, that each citizen of
the metropolis be accorded five votes that they can cast in whatever
local elections they feel affect their interest.24 In this manner, he reasons, elected representatives would view themselves as having constituents throughout the region (p. 106).
In Part II below, I address some of the practical difficulties of effecting doctrinal changes premised on these alternative subjectivities
of the locality. Despite these practical difficulties, Frug's enterprise
has value in boldly challenging the dominant thinking on local govermnent organization. Most importantly, he has eloquently sketched
possibilities for basing local government law on something other than
the freely autonomous individual. He admits that there may be other
subjectivities, but he finds the images of the situated and postmodern
subjects most attractive and he feels no compulsion to choose between
the two. Both visions, he argues, stimulate alternative thinking. They
both reject the centered subject's focus on boundaries and seek "to
build a form of metropolitan life in which people across the region
learn to recognize, and make policy on the basis of, their interactions
with each other" (p. 111). The beauty of these constructs is that they
negotiate the conundrum of city power and powerlessness without
doing violence to the near-sacred value of self-determination. Frug
offers a revolutionary vision premised on interconnectedness that
leaves individuals with the necessary comfort of a local community,
which they can select and shape based upon individual preferences.
Those who want to live in communities of like preferences, race, income, etc., may do so (within the limits of anti-discrimination law).
But they cannot do so without dealing with people from other com24. A similar proposal has been suggested by Richard Ford. See Ford, supra note 3, at
1909-10 & n.221. See also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACY 149 (1994) (suggesting a system of

"cumulative voting" whereby each person would have a number of votes to distribute among
elective candidates and arguing that such a system would give minorities more sway over
who is elected, while preserving the overall system of majority rule).
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munities. In this sense, both the situated and postmodern subjectivities of local government "are postintegration visions of America: integration remains possible, but is no longer a master goal" (p. 111).
Whether or not you accept the viability of these alternative visions,
considering them seriously frees you to imagine possibilities other
than the current legal order. They illuminate the ways in which the
core incentive structure of the current legal regime - untethered pursuit of social and economic self-interest - might be different. And in
doing so, they undermine the logic of the existing system. Frug is right
to suggest that we need much more in the way of a public space to discuss these issues if centuries of entrenched popular, legal, and academic thinking are to be reversed. While I am not in agreement with
all of his ultimate proposals, I believe he has offered a powerful case
for reconceiving the legal system of local governance so as to appeal to
the better angels of our nature. In Part III below, I accept Frug's
challenge to imagine a different order, by suggesting an alternative
"post-integrationist" vision for metropolitan governance that I believe
fits better with the realities of metropolitan power dynamics.
II. FRUG'S PROPOSED SOLUTION-

COMMUNITY BUILDING AND

THE UNREALITY OF NEGOTIATED COMPROMISE

As noted, Frug's chief vehicle, for realizing his vision of a new, decentered subjectivity for American localities is a regional legislature.
He would shift the power to define the legal authority of cities from
the state government to this new regional entity. But he rejects decidedly the idea of a regional government that would exercise supra-local
powers. Instead, he proposes a regional, democratically elected body
that would take on one specific function now performed by state legislatures and courts: "defining the power - specifying what lawyers
call the legal entitlements - of local governments" (p. 86). Examples
of the types of entitlements this new legislature might allocate include
the extent to which individual localities must accommodate regional
affordable housing needs, the portion of local tax revenues that can be
used exclusively for local schools, and the incentives a locality will be
allowed to offer a business from a neighboring jurisdiction to entice it
to move across the border (p. 86). The regional legislature would have
the power to determine what entitlement questions it can decide. But
this would differ from a regional government because, once an entitlement was defined, the local governments would exercise the resulting authority, not the regional legislature. To enhance the possibility
of meaningful interlocal compromise, Frug proposes that representatives be elected at the neighborhood level. Thus, the various sub25. This neighborhood-based version of representation is offered to give effect to the
subjectivity of the "situated self." Frug would modify the regional legislature proposal to
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groups that make up an individual locality would participate in negotiations. Because no city could achieve its specific entitlement goals
without convincing fellow legislators of the wisdom of its vision of decentralization, Frug argues, the brute objective of parochial selfinterest would necessarily give way to a broader understanding of the
purpose of local powers (p. 87).
Frug's central objective of community building would be achieved,
he imagines, by giving the metropolis this much-needed regional forum for negotiating how land use and other powers will be exercised.
He would enhance the chance for success of such interlocal negotiations by causing failure to agree to result in no local powers on the
given issue. In the realm of zoning, for example, "unless an entitlement to do so results from intercity negotiation, no city should have
the right to zone in a way that excludes 'undesirables,' or to foster development favoring its residents over outsiders" (p. 163). He acknowledges that interlocal negotiation is not likely to result in a uniform distribution of races and classes of people or of commercial development throughout the metropolitan region. Instead, as in those
few places in the United States that have strong regional governance
structures,2 a central focus for a regional legislature is likely to be the
proper allocation of tax revenues generated by new development,
wherever its location. Even if such negotiations fail, as well they
might, Frug argues that the process of negotiation would be valuable
because "[t]here is little doubt that the retention of existing stategranted entitlements without the establishment of a regional negotiation process will produce more and more fragmentation and dispersal"
(p. 164). At minimum, he argues, such negotiations might begin to
mount political pressure to reverse federal and state policies that support and encourage metropolitan fragmentation.
While Frug's aspiration to promote community building through
the creation of a wider public seems correct, I believe his insistence on
intercity negotiation, as opposed to state-created mandates, is misguided. At the outset, one problem with his regional legislature proposal is that the political will to create it does not exist. Such a regional reform, in itself, presupposes the type of coalition politics, or
accommodate the image of the postmodern self by giving individual citizens the opportunity
to vote for up to five candidates from any jurisdiction (or nodal point) that reflects their
interests. P. 106.

26. The Twin Cities, Minnesota; Portland, Oregon; and Seattle, Washington regions are
among the few that have a metropolitan entity that sets the direction for land use, transpor-

tation, and other policies for their regions. Regional cooperation in these metropolitan areas has reduced or mitigated interlocal disparities of tax-base and rendered the urban core

more viable. See, e.g., Arthur C. Nelson & Jeffrey H. Milgroom, Regional Growth Management and Central-City Vitality: ComparingDevelopment Patterns in Atlanta, Georgia, and
Portland, Oregon, in URBAN REVITALIZATION (Fritz W. Wagner et al. eds., 1995). For an

extended survey of existing regional governance arrangements in the United States, see
Cashin, supra note 3 (manuscript at 42-44 & n.244, 48-49, on file with author).
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situated subjectivity, that the regional legislature is designed to engender. In short, in order for Frug's proposal to gain passage in a state
legislature, as would be required, a majority of the localities (or their
representatives in the state legislature) would have to agree to submit
their existing state-created entitlements to the uncertainties of a regional negotiation. This is unlikely to happen because, as Frug admits,
the fragmented system wrought by the existing local government regime has nurtured the "centered" citizen. Indeed, socio-economic and
racial differentiation, and the desire to escape the tax burdens of the
central city were the prime reasons behind the formation of most new
suburban localities in the past five decades. 7 And the majority of voters now live in and have been shaped by these suburban communities .2
But even assuming that Frug is offering his legislative model
merely as an intellectual idea designed to stimulate thinking about
how to promote community building, I believe his conceptual theory is
also misguided. Frug's fundamental premise appears to be that the
"centered" citizen or the "centered" locality cannot be transformed to
embrace a broader subjectivity while also experiencing a loss of
power. He views city powerlessness - the city's subordination to the
state in terms of its legal powers - as antithetical to the creation of a
broader public reaim that might enhance possibilities for intercity
collaboration. In his view, state institutions are too removed from the
citizen to enable a meaningful experience of public life, or, to use his
words, "public freedom" (p. 22). He has a similar view of regional
governments; only when government powers are wielded at the local
level does the citizen truly feel empowered to influence government
policy (pp. 80-81). And only in this manner can the citizen experience
the give-and-take that de Tocqueville and civic republicans view as
necessary for expanding the citizen's heart and perspective 9

27. See NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 75-95 (1994); GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE

FRACTURED METROPOLIS 13-15 (1991).
28. See RUSK, supra note 9, at 5. Older, inner-ring suburbs, however, have more in
common both economically and demographically with central cities than with outer-ring
developing suburbs. See ORFIELD, supra note 9, at 4. This fact has been the key to broad
intercity coalition-building in the Twin Cities area. See infra Part III.
29. See, e.g., TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 21, at 515. Several other local government
scholars, including Georgette Poindexter and Richard Thompson Ford, also adhere to this

logic and hence feel compelled to eschew solutions to metropolitan fragmentation that involve state-imposed mandates. See Ford, supra note 3, at 1908-09 (arguing that regional
administration makes it difficult for politically engaged communities to form because it alienates citizens from the decisionmaking process); Poindexter, supra note 3, at 625; see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1556 (1988) (stating
the civic republican view that deliberation and collective self-determination most naturally
occur through small, localized units of government).
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But virtually all serious regional reforms that have been undertaken in the United States have been enacted by a state legislature,
either as the result of a state court mandate, or a rare political mandate created by a coalition of metropolitan interest groups. 0 As
Richard Briffault has argued, one will search in vain for examples of
significant regional cooperation or burden-sharing that is not statemandated. 1 And this is not surprising, as Frug so powerfully underscores, given the centered subjectivity engendered by the current system. However, as I describe below in Part III, I think the possibilities
for future, voluntary metropolitan cooperation in those few metropolitan areas that have relied on state processes to create strong regional
institutions (at the expense of local powers), has been dramatically
enhanced. Indeed, these areas are much farther along than the rest of
the country in promoting a regional or "decentered" identity among
their citizens.
In sum, relying on interlocal, negotiated compromise to break out
of the status quo of entrenched self-interest is likely to be unsuccessful. Yet, the emerging regionalist models in the United States suggest
that the ideals Frug strives for can be achieved to some degree. The
means to these ends, however, will have to be different. Most importantly, in order to achieve the ideal of community-building - enhancing the ability of the citizens of the metropolis to work with each
other across jurisdictional boundaries of race and class - proposals
for reform must be informed by the empirical realities of metropolitan
politics.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE VISION: REVITALIZED DEMOCRACY AND
WARRING FACTIONS IN THE POST-INTEGRATIONIST METROPOLIS

Frug acknowledges that in addition to the "situated" or "postmodern" self, there might be other alternatives to the subjectivity of the
"centered" self. Likewise, his reconstructed understanding of the city
and its role in promoting community building also has alternatives.
Rather than permitting the continuation of fairly homogenous localities while calling upon them to negotiate and compromise via a regional legislature, one could imagine a state-level mandate to reduce
homogeneity. Of course, this is anathema to the ideal of selfdeterminative local autonomy or city power. But imagine, for a moment, what the American metropolis would be like if poor people,
particularly the minority poor, were more evenly dispersed throughout
30. See generally Cashin, supra note 3 (manuscript at 45-46, 48-49, on file with author).
The New Jersey Supreme Court's seminal Mt. Laurel decision and the Minnesota State legislature's series of regional reforms on behalf of the Twin Cities are the prime examples of
state court and legislative mandates respectively. See id.
31. See Briffault, Local Government BoundaryProblem, supra note 3,at 1156.

May 2000]

Building Community

1719

the region.32 By distributing the fiscal obligations attendant to housing
the poor more evenly, the urban core would enjoy more of the fruits
of their local powers. In other words, they would have a more meaningful opportunity to use their local powers in ways that meet their
citizens' preferences because they would be freed, to some degree,
from the often extreme economic constraints that come with having a
disproportionate share of the region's service burdens. In turn, affluent suburbs would no longer enjoy the extreme comparative advantage of being able to garner much of the region's economic activity
and wealth while walling out virtually all of the social costs and burdens that exist in the region. The region as a whole would be put on a
more stable economic course.33 Further, a concrete "being together of
strangers" would be achieved because every community would have
its share of low-income (and minority) persons.
This vision constitutes an integrationist ideal, which has not been
achieved anywhere in the United States, and which is not likely to
happen. Even in New Jersey, the state that has most systematically
attacked the problem of fair-share affordable housing, the results in
terms of integration of low-income and minority persons into suburbs
have been disappointing.' The reason this vision will likely remain a
chimera in the United States is complex. At least two oppositional
forces are at work. First, there is fierce political opposition from citizens who want to protect property values and fear the economic consequences of living near low-income people. Obviously, racism and
classism are also a part of this political opposition.35 But the economic
incentives alone would lead many, if not most, persons to oppose economic integration of their neighborhoods. Put in a more positive light,
as Frug suggests, there is also a widespread desire among all groups,
including minority groups, to live in neighborhoods that create a "we"
feeling (pp. 163-64). Second, our nation's sustained ideological com32. African-American poverty is more highly concentrated than white and Hispanic
poverty. In 1997, 58% of African Americans living in poverty resided within central cities,
while 24% lived in suburban areas. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS AND BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY, MARCH SUPPLEMENT, TABLE FOUR
(1998) (visited March 12, 2000) <http:l/ferret.bls.census.gov/macro/031998/pov/4-OO1.htm>
(placing the remaining 18% in predominantly rural areas). 56% of Hispanics living in poverty resided in central cities and 33% lived in the suburbs. See id (placing the remaining
11% in rural areas). 35% of non-Hispanic whites living in poverty lived in central cities and

39% lived in the suburbs. See id- (placing 26% in rural areas).
33. For an extended explanation of the way in which the current system of local governance weakens the economies of central cities and older suburbs while strengthening the

economies of affluent outer-ring suburbs, see Cashin, supranote 3.
34. See id. (manuscript at 45-46, on file with author) (noting that the largest and most
comprehensive study of the impact of the Mt. Laurel decision found that the "Mt. Laurel"
housing units produced were primarily for moderate, not low-income households, that over
80% of suburban units went to white households, and that over 80% of urban units went to
black and Latino households).
35. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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mitment to local powers has cloaked the idea of local selfdetermination in the trappings of individual rights. In the mind of a
new suburban property owner, there is likely not much difference between the right to exclude undesired persons from her own property
and the right of her and her neighbors to collectively determine what
kind of community they are going to live in, i.e., who should and
should not live there. 6
Thus, an integrationist ideal for the American metropolis is a political non-starter.'
That said, I believe there are other alternative
models that have a better chance of achieving Frug's vision of a "being
together of strangers" than the interlocal negotiation model he offers.
In the Twin Cities, for example, a political majority in the state legislature was forged among representatives of the urban core - the central
cities and older, inner-ring suburbs. This coalition has succeeded over
a period of years in enacting a number of regional reforms that reduce
interlocal economic disparities. Their legislative victories include laws
mandating regional fair-share affordable housing, regional tax-base
sharing, and an enhanced regional governance structure - the Metropolitan Council - which administers a $600 million budget and sets
the direction for land use, transportation and other policies in the
Twin Cities area. 38 As a result of such reforms, interlocal tax-base disparities in the region have been reduced substantially, and the region
has in place an established forum for deliberating on regional issues i.e., for addressing the negative externalities that result from unchecked, self-interested local decisionmaking.
The primary impetus for the extensive grassroots coalition that has
been created in the Twin Cities area is regional inequity. In particular,
coalition organizers harnessed the self-interest - the centered subjectivity if you will - of citizens and leaders of the older suburbs, making
them realize that they, like the central cities, were also losing in the
regional competition for public investments that fuel growth. Once
leaders like Jesse Ventura - then the mayor of an older, declining
36. See, e.g., KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION

OF THE UNITED STATES 241 (1985) (describing "economic and racial homogeneity" as "perhaps [the] most important characteristic of the postwar suburb .... ).

37. I raise the integrationist vision for consideration, however, because I believe it underscores just how much we as a society have lost after over a century of "localism." Notably, American cities were fairly integrated racially and economically at the dawn of the

twentieth century. In 1900, African Americans in urban areas generally lived in areas that
were 90% white. See Frug, The Geography of Community, supranote 3, at 1064. I mourn
the loss of the integrationist ideal because I believe it represented the best route to equal

opportunity and intergroup understanding for our country. I accept, however, the politics
that make it fairly unrealistic as an option. But we should continue to be vigorous in fighting
discrimination in housing markets and in eliminating barriers to residential mobility for all
citizens.
38. See generally Cashin, supra note 3 (manuscript at 48-49, on file with author) (describing the Twin Cities' experience in detail).
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suburb - realized that an affluent, favored quarter was garnering
more than 60% of the region's public infrastructure investments and
the urban core was subsidizing the outmigration of people and jobs to
this quadrant, they were more than willing to join a coalition for legislative change.
But this is brute politics, not a civic republican ideal. Affluent
suburban communities, that were going to be net contributors under
tax-base sharing and were going to have to open their communities to
affordable housing, were vocal, strenuous, and sometimes ugly in their
opposition to such measures? 9 In short, democracy was reinvigorated,
but, as with all democratic processes, there were dissenting voices that
ultimately had some proposals imposed upon them. In this-case, however, the political losers were the most privileged and advantaged of
communities - communities that had the fewest barriers to effective
participation in state and federal political processes and that were
benefitting
disproportionately from the existing regime of local gov0
ernance.
There are other avenues to meaningful interlocal coordination and
collaboration, if not a fairer distribution of benefits and burdens, in
the American metropolis. Recently, the issue of uncontrolled suburban growth and its impact on quality of life has fueled a groundswell
of state and local initiatives designed to better manage and coordinate
local land use. In the Atlanta metropolitan region, for example, the
Georgia state legislature recently created the Georgia Regional
Transportation Authority - a new regional entity that will have broad
powers "to impose transit systems and highways on local governments,
[to] restrict development, and even [to] put pressure on cities and
counties to raise taxes."'" The new Authority will have effective veto
power over any new development proposed by a locality that is in an
overly congested area or that does not have adequate transportation
routes. The Authority will also have power to withhold certain state
funds to any locality that refuses to participate in planned regional
transportation projects, like new rail, bus, or carpool lane routes.42
This state usurpation of local powers was precipitated by an air pollution and traffic congestion crisis that, in turn, was wrought by fragmented local authority in the 13-county Atlanta area. Because of

39. See generally ORFIELD, supra note 9, at 13. In one instance, an angry mob of subur-

ban residents occupied the city council chambers in protest of a planned low-income housing
development in their neighborhood. See id at 127-28.
40. See generally Cashin,supra note 3 (manuscript at 19-24, on file with author) (citing
empirical evidence of the degree of public investment in affluent suburbs and the extent of

cross-subsidization from which they benefit).
41. David Firestone, Georgia Setting Up Tough Anti-Sprawl Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.

25,1999, at A20.
42. See id.
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years of squabbling and competition among scores of local governments for development, the region had never been able to agree on a
regional plan for growth and mass transit. Consequently, the region
had been rendered ineligible for federal funds because of record violations of federal air pollution standards. 43 In addition, the predominately white outer counties long opposed expansion of MARTA,
Atlanta's rail transport system, because of their fear of a connection to
the predominantly black central city.'
In both the Twin Cities and the Atlanta scenarios, citizens were
able to overcome the problem of "centered" subjectivity or parochial
self-interest through an education process that formed cross-border
political coalitions based upon a more enlightened understanding of
their self-interest. A civic dialogue did occur that focused upon objective evidence of fiscal inequities or the negative externalities - air
pollution and traffic congestion - wrought by uncoordinated growth.
This process harnessed and re-energized region-wide majoritarian
politics. But these efforts would not have been successful had the regional majority - the two-thirds of the population that live in the central city and older suburbs45 - not had a supra-local forum to go to
that could impose mandates on dissenting localities.
Hence, under both of these regionalist scenarios, local powers
were reduced but the ability of the region to solve difficult problems
that transcend local borders was dramatically enhanced. These scenarios demonstrate that we need pressure points beyond mere negotiation to overcome affluent suburban hegemony. The rewards of
selfishness are simply too great, at least for some powerful communities.
But this loss of local power, particularly by dissenting localities,
does not sacrifice the community-building ideal so dear to Frug and
others. My "post-integrationist" vision for the twenty-first century
metropolis is premised on a revitalization of grassroots democratic
processes. The citizens of the metropolis must collectively decide
whether and how they will pursue a regional agenda. In my view, the
emerging issues of fiscal inequity and sustainable development will
provide an impetus for many to act. Enactment of strong regional reforms, however, will take place only after the creation of a broad coalition of disparate interests that is now all too rare in metropolitan
America. Thus, this process of building coalitions for regional reform
will necessarily build community.
43. See id
44. See Urban Sprawl To Traffic Hell and Back, THE ECONOMIST, May 8, 1999, at 23.
45. Approximately one-third of the metropolitan population lives in the central city,
inner-suburbs and outer suburbs, respectively. See ORFIELD, supra note 9, at 12-13. The
key to metropolitan coalition building in the next century will be building closer political
alliances between the central city and older suburbs. See id. at 168-69.

May 2000]

Building Community

1723

More importantly, if the majority of citizens has coalesced to create new regional institutions with supra-local powers, this does not
mean that a "decentered" identity can never be cultivated among dissenting communities. The experience in New Jersey with state mandates of fair-share affordable housing, although not ideal, suggests that
recalcitrant communities have adjusted to the mandate 6 Just as many
segregationists had to be dragged kicking and screaming to the second
Reconstruction wrought by Brown v. Board of Education'4I regionalism may be a movement in the next century that upsets long-settled
expectations created by legal doctrine. In the end, my vision is not
dissimilar to Frug's. It is, however, less idealistic. It is premised on
gritty democratic realities and an understanding of the entrenched attitudes that disenfranchise the urban core under the existing regime of
local governance.
CONCLUSION

City Making offers a revolutionary vision for the twenty-first century. If our nation were able to realize it, our society would be much
better off because the prospects for social cohesion would be greatly
enhanced. The problems with the book stem both from its inattention
to real-world realities and its fierce adherence to the values fueling
localist ideology. The civic republican ideal - the belief that local
institutions best cultivate citizens and community - borders on romanticism when compared to the manner in which fragmented local
authority is disenfranchising many citizens of the metropolis. In the
absence of strong regional institutions that enable the metropolis to
give effect to majoritarian regional consensus, fragmented localities
may remain gridlocked and interlocal inequities may persist or accelerate. In such circumstances, it will matter little to a citizen that she
might be able to influence her own local government, given that this
government will be powerless to address certain issues - like traffic
congestion, air pollution, and suburban job access - that greatly impact her life.
In light of this reality, I do not believe Frug makes a persuasive
case for why reliance on state institutions to define and perhaps circumscribe local authority is necessarily an inappropriate route to metropolitanism. If revitalized grassroots democracy is the vehicle for
achieving changes in state-defined allocations of power, the enhanced

46. See CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS

JUDGES 188-89 (1996) (noting that "almost all localities in New Jersey have institutionalized
planning for moderate- and low-income dwelling units" and that the Mount Laurel mandates
"make the local process of considering [regional] housing needs a common routine that
stands as a new norm in the political ... process").
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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public realm that is Frug's ultimate goal will have been achieved.
Given the often extreme injustices currently being visited upon many
citizens of the American metropolis, I believe the end is more important than the means. Yet, Frug has made a powerful case for how we
might give effect to the values undergirding local autonomy while pursuing a brave new course for the collective greater good. He has laid
down the markers for a debate that will become increasingly central in
the next century. So let the new century and the debate begin.

